Message ID | 20240320083945.991426-23-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support | expand |
On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 03:39:18AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > SEV-SNP support relies on a different set of properties/state than the > existing 'sev-guest' object. This patch introduces the 'sev-snp-guest' > object, which can be used to configure an SEV-SNP guest. For example, > a default-configured SEV-SNP guest with no additional information > passed in for use with attestation: > > -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0 > > or a fully-specified SEV-SNP guest where all spec-defined binary > blobs are passed in as base64-encoded strings: > > -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0, \ > policy=0x30000, \ > init-flags=0, \ > id-block=YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg==, \ > id-auth=CxHK/OKLkXGn/KpAC7Wl1FSiisWDbGTEKz..., \ > auth-key-enabled=on, \ > host-data=LNkCWBRC5CcdGXirbNUV1OrsR28s..., \ > guest-visible-workarounds=AA==, \ > > See the QAPI schema updates included in this patch for more usage > details. > > In some cases these blobs may be up to 4096 characters, but this is > generally well below the default limit for linux hosts where > command-line sizes are defined by the sysconf-configurable ARG_MAX > value, which defaults to 2097152 characters for Ubuntu hosts, for > example. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (for QAPI schema) > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > --- > docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 78 ++++++- > qapi/qom.json | 51 +++++ > target/i386/sev.c | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++ > target/i386/sev.h | 1 + > 4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > +## > +# @SevSnpGuestProperties: > +# > +# Properties for sev-snp-guest objects. Most of these are direct arguments > +# for the KVM_SNP_* interfaces documented in the linux kernel source > +# under Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst, which are in > +# turn closely coupled with the SNP_INIT/SNP_LAUNCH_* firmware commands > +# documented in the SEV-SNP Firmware ABI Specification (Rev 0.9). > +# > +# More usage information is also available in the QEMU source tree under > +# docs/amd-memory-encryption. > +# > +# @policy: the 'POLICY' parameter to the SNP_LAUNCH_START command, as > +# defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: 0x30000) > +# > +# @guest-visible-workarounds: 16-byte, base64-encoded blob to report > +# hypervisor-defined workarounds, corresponding > +# to the 'GOSVW' parameter of the > +# SNP_LAUNCH_START command defined in the > +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > +# > +# @id-block: 96-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Block' > +# structure for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined in the > +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > +# > +# @id-auth: 4096-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Authentication > +# Information Structure' for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined > +# in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > +# > +# @auth-key-enabled: true if 'id-auth' blob contains the 'AUTHOR_KEY' field > +# defined SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: false) > +# > +# @host-data: 32-byte, base64-encoded, user-defined blob to provide to the > +# guest, as documented for the 'HOST_DATA' parameter of the > +# SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI > +# (default: all-zero) > +# > +# Since: 7.2 This will be 9.1 at the earliest now. > +## > +{ 'struct': 'SevSnpGuestProperties', > + 'base': 'SevCommonProperties', > + 'data': { > + '*policy': 'uint64', > + '*guest-visible-workarounds': 'str', > + '*id-block': 'str', > + '*id-auth': 'str', > + '*auth-key-enabled': 'bool', > + '*host-data': 'str' } } > + > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index 63a220de5e..7e6dab642a 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ > > OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevCommonState, SEV_COMMON) > OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST) > +OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SEV_SNP_GUEST) > > struct SevCommonState { > X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj; > @@ -87,8 +88,22 @@ struct SevGuestState { > bool kernel_hashes; > }; > > +struct SevSnpGuestState { > + SevCommonState sev_common; > + > + /* configuration parameters */ > + char *guest_visible_workarounds; > + char *id_block; > + char *id_auth; > + char *host_data; > + > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start kvm_start_conf; > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish kvm_finish_conf; > +}; > + > #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */ > #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev" > +#define DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY 0x30000 > > #define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e" > typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock { > @@ -1473,11 +1488,237 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { > .class_init = sev_guest_class_init, > + > +static char * > +sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, Error **errp) > +{ > + return g_strdup(SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->guest_visible_workarounds); > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, const char *value, > + Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf; > + g_autofree guchar *blob; > + gsize len; > + > + if (sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds) { > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds); > + } Redundant 'if' test - g_free is happy with NULL > + > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > + sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds = g_strdup(value); > + > + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds, -1, &len, errp); > + if (!blob) { > + return; > + } > + > + if (len > sizeof(start->gosvw)) { The QAPI docs said this property must be '16 bytes', so I'd suggest we do a strict equality test, rather than min size test to catch a wider set of mistakes. > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu", > + len, sizeof(start->gosvw)); > + return; > + } > + > + memcpy(start->gosvw, blob, len); > +} > + > +static char * > +sev_snp_guest_get_id_block(Object *obj, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + > + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_block); > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_set_id_block(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; > + gsize len; > + > + if (sev_snp_guest->id_block) { > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block); > + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_block_uaddr); > + } Assuming 'id_block_uaddr' is also initialized to 0, when id_block is NULL, then you can remove the 'if' conditional. > + > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > + sev_snp_guest->id_block = g_strdup(value); > + > + finish->id_block_uaddr = > + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_block, -1, &len, errp); > + > + if (!finish->id_block_uaddr) { > + return; > + } > + > + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE) { Again, lets do a strict equality test to match the documented required size. > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %u", > + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE); > + return; > + } > + > + finish->id_block_en = (len) ? 1 : 0; > +} > + > +static char * > +sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth(Object *obj, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + > + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_auth); > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; > + gsize len; > + > + if (sev_snp_guest->id_auth) { > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_auth); > + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_auth_uaddr); > + } Same probably redundant 'if' > + > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > + sev_snp_guest->id_auth = g_strdup(value); > + > + finish->id_auth_uaddr = > + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_auth, -1, &len, errp); > + > + if (!finish->id_auth_uaddr) { > + return; > + } > + > + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE) { Equality test. > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %u", > + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE); > + return; > + } > +} > + > +static bool > +sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en(Object *obj, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + > + return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en; > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + > + sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en = value; > +} > + > +static char * > +sev_snp_guest_get_host_data(Object *obj, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + > + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->host_data); > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_set_host_data(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; > + g_autofree guchar *blob; > + gsize len; > + > + if (sev_snp_guest->host_data) { > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->host_data); > + } Redundant 'if' > + > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > + sev_snp_guest->host_data = g_strdup(value); > + > + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->host_data, -1, &len, errp); > + > + if (!blob) { > + return; > + } > + > + if (len > sizeof(finish->host_data)) { Equality test > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu", > + len, sizeof(finish->host_data)); > + return; > + } > + > + memcpy(finish->host_data, blob, len); > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) > +{ > + object_class_property_add(oc, "policy", "uint64", > + sev_snp_guest_get_policy, > + sev_snp_guest_set_policy, NULL, NULL); > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "guest-visible-workarounds", > + sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds, > + sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds); > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-block", > + sev_snp_guest_get_id_block, > + sev_snp_guest_set_id_block); > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-auth", > + sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth, > + sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth); > + object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "auth-key-enabled", > + sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en, > + sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en); > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "host-data", > + sev_snp_guest_get_host_data, > + sev_snp_guest_set_host_data); > +} > + > +static void > +sev_snp_guest_instance_init(Object *obj) > +{ > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > + > + /* default init/start/finish params for kvm */ > + sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf.policy = DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY; > +} > + > +/* guest info specific to sev-snp */ > +static const TypeInfo sev_snp_guest_info = { > + .parent = TYPE_SEV_COMMON, > + .name = TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST, > + .instance_size = sizeof(SevSnpGuestState), > + .class_init = sev_snp_guest_class_init, > + .instance_init = sev_snp_guest_instance_init, > +}; Use the OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE_WITH_INTERFACES macro here. > + > static void > sev_register_types(void) > { > type_register_static(&sev_common_info); > type_register_static(&sev_guest_info); > + type_register_static(&sev_snp_guest_info); > } > > type_init(sev_register_types); > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h > index 668374eef3..bedc667eeb 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.h > +++ b/target/i386/sev.h > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > > #define TYPE_SEV_COMMON "sev-common" > #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest" > +#define TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST "sev-snp-guest" > > #define SEV_POLICY_NODBG 0x1 > #define SEV_POLICY_NOKS 0x2 > -- > 2.25.1 > With regards, Daniel
