| Message ID | 20240801-arm64-gcs-v10-18-699e2bd2190b@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace | expand |
On Thu, Aug 01, 2024 at 01:06:45PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote: > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > index 451ba7cbd5ad..0973dd09f11a 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c > @@ -486,6 +486,14 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, > } > } > > +static bool is_gcs_fault(unsigned long esr) > +{ > + if (!esr_is_data_abort(esr)) > + return false; > + > + return ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr) & ESR_ELx_GCS; > +} > + > static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr) > { > return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW; > @@ -500,6 +508,25 @@ static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr) > return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM); > } > > +static bool is_invalid_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr) > +{ > + if (!system_supports_gcs()) > + return false; > + > + if (unlikely(is_gcs_fault(esr))) { > + /* GCS accesses must be performed on a GCS page */ > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) > + return true; > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) > + return true; Do we need the VM_WRITE check here? Further down in do_page_fault(), we already do the check as we set vm_flags = VM_WRITE. > + } else if (unlikely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) { > + /* Only GCS operations can write to a GCS page */ > + return is_write_abort(esr); > + } > + > + return false; > +} > + > static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, > struct pt_regs *regs) > { > @@ -535,6 +562,14 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, > /* It was exec fault */ > vm_flags = VM_EXEC; > mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION; > + } else if (is_gcs_fault(esr)) { > + /* > + * The GCS permission on a page implies both read and > + * write so always handle any GCS fault as a write fault, > + * we need to trigger CoW even for GCS reads. > + */ > + vm_flags = VM_WRITE; > + mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; > } else if (is_write_abort(esr)) { > /* It was write fault */ > vm_flags = VM_WRITE; > @@ -568,6 +603,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, > if (!vma) > goto lock_mmap; > > + if (is_invalid_gcs_access(vma, esr)) { > + vma_end_read(vma); > + fault = 0; > + si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; > + goto bad_area; > + } > + > if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) { > vma_end_read(vma); > fault = 0; This check I mentioned above. I was wondering whether we should prevent mprotect(PROT_READ) on the GCS page. But I guess that's fine, we'll SIGSEGV later if we get an invalid GCS access.
On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 10:17:52AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > On Thu, Aug 01, 2024 at 01:06:45PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote: > > +static bool is_invalid_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr) > > +{ > > + if (unlikely(is_gcs_fault(esr))) { > > + /* GCS accesses must be performed on a GCS page */ > > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) > > + return true; > > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) > > + return true; > Do we need the VM_WRITE check here? Further down in do_page_fault(), we > already do the check as we set vm_flags = VM_WRITE. > > if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) { > > vma_end_read(vma); > > fault = 0; It looks bitrotted, yes. > I was wondering whether we should prevent mprotect(PROT_READ) on the GCS > page. But I guess that's fine, we'll SIGSEGV later if we get an invalid > GCS access. Yeah, that doesn't seem like a particular problem - the concern is adding rather than removing GCS.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 451ba7cbd5ad..0973dd09f11a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -486,6 +486,14 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, } } +static bool is_gcs_fault(unsigned long esr) +{ + if (!esr_is_data_abort(esr)) + return false; + + return ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr) & ESR_ELx_GCS; +} + static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr) { return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW; @@ -500,6 +508,25 @@ static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr) return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM); } +static bool is_invalid_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr) +{ + if (!system_supports_gcs()) + return false; + + if (unlikely(is_gcs_fault(esr))) { + /* GCS accesses must be performed on a GCS page */ + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) + return true; + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) + return true; + } else if (unlikely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) { + /* Only GCS operations can write to a GCS page */ + return is_write_abort(esr); + } + + return false; +} + static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -535,6 +562,14 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, /* It was exec fault */ vm_flags = VM_EXEC; mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION; + } else if (is_gcs_fault(esr)) { + /* + * The GCS permission on a page implies both read and + * write so always handle any GCS fault as a write fault, + * we need to trigger CoW even for GCS reads. + */ + vm_flags = VM_WRITE; + mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; } else if (is_write_abort(esr)) { /* It was write fault */ vm_flags = VM_WRITE; @@ -568,6 +603,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, if (!vma) goto lock_mmap; + if (is_invalid_gcs_access(vma, esr)) { + vma_end_read(vma); + fault = 0; + si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; + goto bad_area; + } + if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) { vma_end_read(vma); fault = 0;
All GCS operations at EL0 must happen on a page which is marked as having UnprivGCS access, including read operations. If a GCS operation attempts to access a page without this then it will generate a data abort with the GCS bit set in ESR_EL1.ISS2. EL0 may validly generate such faults, for example due to copy on write which will cause the GCS data to be stored in a read only page with no GCS permissions until the actual copy happens. Since UnprivGCS allows both reads and writes to the GCS (though only through GCS operations) we need to ensure that the memory management subsystem handles GCS accesses as writes at all times. Do this by adding FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to any GCS page faults, adding handling to ensure that invalid cases are identfied as such early so the memory management core does not think they will succeed. The core cannot distinguish between VMAs which are generally writeable and VMAs which are only writeable through GCS operations. EL1 may validly write to EL0 GCS for management purposes (eg, while initialising with cap tokens). We also report any GCS faults in VMAs not marked as part of a GCS as access violations, causing a fault to be delivered to userspace if it attempts to do GCS operations outside a GCS. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)