mbox series

[0/5] Improve arm64 pkeys handling in signal delivery

Message ID 20241017133909.3837547-1-kevin.brodsky@arm.com (mailing list archive)
Headers show
Series Improve arm64 pkeys handling in signal delivery | expand

Message

Kevin Brodsky Oct. 17, 2024, 1:39 p.m. UTC
This series is a follow-up to Joey's Permission Overlay Extension (POE)
series [1] that recently landed on mainline. The goal is to improve the
way we handle the register that governs which pkeys/POIndex are
accessible (POR_EL0) during signal delivery. As things stand, we may
unexpectedly fail to write the signal frame on the stack because POR_EL0
is not reset before the uaccess operations. See patch 3 for more details
and the main changes this series brings.

A similar series landed recently for x86/MPK [2]; the present series
aims at aligning arm64 with x86. Worth noting: once the signal frame is
written, POR_EL0 is still set to POR_EL0_INIT, granting access to pkey 0
only. This means that a program that sets up an alternate signal stack
with a non-zero pkey will need some assembly trampoline to set POR_EL0
before invoking the real signal handler, as discussed here [3].

The x86 series also added kselftests to ensure that no spurious SIGSEGV
occurs during signal delivery regardless of which pkey is accessible at
the point where the signal is delivered. This series adapts those
kselftests to allow running them on arm64 (patch 4-5).

Finally patch 2 is a clean-up following feedback on Joey's series [4].

I have tested this series on arm64 and x86_64 (booting and running the
protection_keys and pkey_sighandler_tests mm kselftests).

- Kevin

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240822151113.1479789-1-joey.gouly@arm.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240802061318.2140081-1-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABi2SkWxNkP2O7ipkP67WKz0-LV33e5brReevTTtba6oKUfHRw@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20241015114116.GA19334@willie-the-truck/

Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Cc: aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com
Cc: broonie@kernel.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.martin@arm.com
Cc: jeffxu@chromium.org
Cc: joey.gouly@arm.com
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: will@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org

Kevin Brodsky (5):
  arm64: signal: Remove unused macro
  arm64: signal: Remove unnecessary check when saving POE state
  arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures
  selftests/mm: Use generic pkey register manipulation
  selftests/mm: Enable pkey_sighandler_tests on arm64

 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c                    |  92 +++++++++++++---
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile           |   8 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-arm64.h       |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-x86.h         |   2 +
 .../selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c      | 101 +++++++++++++-----
 5 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

Comments

Dave Martin Oct. 17, 2024, 3:48 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 02:39:04PM +0100, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> This series is a follow-up to Joey's Permission Overlay Extension (POE)
> series [1] that recently landed on mainline. The goal is to improve the
> way we handle the register that governs which pkeys/POIndex are
> accessible (POR_EL0) during signal delivery. As things stand, we may
> unexpectedly fail to write the signal frame on the stack because POR_EL0
> is not reset before the uaccess operations. See patch 3 for more details
> and the main changes this series brings.
> 
> A similar series landed recently for x86/MPK [2]; the present series
> aims at aligning arm64 with x86. Worth noting: once the signal frame is
> written, POR_EL0 is still set to POR_EL0_INIT, granting access to pkey 0
> only. This means that a program that sets up an alternate signal stack
> with a non-zero pkey will need some assembly trampoline to set POR_EL0
> before invoking the real signal handler, as discussed here [3].

This feels a bit bogus (though it's anyway orthogonal to this series).

Really, we want some way for userspace to tell the kernel what
permissions to use for the alternate signal stack and signal handlers
using it, and then honour that request consistently (just as we try to
do for the main stack today).

ss_flags is mostly unused... I wonder whether we could add something in
there?  Or add a sigaltstack2()?

[...]

Cheers
---Dave