On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 11:58:57AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 03:39:18AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > > > SEV-SNP support relies on a different set of properties/state than the > > existing 'sev-guest' object. This patch introduces the 'sev-snp-guest' > > object, which can be used to configure an SEV-SNP guest. For example, > > a default-configured SEV-SNP guest with no additional information > > passed in for use with attestation: > > > > -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0 > > > > or a fully-specified SEV-SNP guest where all spec-defined binary > > blobs are passed in as base64-encoded strings: > > > > -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0, \ > > policy=0x30000, \ > > init-flags=0, \ > > id-block=YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg==, \ > > id-auth=CxHK/OKLkXGn/KpAC7Wl1FSiisWDbGTEKz..., \ > > auth-key-enabled=on, \ > > host-data=LNkCWBRC5CcdGXirbNUV1OrsR28s..., \ > > guest-visible-workarounds=AA==, \ > > > > See the QAPI schema updates included in this patch for more usage > > details. > > > > In some cases these blobs may be up to 4096 characters, but this is > > generally well below the default limit for linux hosts where > > command-line sizes are defined by the sysconf-configurable ARG_MAX > > value, which defaults to 2097152 characters for Ubuntu hosts, for > > example. > > > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > > Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (for QAPI schema) > > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > > --- > > docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 78 ++++++- > > qapi/qom.json | 51 +++++ > > target/i386/sev.c | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++ > > target/i386/sev.h | 1 + > > 4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > > +## > > +# @SevSnpGuestProperties: > > +# > > +# Properties for sev-snp-guest objects. Most of these are direct arguments > > +# for the KVM_SNP_* interfaces documented in the linux kernel source > > +# under Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst, which are in > > +# turn closely coupled with the SNP_INIT/SNP_LAUNCH_* firmware commands > > +# documented in the SEV-SNP Firmware ABI Specification (Rev 0.9). > > +# > > +# More usage information is also available in the QEMU source tree under > > +# docs/amd-memory-encryption. > > +# > > +# @policy: the 'POLICY' parameter to the SNP_LAUNCH_START command, as > > +# defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: 0x30000) > > +# > > +# @guest-visible-workarounds: 16-byte, base64-encoded blob to report > > +# hypervisor-defined workarounds, corresponding > > +# to the 'GOSVW' parameter of the > > +# SNP_LAUNCH_START command defined in the > > +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > > +# > > +# @id-block: 96-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Block' > > +# structure for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined in the > > +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > > +# > > +# @id-auth: 4096-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Authentication > > +# Information Structure' for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined > > +# in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > > +# > > +# @auth-key-enabled: true if 'id-auth' blob contains the 'AUTHOR_KEY' field > > +# defined SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: false) > > +# > > +# @host-data: 32-byte, base64-encoded, user-defined blob to provide to the > > +# guest, as documented for the 'HOST_DATA' parameter of the > > +# SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI > > +# (default: all-zero) > > +# > > +# Since: 7.2 > > This will be 9.1 at the earliest now. Amazing how good I am at remembering these once I see a reply to a schema patch I'd already hit 'send' on :) > > > +## > > +{ 'struct': 'SevSnpGuestProperties', > > + 'base': 'SevCommonProperties', > > + 'data': { > > + '*policy': 'uint64', > > + '*guest-visible-workarounds': 'str', > > + '*id-block': 'str', > > + '*id-auth': 'str', > > + '*auth-key-enabled': 'bool', > > + '*host-data': 'str' } } > > + > > > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > > index 63a220de5e..7e6dab642a 100644 > > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > > @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ > > > > OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevCommonState, SEV_COMMON) > > OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST) > > +OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SEV_SNP_GUEST) > > > > struct SevCommonState { > > X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj; > > @@ -87,8 +88,22 @@ struct SevGuestState { > > bool kernel_hashes; > > }; > > > > +struct SevSnpGuestState { > > + SevCommonState sev_common; > > + > > + /* configuration parameters */ > > + char *guest_visible_workarounds; > > + char *id_block; > > + char *id_auth; > > + char *host_data; > > + > > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start kvm_start_conf; > > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish kvm_finish_conf; > > +}; > > + > > #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */ > > #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev" > > +#define DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY 0x30000 > > > > #define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e" > > typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock { > > @@ -1473,11 +1488,237 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { > > .class_init = sev_guest_class_init, > > > + > > +static char * > > +sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + return g_strdup(SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->guest_visible_workarounds); > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, const char *value, > > + Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf; > > + g_autofree guchar *blob; > > + gsize len; > > + > > + if (sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds) { > > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds); > > + } > > Redundant 'if' test - g_free is happy with NULL > > > + > > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > > + sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds = g_strdup(value); > > + > > + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds, -1, &len, errp); > > + if (!blob) { > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + if (len > sizeof(start->gosvw)) { > > The QAPI docs said this property must be '16 bytes', so I'd > suggest we do a strict equality test, rather than min size > test to catch a wider set of mistakes. Makes sense. > > > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu", > > + len, sizeof(start->gosvw)); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + memcpy(start->gosvw, blob, len); > > +} > > + > > +static char * > > +sev_snp_guest_get_id_block(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + > > + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_block); > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_set_id_block(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; > > + gsize len; > > + > > + if (sev_snp_guest->id_block) { > > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block); > > + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_block_uaddr); > > + } > > Assuming 'id_block_uaddr' is also initialized to 0, when id_block > is NULL, then you can remove the 'if' conditional. id_block_uaddr only ever gets initialized after id_block gets initialized via g_strdup() below, and the SevSnpGuestState struct is zero'd during creation time so no need to worry about uninitialized values. So I think we can indeed drop the if check. > > > + > > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > > + sev_snp_guest->id_block = g_strdup(value); > > + > > + finish->id_block_uaddr = > > + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_block, -1, &len, errp); > > + > > + if (!finish->id_block_uaddr) { > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE) { > > Again, lets do a strict equality test to match the documented > required size. > > > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %u", > > + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + finish->id_block_en = (len) ? 1 : 0; > > +} > > + > > +static char * > > +sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + > > + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_auth); > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; > > + gsize len; > > + > > + if (sev_snp_guest->id_auth) { > > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_auth); > > + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_auth_uaddr); > > + } > > Same probably redundant 'if' Looks like it. Will address these and recurring cases below. -Mike > > > + > > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > > + sev_snp_guest->id_auth = g_strdup(value); > > + > > + finish->id_auth_uaddr = > > + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_auth, -1, &len, errp); > > + > > + if (!finish->id_auth_uaddr) { > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE) { > > Equality test. > > > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %u", > > + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE); > > + return; > > + } > > +} > > + > > +static bool > > +sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + > > + return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en; > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + > > + sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en = value; > > +} > > + > > +static char * > > +sev_snp_guest_get_host_data(Object *obj, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + > > + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->host_data); > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_set_host_data(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; > > + g_autofree guchar *blob; > > + gsize len; > > + > > + if (sev_snp_guest->host_data) { > > + g_free(sev_snp_guest->host_data); > > + } > > Redundant 'if' > > > + > > + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ > > + sev_snp_guest->host_data = g_strdup(value); > > + > > + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->host_data, -1, &len, errp); > > + > > + if (!blob) { > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + if (len > sizeof(finish->host_data)) { > > Equality test > > > + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu", > > + len, sizeof(finish->host_data)); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + memcpy(finish->host_data, blob, len); > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) > > +{ > > + object_class_property_add(oc, "policy", "uint64", > > + sev_snp_guest_get_policy, > > + sev_snp_guest_set_policy, NULL, NULL); > > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "guest-visible-workarounds", > > + sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds, > > + sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds); > > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-block", > > + sev_snp_guest_get_id_block, > > + sev_snp_guest_set_id_block); > > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-auth", > > + sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth, > > + sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth); > > + object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "auth-key-enabled", > > + sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en, > > + sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en); > > + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "host-data", > > + sev_snp_guest_get_host_data, > > + sev_snp_guest_set_host_data); > > +} > > + > > +static