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Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com; client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C Received: from SATLEXMB04.amd.com (165.204.84.17) by SJ1PEPF00001CDC.mail.protection.outlook.com (10.167.242.4) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.20.7409.10 via Frontend Transport; Fri, 29 Mar 2024 23:00:10 +0000 Received: from localhost (10.180.168.240) by SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.35; Fri, 29 Mar 2024 18:00:03 -0500 From: Michael Roth To: CC: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v12 11/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 17:58:17 -0500 Message-ID: <20240329225835.400662-12-michael.roth@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20240329225835.400662-1-michael.roth@amd.com> References: <20240329225835.400662-1-michael.roth@amd.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: SJ1PEPF00001CDC:EE_|DM6PR12MB4106:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: c27c7199-0608-4e58-824a-08dc5043fc68 X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; 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X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 29 Mar 2024 23:00:10.6256 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: c27c7199-0608-4e58-824a-08dc5043fc68 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: SJ1PEPF00001CDC.namprd05.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: DM6PR12MB4106 From: Brijesh Singh A key aspect of a launching an SNP guest is initializing it with a known/measured payload which is then encrypted into guest memory as pre-validated private pages and then measured into the cryptographic launch context created with KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START so that the guest can attest itself after booting. Since all private pages are provided by guest_memfd, make use of the kvm_gmem_populate() interface to handle this. The general flow is that guest_memfd will handle allocating the pages associated with the GPA ranges being initialized by each particular call of KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, copying data from userspace into those pages, and then the post_populate callback will do the work of setting the RMP entries for these pages to private and issuing the SNP firmware calls to encrypt/measure them. For more information see the SEV-SNP specification. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Co-developed-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra --- .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 39 ++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 15 ++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 265 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst index a10b817c162d..4268aa5c380e 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -478,6 +478,45 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error See the SEV-SNP spec [snp-fw-abi]_ for further detail on the launch input. +19. KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE +----------------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command is used for loading userspace-provided +data into a guest GPA range, measuring the contents into the SNP guest context +created by KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, and then encrypting/validating that GPA +range so that it will be immediately readable using the encryption key +associated with the guest context once it is booted, after which point it can +attest the measurement associated with its context before unlocking any +secrets. + +It is required that the GPA ranges initialized by this command have had the +KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE attribute set in advance. See the documentation +for KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES for more details on this aspect. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update { + __u64 gfn_start; /* Guest page number to load/encrypt data into. */ + __u64 uaddr; /* Userspace address of data to be loaded/encrypted. */ + __u32 len; /* 4k-aligned length in bytes to copy into guest memory.*/ + __u8 type; /* The type of the guest pages being initialized. */ + }; + +where the allowed values for page_type are #define'd as:: + + KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL + KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO + KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED + KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS + KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID + +See the SEV-SNP spec [snp-fw-abi]_ for further details on how each page type is +used/measured. + Device attribute API ==================== diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 350ddd5264ea..956eb548c08e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ enum sev_cmd_id { /* SNP-specific commands */ KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, + KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, }; @@ -826,6 +827,20 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { __u8 gosvw[16]; }; +/* Kept in sync with firmware values for simplicity. */ +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS 0x5 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID 0x6 + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update { + __u64 gfn_start; + __u64 uaddr; + __u32 len; + __u8 type; +}; + #define KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS (1ULL << 0) #define KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK (1ULL << 1) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 6c7c77e33e62..a8a8a285b4a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -247,6 +247,35 @@ static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle) sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL); } +static int snp_page_reclaim(u64 pfn) +{ + struct sev_data_snp_page_reclaim data = {0}; + int err, rc; + + data.paddr = __sme_set(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); + rc = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM, &data, &err); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rc)) { + /* + * This shouldn't happen under normal circumstances, but if the + * reclaim failed, then the page is no longer safe to use. + */ + snp_leak_pages(pfn, 1); + } + + return rc; +} + +static int host_rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level, bool leak) +{ + int rc; + + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, level); + if (rc && leak) + snp_leak_pages(pfn, page_level_size(level) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + + return rc; +} + static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle) { struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate; @@ -2075,6 +2104,185 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return rc; } +struct sev_gmem_populate_args { + __u8 type; + int sev_fd; + int fw_error; +}; + +static int sev_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, + gfn_t gfn_start, kvm_pfn_t pfn, void __user *src, + int order, void *opaque) +{ + struct sev_gmem_populate_args *sev_populate_args = opaque; + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + int npages = (1 << order); + int n_private = 0; + int ret, i; + gfn_t gfn; + + pr_debug("%s: gfn_start %llx pfn_start %llx npages %d\n", + __func__, gfn_start, pfn, npages); + + for (gfn = gfn_start, i = 0; gfn < gfn_start + npages; gfn++, i++) { + struct sev_data_snp_launch_update fw_args = {0}; + bool assigned; + int level; + + if (!kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn)) { + pr_debug("%s: Failed to ensure GFN 0x%llx has private memory attribute set\n", + __func__, gfn); + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + ret = snp_lookup_rmpentry((u64)pfn + i, &assigned, &level); + if (ret || assigned) { + pr_debug("%s: Failed to ensure GFN 0x%llx RMP entry is initial shared state, ret: %d assigned: %d\n", + __func__, gfn, ret, assigned); + break; + } + + ret = rmp_make_private(pfn + i, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, PG_LEVEL_4K, + sev_get_asid(kvm), true); + if (ret) { + pr_debug("%s: Failed to convert GFN 0x%llx to private, ret: %d\n", + __func__, gfn, ret); + break; + } + + n_private++; + + fw_args.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context); + fw_args.address = __sme_set(pfn_to_hpa(pfn + i)); + fw_args.page_size = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(PG_LEVEL_4K); + fw_args.page_type = sev_populate_args->type; + ret = __sev_issue_cmd(sev_populate_args->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, + &fw_args, &sev_populate_args->fw_error); + if (ret) { + pr_debug("%s: SEV-SNP launch update failed, ret: 0x%x, fw_error: 0x%x\n", + __func__, ret, sev_populate_args->fw_error); + + if (snp_page_reclaim(pfn + i)) + break; + + /* + * When invalid CPUID function entries are detected, + * firmware writes the expected values into the page and + * leaves it unencrypted so it can be used for debugging + * and error-reporting. + * + * Copy this page back into the source buffer so + * userspace can use this information to provide + * information on which CPUID leaves/fields failed CPUID + * validation. + */ + if (sev_populate_args->type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID && + sev_populate_args->fw_error == SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM) { + void *vaddr; + + host_rmp_make_shared(pfn + i, PG_LEVEL_4K, true); + vaddr = kmap_local_pfn(pfn + i); + + if (copy_to_user(src + i * PAGE_SIZE, + vaddr, PAGE_SIZE)) + pr_debug("Failed to write CPUID page back to userspace\n"); + + kunmap_local(vaddr); + } + + break; + } + } + + if (ret) { + pr_debug("%s: exiting with error ret %d, undoing %d populated gmem pages.\n", + __func__, ret, n_private); + for (i = 0; i < n_private; i++) + host_rmp_make_shared(pfn + i, PG_LEVEL_4K, true); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_gmem_populate_args sev_populate_args = {0}; + struct kvm_gmem_populate_args populate_args = {0}; + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update params; + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; + unsigned int npages; + int ret = 0; + + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm) || !sev->snp_context) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(params.len, PAGE_SIZE) || + (params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL && + params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO && + params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED && + params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS && + params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID)) + return -EINVAL; + + npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE; + + pr_debug("%s: GFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx type %d\n", __func__, + params.gfn_start, params.gfn_start + npages, params.type); + + /* + * For each GFN that's being prepared as part of the initial guest + * state, the following pre-conditions are verified: + * + * 1) The backing memslot is a valid private memslot. + * 2) The GFN has been set to private via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + * beforehand. + * 3) The PFN of the guest_memfd has not already been set to private + * in the RMP table. + * + * The KVM MMU relies on kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq to retry nested page + * faults if there's a race between a fault and an attribute update via + * KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, and a similar approach could be utilized + * here. However, kvm->slots_lock guards against both this as well as + * concurrent memslot updates occurring while these checks are being + * performed, so use that here to make it easier to reason about the + * initial expected state and better guard against unexpected + * situations. + */ + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); + + memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, params.gfn_start); + if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + sev_populate_args.sev_fd = argp->sev_fd; + sev_populate_args.type = params.type; + + populate_args.opaque = &sev_populate_args; + populate_args.gfn = params.gfn_start; + populate_args.src = u64_to_user_ptr(params.uaddr); + populate_args.npages = npages; + populate_args.do_memcpy = params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO; + populate_args.post_populate = sev_gmem_post_populate; + + ret = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, memslot, &populate_args); + if (ret) { + argp->error = sev_populate_args.fw_error; + pr_debug("%s: kvm_gmem_populate failed, ret %d\n", __func__, ret); + } + +out: + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); + + return ret; +} + int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -2165,6 +2373,9 @@ int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START: r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE: + r = snp_launch_update(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out;