[RFC,7/7] KVM: SVM: Support initialization of an SVSM

Message ID	8d5d8aae56f3623ee3fe247aafa764b2c0b181c9.1724795971.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Received: from NAM11-BN8-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bn8nam11on2066.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.236.66]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D2F071D415E; Tue, 27 Aug 2024 22:00:55 +0000 (UTC) Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com; client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev> CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, "Ashish Kalra" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>, Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@suse.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH 7/7] KVM: SVM: Support initialization of an SVSM Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 16:59:31 -0500 Message-ID: <8d5d8aae56f3623ee3fe247aafa764b2c0b181c9.1724795971.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <cover.1724795970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> References: <cover.1724795970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Precedence: bulk MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain
Series	KVM: SEV-SNP support for running an SVSM \| expand [RFC,0/7] KVM: SEV-SNP support for running an SVSM [RFC,1/7] KVM: SVM: Implement GET_AP_APIC_IDS NAE event [RFC,2/7] KVM: SEV: Allow for VMPL level specification in AP create [RFC,3/7] KVM: SVM: Invoke a specified VMPL level VMSA for the vCPU [RFC,4/7] KVM: SVM: Maintain per-VMPL SEV features in kvm_sev_info [RFC,5/7] KVM: SVM: Prevent injection when restricted injection is active [RFC,6/7] KVM: SVM: Support launching an SVSM with Restricted Injection set [RFC,7/7] KVM: SVM: Support initialization of an SVSM