void > > +sev_snp_guest_instance_init(Object *obj) > > +{ > > + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); > > + > > + /* default init/start/finish params for kvm */ > > + sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf.policy = DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY; > > +} > > + > > +/* guest info specific to sev-snp */ > > +static const TypeInfo sev_snp_guest_info = { > > + .parent = TYPE_SEV_COMMON, > > + .name = TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST, > > + .instance_size = sizeof(SevSnpGuestState), > > + .class_init = sev_snp_guest_class_init, > > + .instance_init = sev_snp_guest_instance_init, > > +}; > > Use the OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE_WITH_INTERFACES macro here. > > > + > > static void > > sev_register_types(void) > > { > > type_register_static(&sev_common_info); > > type_register_static(&sev_guest_info); > > + type_register_static(&sev_snp_guest_info); > > } > > > > type_init(sev_register_types); > > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h > > index 668374eef3..bedc667eeb 100644 > > --- a/target/i386/sev.h > > +++ b/target/i386/sev.h > > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > > > > #define TYPE_SEV_COMMON "sev-common" > > #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest" > > +#define TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST "sev-snp-guest" > > > > #define SEV_POLICY_NODBG 0x1 > > #define SEV_POLICY_NOKS 0x2 > > -- > > 2.25.1 > > > > With regards, > Daniel > -- > |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| > |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| > |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :| >
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> writes: > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > SEV-SNP support relies on a different set of properties/state than the > existing 'sev-guest' object. This patch introduces the 'sev-snp-guest' > object, which can be used to configure an SEV-SNP guest. For example, > a default-configured SEV-SNP guest with no additional information > passed in for use with attestation: > > -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0 > > or a fully-specified SEV-SNP guest where all spec-defined binary > blobs are passed in as base64-encoded strings: > > -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0, \ > policy=0x30000, \ > init-flags=0, \ > id-block=YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg==, \ > id-auth=CxHK/OKLkXGn/KpAC7Wl1FSiisWDbGTEKz..., \ > auth-key-enabled=on, \ > host-data=LNkCWBRC5CcdGXirbNUV1OrsR28s..., \ > guest-visible-workarounds=AA==, \ > > See the QAPI schema updates included in this patch for more usage > details. > > In some cases these blobs may be up to 4096 characters, but this is > generally well below the default limit for linux hosts where > command-line sizes are defined by the sysconf-configurable ARG_MAX > value, which defaults to 2097152 characters for Ubuntu hosts, for > example. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (for QAPI schema) > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> [...] > diff --git a/qapi/qom.json b/qapi/qom.json > index 66b5781ca6..b25a3043da 100644 > --- a/qapi/qom.json > +++ b/qapi/qom.json > @@ -920,6 +920,55 @@ > '*handle': 'uint32', > '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } } > > +## > +# @SevSnpGuestProperties: > +# > +# Properties for sev-snp-guest objects. Most of these are direct arguments > +# for the KVM_SNP_* interfaces documented in the linux kernel source "Linux", please. > +# under Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst, which are in Does not seem to exist. Do you mean Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst? > +# turn closely coupled with the SNP_INIT/SNP_LAUNCH_* firmware commands > +# documented in the SEV-SNP Firmware ABI Specification (Rev 0.9). docs/devel/qapi-code-gen.rst: For legibility, wrap text paragraphs so every line is at most 70 characters long. Separate sentences with two spaces. > +# > +# More usage information is also available in the QEMU source tree under > +# docs/amd-memory-encryption. > +# > +# @policy: the 'POLICY' parameter to the SNP_LAUNCH_START command, as > +# defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: 0x30000) docs/devel/qapi-code-gen.rst: Descriptions start with '\@name:'. The description text must be indented like this:: # @name: Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed # do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. > +# > +# @guest-visible-workarounds: 16-byte, base64-encoded blob to report > +# hypervisor-defined workarounds, corresponding > +# to the 'GOSVW' parameter of the > +# SNP_LAUNCH_START command defined in the > +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > +# > +# @id-block: 96-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Block' > +# structure for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined in the > +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > +# > +# @id-auth: 4096-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Authentication > +# Information Structure' for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined > +# in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) > +# > +# @auth-key-enabled: true if 'id-auth' blob contains the 'AUTHOR_KEY' field > +# defined SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: false) > +# > +# @host-data: 