diff mbox series

[v12,09/29] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support

Message ID 20240329225835.400662-10-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand

Commit Message

Michael Roth March 29, 2024, 10:58 p.m. UTC
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious
hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and
more, to create an isolated execution environment.

Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities
and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic
helper to check whether SNP is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: commit fixups, use similar ASID reporting as with SEV/SEV-ES]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h      |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c          | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h          | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Comments

Paolo Bonzini March 30, 2024, 7:58 p.m. UTC | #1
On 3/29/24 23:58, Michael Roth wrote:
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
> encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious
> hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and
> more, to create an isolated execution environment.
> 
> Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities
> and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic
> helper to check whether SNP is enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> [mdr: commit fixups, use similar ASID reporting as with SEV/SEV-ES]
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h      |  3 ++-
>   arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c          | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  3 ++-
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h          | 12 ++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  2 +-
>   6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index 728c98175b9c..544a43c1cf11 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
>   
>   #define AVIC_HPA_MASK	~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
>   
> -#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP                        BIT(5)
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE				BIT(0)
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP				BIT(5)
>   
>   struct vmcb_seg {
>   	u16 selector;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 51b13080ed4b..725b75cfe9ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -868,5 +868,6 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
>   #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM	1
>   #define KVM_X86_SEV_VM		2
>   #define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM	3
> +#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM		4
>   
>   #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 1e65f5634ad3..3d9771163562 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
>   module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   
> +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */
> +static bool sev_snp_enabled;
> +
>   /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
>   static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
>   module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
> @@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
>   	sev->es_active = es_active;
>   	sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features;
>   
> +	if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
> +		sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
> +
>   	ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
>   	if (ret)
>   		goto e_no_asid;
> @@ -326,7 +332,8 @@ static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
>   	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM &&
> -	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM)
> +	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM &&
> +	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
>   	if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data)))
> @@ -2297,11 +2304,16 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
>   		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
>   	}
> +	if (sev_snp_enabled) {
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
> +		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
> +	}
>   }
>   
>   void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   {
>   	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
> +	bool sev_snp_supported = false;
>   	bool sev_es_supported = false;
>   	bool sev_supported = false;
>   
> @@ -2382,6 +2394,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
>   	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
>   	sev_es_supported = true;
> +	sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
>   
>   out:
>   	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
> @@ -2394,9 +2407,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   		pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
>   			sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
>   			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> +		pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
> +			sev_snp_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
> +			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
>   
>   	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
>   	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
> +	sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
> +
>   	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
>   	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
>   		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 0f3b59da0d4a..2c162f6a1d78 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4890,7 +4890,8 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
>   
>   	if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM &&
>   	    type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) {
> -		kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
> +		kvm->arch.has_protected_state =
> +			(type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
>   		to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
>   	}
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 157eb3f65269..4a01a81dd9b9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -348,6 +348,18 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
>   #endif
>   }
>   
> +static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) &&
> +	       !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm));
> +#else
> +	return false;
> +#endif
> +}
> +
>   static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
>   {
>   	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 64eda7949f09..f85735b6235d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12603,7 +12603,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
>   
>   	kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
>   	kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
> -		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
> +		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
>   
>   	ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
>   	if (ret)

Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Paolo
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 728c98175b9c..544a43c1cf11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -285,7 +285,8 @@  static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
 
 #define AVIC_HPA_MASK	~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
 
-#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP                        BIT(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE				BIT(0)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP				BIT(5)
 
 struct vmcb_seg {
 	u16 selector;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 51b13080ed4b..725b75cfe9ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -868,5 +868,6 @@  struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
 #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM	1
 #define KVM_X86_SEV_VM		2
 #define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM	3
+#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM		4
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1e65f5634ad3..3d9771163562 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@  module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
+/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */
+static bool sev_snp_enabled;
+
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
 static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
@@ -275,6 +278,9 @@  static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
 	sev->es_active = es_active;
 	sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features;
 
+	if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
+		sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
+
 	ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
 	if (ret)
 		goto e_no_asid;
@@ -326,7 +332,8 @@  static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM &&
-	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM)
+	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM &&
+	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data)))
@@ -2297,11 +2304,16 @@  void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
 		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
 	}
+	if (sev_snp_enabled) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+	}
 }
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
+	bool sev_snp_supported = false;
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
@@ -2382,6 +2394,7 @@  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
 	sev_es_supported = true;
+	sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
 
 out:
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
@@ -2394,9 +2407,15 @@  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 		pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
 			sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
 			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+		pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
+			sev_snp_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
+			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
 
 	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
 	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+	sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
+
 	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
 		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 0f3b59da0d4a..2c162f6a1d78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4890,7 +4890,8 @@  static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 	if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM &&
 	    type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) {
-		kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+		kvm->arch.has_protected_state =
+			(type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
 		to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 157eb3f65269..4a01a81dd9b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -348,6 +348,18 @@  static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 #endif
 }
 
+static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) &&
+	       !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm));
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
 static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
 	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 64eda7949f09..f85735b6235d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12603,7 +12603,7 @@  int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
 
 	kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
 	kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
-		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
 
 	ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
 	if (ret)