| Message ID | 3e019617640d1b07d0ab1c9a91455957c201d4cd.1405546879.git.luto@amacapital.net (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
> + case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED: > + get_random_bytes(&data, sizeof(data)); > + break; Should this be rate limited in the interest of conserving randomness? If there ever is an attack on the prng, this would create very favorable conditions for an attacker to exploit it. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 10:43 AM, Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> wrote: >> + case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED: >> + get_random_bytes(&data, sizeof(data)); >> + break; > > Should this be rate limited in the interest of conserving randomness? > If there ever is an attack on the prng, this would create very > favorable conditions for an attacker to exploit it. IMO if the nonblocking pool has a weakness that requires us to conserve its output, then this is the least of our worries. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt index 3c65feb..0ab043b 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt @@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT || 7 || guest checks this feature bit || || before enabling paravirtualized || || spinlock support. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED || 8 || host provides rng seed data via + || || MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT || 24 || host will warn if no guest-side || || per-cpu warps are expected in || || kvmclock. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h index 94dc8ca..e2eaf93 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #define KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME 5 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI 6 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT 7 +#define KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED 8 /* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. @@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN 0x4b564d02 #define MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME 0x4b564d03 #define MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN 0x4b564d04 +#define MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED 0x4b564d05 struct kvm_steal_time { __u64 steal; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 38a0afe..40d6763 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF) | (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI) | (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT) | - (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT); + (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT) | + (1 << KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED); if (sched_info_on()) entry->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index f644933..4e81853 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h> #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <trace/events/kvm.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -2480,6 +2481,9 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata) case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN: data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val; break; + case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED: + get_random_bytes(&data, sizeof(data)); + break; case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR: case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE: case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
This adds a simple interface to allow a guest to request 64 bits of host nonblocking entropy. This is independent of virtio-rng for a couple of reasons: - It's intended to be usable during early boot, when a trivial synchronous interface is needed. - virtio-rng gives blocking entropy, and making guest boot wait for the host's /dev/random will cause problems. MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is intended to provide 64 bits of best-effort cryptographically secure data for use as a seed. It provides no guarantee that the result contains any actual entropy. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> --- Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)