32-byte, base64-encoded, user-defined blob to provide to the > +# guest, as documented for the 'HOST_DATA' parameter of the > +# SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI > +# (default: all-zero) > +# > +# Since: 7.2 9.1 > +## Together: ## # @SevSnpGuestProperties: # # Properties for sev-snp-guest objects. Most of these are direct # arguments for the KVM_SNP_* interfaces documented in the Linux # kernel source under # Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst, which are in turn # closely coupled with the SNP_INIT/SNP_LAUNCH_* firmware commands # documented in the SEV-SNP Firmware ABI Specification (Rev 0.9). # # More usage information is also available in the QEMU source tree # under docs/amd-memory-encryption. # # @policy: the 'POLICY' parameter to the SNP_LAUNCH_START command, as # defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: 0x30000) # # @guest-visible-workarounds: 16-byte, base64-encoded blob to report # hypervisor-defined workarounds, corresponding to the 'GOSVW' # parameter of the SNP_LAUNCH_START command defined in the SEV-SNP # firmware ABI (default: all-zero) # # @id-block: 96-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Block' # structure for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined in the # SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) # # @id-auth: 4096-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID # Authentication Information Structure' for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH # command defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) # # @auth-key-enabled: true if 'id-auth' blob contains the 'AUTHOR_KEY' # field defined SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: false) # # @host-data: 32-byte, base64-encoded, user-defined blob to provide to # the guest, as documented for the 'HOST_DATA' parameter of the # SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: # all-zero) # # @certs-path: path to certificate data that can be passed to guests # via SNP Extended Guest Requests. File should be in the format # described in the GHCB specification. (default: none) # # Since: 9.1 ## We generally prefer symbolic to numeric / binary encoding in QMP. Can you explain briefly why you choose numeric and binary here? > +{ 'struct': 'SevSnpGuestProperties', > + 'base': 'SevCommonProperties', > + 'data': { > + '*policy': 'uint64', > + '*guest-visible-workarounds': 'str', > + '*id-block': 'str', > + '*id-auth': 'str', > + '*auth-key-enabled': 'bool', > + '*host-data': 'str' } } > + > ## > # @ThreadContextProperties: > # > @@ -998,6 +1047,7 @@ > { 'name': 'secret_keyring', > 'if': 'CONFIG_SECRET_KEYRING' }, > 'sev-guest', > + 'sev-snp-guest', > 'thread-context', > 's390-pv-guest', > 'throttle-group', > @@ -1068,6 +1118,7 @@ > 'secret_keyring': { 'type': 'SecretKeyringProperties', > 'if': 'CONFIG_SECRET_KEYRING' }, > 'sev-guest': 'SevGuestProperties', > + 'sev-snp-guest': 'SevSnpGuestProperties', > 'thread-context': 'ThreadContextProperties', > 'throttle-group': 'ThrottleGroupProperties', > 'tls-creds-anon': 'TlsCredsAnonProperties', [...]
diff --git a/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst index e9bc142bc1..9d6b63acd9 100644 --- a/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ support for notifying a guest's operating system when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function. -Launching ---------- +Launching (SEV and SEV-ES) +-------------------------- Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The ``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: ``LAUNCH_START``, @@ -161,6 +161,80 @@ The value of GCTX.LD is If kernel hashes are not used, or SEV-ES is disabled, use empty blobs for ``kernel_hashes_blob`` and ``vmsas_blob`` as needed. +Launching (SEV-SNP) +------------------- +Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The +``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: +``KVM_SNP_INIT``, ``SNP_LAUNCH_START``, ``SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE``, and +``SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH``. These four commands together generate a fresh memory +encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot images for a successful launch. + +KVM_SNP_INIT is called first to initialize the SEV-SNP firmware and SNP +features in the KVM. The feature flags value can be provided through the +init-flags property of the sev-snp-guest object. + ++------------+-------+----------+---------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++------------+-------+----------+---------------------------------+ +| init_flags | hex | 0 | SNP feature flags | ++-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + +Note: currently the init_flags must be zero. + +``SNP_LAUNCH_START`` is called first to create a cryptographic launch context +within the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide a guest +policy and other parameters as described in the SEV-SNP firmware +specification. The launch parameters should be specified as described in the +QAPI schema for the sev-snp-guest object. + +The ``SNP_LAUNCH_START`` uses the following parameters (see the SEV-SNP +specification for more details): + ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| policy | hex | 0x30000 | a 64-bit guest policy | +| imi_en | bool | 0 | 1 when IMI is enabled | +| ma_end | bool | 0 | 1 when migration agent is used | +| gosvw | string| 0 | 16-byte base64 encoded string for the guest | +| | | | OS visible workaround. | ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ + +``SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE`` encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context +created via the ``SNP_LAUNCH_START`` command. If required, this command can be +called multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also +calculates the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts. + +``SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH`` finalizes