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Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com; client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C Received: from SATLEXMB04.amd.com (165.204.84.17) by SJ1PEPF00001CDF.mail.protection.outlook.com (10.167.242.7) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.20.7409.10 via Frontend Transport; Fri, 29 Mar 2024 22:59:23 +0000 Received: from localhost (10.180.168.240) by SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.35; Fri, 29 Mar 2024 17:59:21 -0500 From: Michael Roth To: CC: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v12 10/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 17:58:16 -0500 Message-ID: <20240329225835.400662-11-michael.roth@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20240329225835.400662-1-michael.roth@amd.com> References: <20240329225835.400662-1-michael.roth@amd.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: SJ1PEPF00001CDF:EE_|PH8PR12MB6721:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: a9179cff-2565-428c-c1f4-08dc5043e056 X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:ErrorRetry;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230031)(7416005)(36860700004)(82310400014)(376005)(1800799015);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 29 Mar 2024 22:59:23.5330 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: a9179cff-2565-428c-c1f4-08dc5043e056 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: SJ1PEPF00001CDF.namprd05.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: PH8PR12MB6721 From: Brijesh Singh KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START begins the launch process for an SEV-SNP guest. The command initializes a cryptographic digest context used to construct the measurement of the guest. Other commands can then at that point be used to load/encrypt data into the guest's initial launch image. For more information see the SEV-SNP specification. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra [mdr: hold sev_deactivate_lock when calling SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION] Signed-off-by: Michael Roth --- .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 23 ++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 8 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst index f7c007d34114..a10b817c162d 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -459,6 +459,25 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error +18. KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START +---------------------------- + +The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption +context for the SEV-SNP guest. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { + __u64 policy; /* Guest policy to use. */ + __u8 gosvw[16]; /* Guest OS visible workarounds. */ + }; + +See the SEV-SNP spec [snp-fw-abi]_ for further detail on the launch input. + Device attribute API ==================== @@ -490,9 +509,11 @@ References ========== -See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_ and [kvm-forum]_ for more info. +See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_, [kvm-forum]_, and [snp-fw-abi]_ +for more info. .. [white-paper] https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf .. [api-spec] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf .. [amd-apm] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34) .. [kvm-forum] https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf +.. [snp-fw-abi] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 725b75cfe9ff..350ddd5264ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -693,6 +693,9 @@ enum sev_cmd_id { /* Second time is the charm; improved versions of the above ioctls. */ KVM_SEV_INIT2, + /* SNP-specific commands */ + KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, }; @@ -818,6 +821,11 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { __u32 pad2; }; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { + __u64 policy; + __u8 gosvw[16]; +}; + #define KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS (1ULL << 0) #define KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK (1ULL << 1) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 3d9771163562..6c7c77e33e62 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "mmu.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -58,6 +59,10 @@ static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features; #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT 1 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO 2 +/* As defined by SEV-SNP Firmware ABI, under "Guest Policy". */ +#define SNP_POLICY_MASK_SMT BIT_ULL(16) +#define SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET BIT_ULL(20) + static u8 sev_enc_bit; static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock); static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock); @@ -68,6 +73,8 @@ static unsigned int nr_asids; static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap; +static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm); + struct enc_region { struct list_head list; unsigned long npages; @@ -94,12 +101,17 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid) down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); - ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error); + + if (sev_snp_enabled) + ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, &error); + else + ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error); up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); if (ret) - pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error); + pr_err("SEV%s: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", + sev_snp_enabled ? "-SNP" : "", ret, error); return ret; } @@ -1967,6 +1979,102 @@ int sev_dev_get_attr(u64 attr, u64 *val) } } +/* + * The guest context contains all the information, keys and metadata + * associated with the guest that the firmware tracks to implement SEV + * and SNP features. The firmware stores the guest context in hypervisor + * provide page via the SNP_GCTX_CREATE command. + */ +static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {}; + void *context; + int rc; + + /* Allocate memory for context page */ + context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!context) + return NULL; + + data.address = __psp_pa(context); + rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error); + if (rc) { + pr_warn("Failed to create SEV-SNP context, rc %d fw_error %d", + rc, argp->error); + snp_free_firmware_page(context); + return NULL; + } + + return context; +} + +static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_snp_activate data = {0}; + + data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context); + data.asid = sev_get_asid(kvm); + return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE, &data, error); +} + +static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_snp_launch_start start = {0}; + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start params; + int rc; + + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Don't allow userspace to allocate memory for more than 1 SNP context. */ + if (sev->snp_context) { + pr_debug("SEV-SNP context already exists. Refusing to allocate an additional one."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp); + if (!sev->snp_context) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET) { + pr_debug("SEV-SNP hypervisor does not support limiting guests to a single socket."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!(params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_SMT)) { + pr_debug("SEV-SNP hypervisor does not support limiting guests to a single SMT thread."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context); + start.policy = params.policy; + memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw)); + rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error); + if (rc) { + pr_debug("SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START command failed, rc %d\n", rc); + goto e_free_context; + } + + sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; + rc = snp_bind_asid(kvm, &argp->error); + if (rc) { + pr_debug("Failed to bind ASID to SEV-SNP context, rc %d\n", rc); + goto e_free_context; + } + + return 0; + +e_free_context: + snp_decommission_context(kvm); + + return rc; +} + int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -2054,6 +2162,9 @@ int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START: + r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -2249,6 +2360,33 @@ int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) return ret; } +static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {}; + int ret; + + /* If context is not created then do nothing */ + if (!sev->snp_context) + return 0; + + data.address = __sme_pa(sev->snp_context); + down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); + ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION, &data, NULL); + if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to release guest context")) { + up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); + return ret; + } + + up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock); + + /* free the context page now */ + snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context); + sev->snp_context = NULL; + + return 0; +} + void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; @@ -2290,7 +2428,15 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) } } - sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); + if (sev_snp_guest(kvm)) { + if (snp_decommission_context(kvm)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "Failed to free SNP guest context, leaking asid!\n"); + return; + } + } else { + sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); + } + sev_asid_free(sev); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 4a01a81dd9b9..a3c190642c57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { struct list_head mirror_entry; /* Use as a list entry of mirrors */ struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */ atomic_t migration_in_progress; + void *snp_context; /* SNP guest context page */ }; struct kvm_svm {