diff mbox series

[v3,02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1

Message ID 20241001050110.3643764-3-xin@zytor.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Enable FRED with KVM VMX | expand

Commit Message

Xin Li Oct. 1, 2024, 5 a.m. UTC
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Don't update the guest's XFD_ERR MSR if CR0.TS is set; per the SDM,
XFD_ERR is not modified if CR0.TS=1.  Although it's not explicitly stated
in the SDM, conceptually it makes sense the CR0.TS check would be done
prior to the XFD_ERR check, e.g. CR0.TS=1 blocks all SIMD state, whereas
XFD blocks only XTILE state.

  Device-not-available exceptions that are not due to XFD - those
  resulting from setting CR0.TS to 1 - do not modify the IA32_XFD_ERR MSR.

Opportunistically update the comment to call out that XFD_ERR is updated
before the VM-Exit check occurs.  Nothing in the SDM explicitly calls out
this behavior, but logically it must be the behavior, otherwise reading
XFD_ERR in handle_nm_fault_irqoff() would return stale data, i.e. the
to-be-delivered XFD_ERR value would need to be saved in EXIT_QUALIFICATION,
a la DR6 for #DB and CR2 for #PF, so that software could capture the guest
value.

Fixes: ec5be88ab29f ("kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 6a93f5edbc0d..3f6257d88ded 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6976,16 +6976,16 @@  static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
 	 * has chance to consume it.
 	 *
-	 * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
-	 * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
-	 * support xfd at all.
+	 * Update the guest's XFD_ERR if and only if XFD is enabled, as the #NM
+	 * interception may have been caused by L1 interception.  Per the SDM,
+	 * XFD_ERR is not modified if CR0.TS=1.
 	 *
-	 * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
-	 * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
-	 *
-	 * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+	 * Note, XFD_ERR is updated _before_ the #NM interception check, i.e.
+	 * unlike CR2 and DR6, the value is not a payload that is attached to
+	 * the #NM exception.
 	 */
-	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd &&
+	    !kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_TS))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
 }