the guest launch flow. Optionally, while +finalizing the launch the firmware can perform checks on the launch digest +computing through the ``SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE``. To perform the check the user must +supply the id block, authentication blob and host data that should be included +in the attestation report. See the SEV-SNP spec for further details. + +The ``SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH`` uses the following parameters, which can be configured +by the corresponding parameters documented in the QAPI schema for the +'sev-snp-guest' object. + ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| id_block | string| none | base64 encoded ID block | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| id_auth | string| none | base64 encoded authentication information | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| auth_key_en| bool | 0 | auth block contains author key | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| host_data | string| none | host provided data | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ + +To launch a SEV-SNP guest (additional parameters are documented in the QAPI +schema for the 'sev-snp-guest' object):: + + # ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1 + + Debugging --------- diff --git a/qapi/qom.json b/qapi/qom.json index 66b5781ca6..b25a3043da 100644 --- a/qapi/qom.json +++ b/qapi/qom.json @@ -920,6 +920,55 @@ '*handle': 'uint32', '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } } +## +# @SevSnpGuestProperties: +# +# Properties for sev-snp-guest objects. Most of these are direct arguments +# for the KVM_SNP_* interfaces documented in the linux kernel source +# under Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst, which are in +# turn closely coupled with the SNP_INIT/SNP_LAUNCH_* firmware commands +# documented in the SEV-SNP Firmware ABI Specification (Rev 0.9). +# +# More usage information is also available in the QEMU source tree under +# docs/amd-memory-encryption. +# +# @policy: the 'POLICY' parameter to the SNP_LAUNCH_START command, as +# defined in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: 0x30000) +# +# @guest-visible-workarounds: 16-byte, base64-encoded blob to report +# hypervisor-defined workarounds, corresponding +# to the 'GOSVW' parameter of the +# SNP_LAUNCH_START command defined in the +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) +# +# @id-block: 96-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Block' +# structure for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined in the +# SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) +# +# @id-auth: 4096-byte, base64-encoded blob to provide the 'ID Authentication +# Information Structure' for the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command defined +# in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: all-zero) +# +# @auth-key-enabled: true if 'id-auth' blob contains the 'AUTHOR_KEY' field +# defined SEV-SNP firmware ABI (default: false) +# +# @host-data: 32-byte, base64-encoded, user-defined blob to provide to the +# guest, as documented for the 'HOST_DATA' parameter of the +# SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command in the SEV-SNP firmware ABI +# (default: all-zero) +# +# Since: 7.2 +## +{ 'struct': 'SevSnpGuestProperties', + 'base': 'SevCommonProperties', + 'data': { + '*policy': 'uint64', + '*guest-visible-workarounds': 'str', + '*id-block': 'str', + '*id-auth': 'str', + '*auth-key-enabled': 'bool', + '*host-data': 'str' } } + ## # @ThreadContextProperties: # @@ -998,6 +1047,7 @@ { 'name': 'secret_keyring', 'if': 'CONFIG_SECRET_KEYRING' }, 'sev-guest', + 'sev-snp-guest', 'thread-context', 's390-pv-guest', 'throttle-group', @@ -1068,6 +1118,7 @@ 'secret_keyring': { 'type': 'SecretKeyringProperties', 'if': 'CONFIG_SECRET_KEYRING' }, 'sev-guest': 'SevGuestProperties', + 'sev-snp-guest': 'SevSnpGuestProperties', 'thread-context': 'ThreadContextProperties', 'throttle-group': 'ThrottleGroupProperties', 'tls-creds-anon': 'TlsCredsAnonProperties', diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 63a220de5e..7e6dab642a 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevCommonState, SEV_COMMON) OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST) +OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SEV_SNP_GUEST) struct SevCommonState { X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj; @@ -87,8 +88,22 @@ struct SevGuestState { bool kernel_hashes; }; +struct SevSnpGuestState { + SevCommonState sev_common; + + /* configuration parameters */ + char *guest_visible_workarounds; + char *id_block; + char *id_auth; + char *host_data; + + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start kvm_start_conf; + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish kvm_finish_conf; +}; + #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */ #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev" +#define DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY 0x30000 #define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e" typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock { @@ -1473,11 +1488,237 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { .class_init = sev_guest_class_init, }; +static void +sev_snp_guest_get_policy(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name, + void *opaque, Error **errp) +{ + visit_type_uint64(v, name, + (uint64_t *)&SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->kvm_start_conf.policy, + errp); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_policy(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name, + void *opaque, Error **errp) +{ + visit_type_uint64(v, name, + (uint64_t *)&SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->kvm_start_conf.policy, + errp); +} + +static char * +sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, Error **errp) +{ + return