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index bf57a824f722..c60557bb4253 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ struct kvm_sync_regs { /* vendor-specific groups and attributes for system fd */ #define KVM_X86_GRP_SEV 1 # define KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES 0 +# define KVM_X86_SEV_SNP_INIT_FLAGS 1 struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_data { __u8 vmcs12[KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS_SIZE]; @@ -703,6 +704,8 @@ enum sev_cmd_id { KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, + KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMPLS, + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, }; @@ -856,6 +859,13 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update { __u64 pad2[4]; }; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update_vmpls { + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update lu; + __u8 vmpl3_perms; + __u8 vmpl2_perms; + __u8 vmpl1_perms; +}; + #define KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE 96 #define KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE 4096 #define KVM_SEV_SNP_FINISH_DATA_SIZE 32 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 3aa9489786ee..25d5fe0dab5a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ #define GHCB_HV_FT_SUPPORTED (GHCB_HV_FT_SNP | \ GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_AP_CREATION | \ - GHCB_HV_FT_APIC_ID_LIST) + GHCB_HV_FT_APIC_ID_LIST | \ + GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_MULTI_VMPL) + +#define SNP_SUPPORTED_INIT_FLAGS KVM_SEV_SNP_SVSM /* enable/disable SEV support */ static bool sev_enabled = true; @@ -329,6 +332,12 @@ static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle) sev_decommission(handle); } +static bool verify_init_flags(struct kvm_sev_init *data, unsigned long vm_type) +{ + return (vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM) ? !data->flags + : !(data->flags & ~SNP_SUPPORTED_INIT_FLAGS); +} + /* * This sets up bounce buffers/firmware pages to handle SNP Guest Request * messages (e.g. attestation requests). See "SNP Guest Request" in the GHCB @@ -414,7 +423,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, if (kvm->created_vcpus) return -EINVAL; - if (data->flags) + if (!verify_init_flags(data, vm_type)) return -EINVAL; if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features) @@ -430,6 +439,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, sev->es_active = es_active; sev->vmsa_features[SVM_SEV_VMPL0] = data->vmsa_features; sev->ghcb_version = data->ghcb_version; + sev->snp_init_flags = data->flags; /* * Currently KVM supports the full range of mandatory features defined @@ -468,6 +478,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, sev_asid_free(sev); sev->asid = 0; e_no_asid: + sev->snp_init_flags = 0; sev->vmsa_features[SVM_SEV_VMPL0] = 0; sev->es_active = false; sev->active = false; @@ -2152,7 +2163,9 @@ int sev_dev_get_attr(u32 group, u64 attr, u64 *val) case KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES: *val = sev_supported_vmsa_features; return 0; - + case KVM_X86_SEV_SNP_INIT_FLAGS: + *val = SNP_SUPPORTED_INIT_FLAGS; + return 0; default: return -ENXIO; } @@ -2260,6 +2273,9 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) struct sev_gmem_populate_args { __u8 type; + __u8 vmpl1_perms; + __u8 vmpl2_perms; + __u8 vmpl3_perms; int sev_fd; int fw_error; }; @@ -2309,6 +2325,9 @@ static int sev_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, kvm_pfn_t pf fw_args.address = __sme_set(pfn_to_hpa(pfn + i)); fw_args.page_size = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(PG_LEVEL_4K); fw_args.page_type = sev_populate_args->type; + fw_args.vmpl1_perms = sev_populate_args->vmpl1_perms; + fw_args.vmpl2_perms = sev_populate_args->vmpl2_perms; + fw_args.vmpl3_perms = sev_populate_args->vmpl3_perms; ret = __sev_issue_cmd(sev_populate_args->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &fw_args, &sev_populate_args->fw_error); @@ -2355,34 +2374,27 @@ static int sev_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, kvm_pfn_t pf return ret; } -static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +static int __snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update_vmpls *params) { - struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_gmem_populate_args sev_populate_args = {0}; - struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update params; struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; long npages, count; void __user *src; int ret = 0; - if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm) || !sev->snp_context) - return -EINVAL; - - if (copy_from_user(&params, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(params))) - return -EFAULT; - pr_debug("%s: GFN start 0x%llx length 0x%llx type %d flags %d\n", __func__, - params.gfn_start, params.len, params.type, params.flags); + params->lu.gfn_start, params->lu.len, params->lu.type, params->lu.flags); - if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) || params.flags || - (params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL && - params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO && - params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED && - params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS && - params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID)) + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(params->lu.len) || params->lu.flags || + (params->lu.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL && + params->lu.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO && + params->lu.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED && + params->lu.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS && + params->lu.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID)) return -EINVAL; - npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE; + npages = params->lu.len / PAGE_SIZE; /* * For each GFN that's being prepared as part of the initial guest @@ -2405,17 +2417,20 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) */ mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); - memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, params.gfn_start); + memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, params->lu.gfn_start); if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } sev_populate_args.sev_fd = argp->sev_fd; - sev_populate_args.type = params.type; - src = params.type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO ? NULL : u64_to_user_ptr(params.uaddr); + sev_populate_args.type = params->lu.type; + sev_populate_args.vmpl1_perms = params->vmpl1_perms; + sev_populate_args.vmpl2_perms = params->vmpl2_perms; + sev_populate_args.vmpl3_perms = params->vmpl3_perms; + src = params->lu.type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO ? NULL : u64_to_user_ptr(params->lu.uaddr); - count = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, params.gfn_start, src, npages, + count = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, params->lu.gfn_start, src, npages, sev_gmem_post_populate, &sev_populate_args); if (count < 0) { argp->error = sev_populate_args.fw_error; @@ -2423,13 +2438,16 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) __func__, count, argp->error); ret = -EIO; } else { - params.gfn_start += count; - params.len -= count * PAGE_SIZE; - if (params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO) - params.uaddr += count * PAGE_SIZE; + params->lu.gfn_start += count; + params->lu.len -= count * PAGE_SIZE; + if (params->lu.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO) + params->lu.uaddr += count * PAGE_SIZE; ret = 0; - if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), &params, sizeof(params))) + + /* Only copy the original LAUNCH_UPDATE area back */ + if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), params, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update))) ret = -EFAULT; } @@ -2439,6 +2457,40 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int snp_launch_update_vmpls(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update_vmpls params; + + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm) || !sev->snp_context) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + return __snp_launch_update(kvm, argp, &params); +} + +static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update_vmpls params; + + if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm) || !sev->snp_context) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Copy only the kvm_sev_snp_launch_update portion */ + if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update))) + return -EFAULT; + + params.vmpl1_perms = 0; + params.vmpl2_perms = 0; + params.vmpl3_perms = 0; + + return __snp_launch_update(kvm, argp, &params); +} + static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; @@ -2454,6 +2506,10 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); u64 pfn = __pa(vmpl_vmsa(svm, SVM_SEV_VMPL0)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + /* If SVSM support is requested, only measure the boot vCPU */ + if ((sev->snp_init_flags & KVM_SEV_SNP_SVSM) && vcpu->vcpu_id != 0) + continue; + ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm); if (ret) return ret; @@ -2482,6 +2538,10 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) * MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR when guest_state_protected is not set. */ svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); + + /* If SVSM support is requested, no more vCPUs are measured. */ + if (sev->snp_init_flags & KVM_SEV_SNP_SVSM) + break; } return 0; @@ -2507,7 +2567,7 @@ static int snp_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) if (params.flags) return -EINVAL; - /* Measure all vCPUs using LAUNCH_UPDATE before finalizing the launch flow. */ + /* Measure vCPUs using LAUNCH_UPDATE before we finalize the launch flow. */ ret = snp_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, argp); if (ret) return ret; @@ -2665,6 +2725,9 @@ int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE: r = snp_launch_update(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMPLS: + r = snp_launch_update_vmpls(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH: r = snp_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 029eb54a8472..97a1b1b4cb5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { void *guest_req_buf; /* Bounce buffer for SNP Guest Request input */ void *guest_resp_buf; /* Bounce buffer for SNP Guest Request output */ struct mutex guest_req_mutex; /* Must acquire before using bounce buffers */ + unsigned int snp_init_flags; }; struct kvm_svm { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 637efc055145..49833912432a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1399,6 +1399,9 @@ struct kvm_enc_region { #define KVM_GET_SREGS2 _IOR(KVMIO, 0xcc, struct kvm_sregs2) #define KVM_SET_SREGS2 _IOW(KVMIO, 0xcd, struct kvm_sregs2) +/* Enable SVSM support */ +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_SVSM (1 << 0) + #define KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_PROTECT_ENABLE (1 << 0) #define KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET (1 << 1)

[RFC,7/7] KVM: SVM: Support initialization of an SVSM

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Patch