| Message ID | 20240404185034.3184582-3-pbonzini@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KVM: guest_memfd: New hooks and functionality for SEV-SNP and TDX | expand |
On 4/4/24 8:50 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > > truncate_inode_pages_range() may attempt to zero pages before truncating > them, and this will occur before arch-specific invalidations can be > triggered via .invalidate_folio/.free_folio hooks via kvm_gmem_aops. For > AMD SEV-SNP this would result in an RMP #PF being generated by the > hardware, which is currently treated as fatal (and even if specifically > allowed for, would not result in anything other than garbage being > written to guest pages due to encryption). On Intel TDX this would also > result in undesirable behavior. > > Set the AS_INACCESSIBLE flag to prevent the MM from attempting > unexpected accesses of this sort during operations like truncation. > > This may also in some cases yield a decent performance improvement for > guest_memfd userspace implementations that hole-punch ranges immediately > after private->shared conversions via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, since > the current implementation of truncate_inode_pages_range() always ends > up zero'ing an entire 4K range if it is backing by a 2M folio. > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZR9LYhpxTaTk6PJX@google.com/ > Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > Message-ID: <20240329212444.395559-6-michael.roth@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> > --- > virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 1 + > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) > > diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c > index 0f4e0cf4f158..5a929536ecf2 100644 > --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c > +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c > @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags) > inode->i_private = (void *)(unsigned long)flags; > inode->i_op = &kvm_gmem_iops; > inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &kvm_gmem_aops; > + inode->i_mapping->flags |= AS_INACCESSIBLE; > inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; > inode->i_size = size; > mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c index 0f4e0cf4f158..5a929536ecf2 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags) inode->i_private = (void *)(unsigned long)flags; inode->i_op = &kvm_gmem_iops; inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &kvm_gmem_aops; + inode->i_mapping->flags |= AS_INACCESSIBLE; inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; inode->i_size = size; mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);