g_strdup(SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->guest_visible_workarounds); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, const char *value, + Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf; + g_autofree guchar *blob; + gsize len; + + if (sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds) { + g_free(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds); + } + + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ + sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds = g_strdup(value); + + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds, -1, &len, errp); + if (!blob) { + return; + } + + if (len > sizeof(start->gosvw)) { + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu", + len, sizeof(start->gosvw)); + return; + } + + memcpy(start->gosvw, blob, len); +} + +static char * +sev_snp_guest_get_id_block(Object *obj, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_block); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_id_block(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; + gsize len; + + if (sev_snp_guest->id_block) { + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block); + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_block_uaddr); + } + + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ + sev_snp_guest->id_block = g_strdup(value); + + finish->id_block_uaddr = + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_block, -1, &len, errp); + + if (!finish->id_block_uaddr) { + return; + } + + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE) { + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %u", + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE); + return; + } + + finish->id_block_en = (len) ? 1 : 0; +} + +static char * +sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth(Object *obj, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_auth); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; + gsize len; + + if (sev_snp_guest->id_auth) { + g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_auth); + g_free((guchar *)finish->id_auth_uaddr); + } + + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ + sev_snp_guest->id_auth = g_strdup(value); + + finish->id_auth_uaddr = + (uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_auth, -1, &len, errp); + + if (!finish->id_auth_uaddr) { + return; + } + + if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE) { + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %u", + len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE); + return; + } +} + +static bool +sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en(Object *obj, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + + return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en; +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + + sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en = value; +} + +static char * +sev_snp_guest_get_host_data(Object *obj, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + + return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->host_data); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_host_data(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf; + g_autofree guchar *blob; + gsize len; + + if (sev_snp_guest->host_data) { + g_free(sev_snp_guest->host_data); + } + + /* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */ + sev_snp_guest->host_data = g_strdup(value); + + blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->host_data, -1, &len, errp); + + if (!blob) { + return; + } + + if (len > sizeof(finish->host_data)) { + error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu", + len, sizeof(finish->host_data)); + return; + } + + memcpy(finish->host_data, blob, len); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) +{ + object_class_property_add(oc, "policy", "uint64", + sev_snp_guest_get_policy, + sev_snp_guest_set_policy, NULL, NULL); + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "guest-visible-workarounds", + sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds, + sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds); + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-block", + sev_snp_guest_get_id_block, + sev_snp_guest_set_id_block); + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-auth", + sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth, + sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth); + object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "auth-key-enabled", + sev_snp_guest_get_auth_key_en, + sev_snp_guest_set_auth_key_en); + object_class_property_add_str(oc, "host-data", + sev_snp_guest_get_host_data, + sev_snp_guest_set_host_data); +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_instance_init(Object *obj) +{ + SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj); + + /* default init/start/finish params for kvm */ + sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf.policy = DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY; +} + +/* guest info specific to sev-snp */ +static const TypeInfo sev_snp_guest_info = { + .parent = TYPE_SEV_COMMON, + .name = TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST, + .instance_size = sizeof(SevSnpGuestState), + .class_init = sev_snp_guest_class_init, + .instance_init = sev_snp_guest_instance_init, +}; + static void sev_register_types(void) { type_register_static(&sev_common_info); type_register_static(&sev_guest_info); + type_register_static(&sev_snp_guest_info); } type_init(sev_register_types); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h index 668374eef3..bedc667eeb 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.h +++ b/target/i386/sev.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #define TYPE_SEV_COMMON "sev-common" #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest" +#define TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST "sev-snp-guest" #define SEV_POLICY_NODBG 0x1 #define SEV_POLICY_NOKS 0x2