diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index 50f5666938c0..6ef92432a5ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ struct snp_psc_desc {
 #define GHCB_TERM_NO_SVSM		7	/* SVSM is not advertised in the secrets page */
 #define GHCB_TERM_SVSM_VMPL0		8	/* SVSM is present but has set VMPL to 0 */
 #define GHCB_TERM_SVSM_CAA		9	/* SVSM is present but CAA is not page aligned */
+#define GHCB_TERM_SECURE_TSC		10	/* Secure TSC initialization failed */
 
 #define GHCB_RESP_CODE(v)		((v) & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 0937ac7a96db..bdcdaac4df1c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ enum msg_type {
 	SNP_MSG_VMRK_REQ,
 	SNP_MSG_VMRK_RSP,
 
+	SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_REQ = 17,
+	SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_RSP,
+
 	SNP_MSG_TYPE_MAX
 };
 
@@ -174,6 +177,21 @@ struct snp_guest_msg {
 	u8 payload[PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg_hdr)];
 } __packed;
 
+#define SNP_TSC_INFO_REQ_SZ	128
+
+struct snp_tsc_info_req {
+	u8 rsvd[SNP_TSC_INFO_REQ_SZ];
+} __packed;
+
+struct snp_tsc_info_resp {
+	u32 status;
+	u32 rsvd1;
+	u64 tsc_scale;
+	u64 tsc_offset;
+	u32 tsc_factor;
+	u8 rsvd2[100];
+} __packed;
+
 struct snp_guest_req {
 	void *req_buf;
 	size_t req_sz;
@@ -463,6 +481,8 @@ void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc);
 int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req,
 			   struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
 
+void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void);
+
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
 #define snp_vmpl 0
@@ -503,6 +523,7 @@ static inline struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) { return NULL; }
 static inline void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { }
 static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req,
 					 struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 2b59b9951c90..92e18798f197 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -417,7 +417,9 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {
 	u8 reserved_0x298[80];
 	u32 pkru;
 	u32 tsc_aux;
-	u8 reserved_0x2f0[24];
+	u64 tsc_scale;
+	u64 tsc_offset;
+	u8 reserved_0x300[8];
 	u64 rcx;
 	u64 rdx;
 	u64 rbx;
@@ -564,7 +566,7 @@ static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x1c0);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x248);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x298);
-	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x2f0);
+	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x300);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x320);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x380);
 	BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET(sev_es_save_area, 0x3f0);
diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
index caa4b4430634..0bf7d33a1048 100644
--- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
+++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
@@ -81,6 +81,14 @@ enum cc_attr {
 	 */
 	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP,
 
+	/**
+	 * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC: SNP Secure TSC is active.
+	 *
+	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and actively
+	 * using AMD SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature.
+	 */
+	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC,
+
 	/**
 	 * @CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP: AMD SNP enabled on the host.
 	 *
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
index 0f81f70aca82..715c2c09582f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP:
 		return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED;
 
+	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC:
+		return (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED) &&
+			(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC);
+
 	case CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP:
 		return cc_flags.host_sev_snp;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index feb145df6bf7..00a0ac3baab7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ static u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
 /* Secrets page physical address from the CC blob */
 static u64 secrets_pa __ro_after_init;
 
+/*
+ * For Secure TSC guests, the BSP fetches TSC_INFO using SNP guest messaging and
+ * initializes snp_tsc_scale and snp_tsc_offset. These values are replicated
+ * across the APs VMSA fields (TSC_SCALE and TSC_OFFSET).
+ */
+static u64 snp_tsc_scale __ro_after_init;
+static u64 snp_tsc_offset __ro_after_init;
+
 /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */
 struct sev_es_runtime_data {
 	struct ghcb ghcb_page;
@@ -1272,6 +1280,12 @@ static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip)
 	vmsa->vmpl		= snp_vmpl;
 	vmsa->sev_features	= sev_status >> 2;
 
+	/* Populate AP's TSC scale/offset to get accurate TSC values. */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC)) {
+		vmsa->tsc_scale = snp_tsc_scale;
+		vmsa->tsc_offset = snp_tsc_offset;
+	}
+
 	/* Switch the page over to a VMSA page now that it is initialized */
 	ret = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, caa, apic_id, true);
 	if (ret) {
@@ -3121,3 +3135,96 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_send_guest_request);
+
+static int __init snp_get_tsc_info(void)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio;
+	struct snp_tsc_info_resp *tsc_resp;
+	struct snp_tsc_info_req *tsc_req;
+	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
+	struct snp_guest_req *req;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	tsc_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*tsc_req), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsc_req)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
+	 * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover
+	 * the authtag.
+	 */
+	tsc_resp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsc_resp)
+		goto e_free_tsc_req;
+
+	req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto e_free_tsc_resp;
+
+	rio = kzalloc(sizeof(*rio), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rio)
+		goto e_free_req;
+
+	mdesc = snp_msg_alloc();
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc))
+		goto e_free_rio;
+
+	rc = snp_msg_init(mdesc, snp_vmpl);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free_mdesc;
+
+	req->msg_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
+	req->msg_type = SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_REQ;
+	req->vmpck_id = snp_vmpl;
+	req->req_buf = tsc_req;
+	req->req_sz = sizeof(*tsc_req);
+	req->resp_buf = (void *)tsc_resp;
+	req->resp_sz = sizeof(*tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
+	req->exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+	rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, req, rio);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_request;
+
+	pr_debug("%s: response status 0x%x scale 0x%llx offset 0x%llx factor 0x%x\n",
+		 __func__, tsc_resp->status, tsc_resp->tsc_scale, tsc_resp->tsc_offset,
+		 tsc_resp->tsc_factor);
+
+	if (!tsc_resp->status) {
+		snp_tsc_scale = tsc_resp->tsc_scale;
+		snp_tsc_offset = tsc_resp->tsc_offset;
+	} else {
+		pr_err("Failed to get TSC info, response status 0x%x\n", tsc_resp->status);
+		rc = -EIO;
+	}
+
+e_request:
+	/* The response buffer contains sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
+	memzero_explicit(tsc_resp, sizeof(*tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN);
+e_free_mdesc:
+	snp_msg_free(mdesc);
+e_free_rio:
+	kfree(rio);
+e_free_req:
+	kfree(req);
+ e_free_tsc_resp:
+	kfree(tsc_resp);
+e_free_tsc_req:
+	kfree(tsc_req);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void)
+{
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+		return;
+
+	if (snp_get_tsc_info()) {
+		pr_alert("Unable to retrieve Secure TSC info from ASP\n");
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SECURE_TSC);
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("SecureTSC enabled");
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 0a120d85d7bb..95bae74fdab2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
 	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
 
+	snp_secure_tsc_prepare();
+
 	print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
 }
 
