From patchwork Sun Apr 14 10:12:49 2013 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jan Kiszka X-Patchwork-Id: 2441671 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-kvm@patchwork.kernel.org Delivered-To: patchwork-process-083081@patchwork1.kernel.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by patchwork1.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BF983FD1A for ; Sun, 14 Apr 2013 10:13:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751437Ab3DNKNQ (ORCPT ); Sun, 14 Apr 2013 06:13:16 -0400 Received: from mout.web.de ([212.227.15.3]:52595 "EHLO mout.web.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751369Ab3DNKNC (ORCPT ); Sun, 14 Apr 2013 06:13:02 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain ([95.157.56.37]) by smtp.web.de (mrweb001) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0LfzgJ-1UtZGV10iR-00pZ2L; Sun, 14 Apr 2013 12:12:56 +0200 From: Jan Kiszka To: Gleb Natapov , Marcelo Tosatti Cc: kvm , Paolo Bonzini , Nadav Har'El Subject: [PATCH v4 5/6] KVM: nVMX: Fix conditions for NMI injection Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2013 12:12:49 +0200 Message-Id: <523b4691a695525a22102c496a078fda6a13d392.1365934368.git.jan.kiszka@web.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.3.4 In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: X-Provags-ID: V02:K0:NLvQozO0+1TtUqwlw/hxkfvuGSEcmxX/EkWHQLx3BbE GsTMWzWhvQWTq1G4Wv5zsjXVBhAhki0KOqPTpmVA0SfKZy7qVF 5pbOa9Lsq2SFbfmpTAm3skaxlDLCziCDGd/+ilQmSzBXGpDFdF bO7iZyTGhN/HpudjsElxVh082kYDy0iZKV6GY+JKBiklkI97Ly OwLKJkwXIRmv+wYubg/3g== Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Jan Kiszka The logic for checking if interrupts can be injected has to be applied also on NMIs. The difference is that if NMI interception is on these events are consumed and blocked by the VM exit. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 56e7519..ad9b4bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -4190,6 +4190,12 @@ static bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK; } +static bool nested_exit_on_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return get_vmcs12(vcpu)->pin_based_vm_exec_control & + PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING; +} + static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control; @@ -4315,6 +4321,28 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked) static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending || + vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == + GUEST_ACTIVITY_WAIT_SIPI) + return 0; + if (nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu)) { + nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu); + vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI; + vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = NMI_VECTOR | + INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK; + /* + * The NMI-triggered VM exit counts as injection: + * clear this one and block further NMIs. + */ + vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0; + vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true); + return 0; + } + } + if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && to_vmx(vcpu)->soft_vnmi_blocked) return 0;