diff mbox series

[v6] KVM: arm64: Fix confusion in documentation for pKVM SME assert

Message ID 20250210-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v6-1-cc26c46d1b43@kernel.org (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series [v6] KVM: arm64: Fix confusion in documentation for pKVM SME assert | expand

Commit Message

Mark Brown Feb. 10, 2025, 9:33 p.m. UTC
As raised in the review comments for the original patch the assert and
comment added in afb91f5f8ad7 ("KVM: arm64: Ensure that SME controls are
disabled in protected mode") are bogus. The comments says that we check
that we do not have SME enabled for a pKVM guest but the assert actually
checks to see if the host has anything set in SVCR which is unrelated to
the guest features or state, regardless of if those guests are protected
or not. This check is also made in the hypervisor, it will refuse to run
a guest if the check fails, so it appears that the assert here is
intended to improve diagnostics.

Update the comment to reflect the check in the code, and to clarify that
we do actually enforce this in the hypervisor. While we're here also
update to use a WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid log spam if this triggers.

Fixes: afb91f5f8ad7 ("KVM: arm64: Ensure that SME controls are disabled in protected mode")
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
This has been sent with v6.10 with only positive review comments after
the first revision, if there is some issue with the change please share
it.

To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
To: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
To: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
Changes in v6:
- Rebase onto v6.14-rc1.
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v5-1-995c8dd1025b@kernel.org

Changes in v5:
- Rebase onto v6.13-rc1.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240930-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v4-1-3c9df71db688@kernel.org

Changes in v4:
- Rebase onto v6.12-rc1
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240730-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v3-1-8699454e5cb8@kernel.org

Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto v6.11-rc1.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240605-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v2-1-54391b0032f4@kernel.org

Changes in v2:
- Commit message tweaks.
- Change the assert to WARN_ON_ONCE().
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v1-1-5d98348d00f8@kernel.org
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


---
base-commit: 2014c95afecee3e76ca4a56956a936e23283f05b
change-id: 20240604-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-5ad755d4e8a6

Best regards,

Comments

Mark Rutland Feb. 11, 2025, 11:34 a.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 09:33:32PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
> As raised in the review comments for the original patch the assert and
> comment added in afb91f5f8ad7 ("KVM: arm64: Ensure that SME controls are
> disabled in protected mode") are bogus. The comments says that we check
> that we do not have SME enabled for a pKVM guest but the assert actually
> checks to see if the host has anything set in SVCR which is unrelated to
> the guest features or state, regardless of if those guests are protected
> or not. This check is also made in the hypervisor, it will refuse to run
> a guest if the check fails, so it appears that the assert here is
> intended to improve diagnostics.
> 
> Update the comment to reflect the check in the code, and to clarify that
> we do actually enforce this in the hypervisor. While we're here also
> update to use a WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid log spam if this triggers.
> 
> Fixes: afb91f5f8ad7 ("KVM: arm64: Ensure that SME controls are disabled in protected mode")
> Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> ---
> This has been sent with v6.10 with only positive review comments after
> the first revision, if there is some issue with the change please share
> it.
> 
> To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> To: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
> To: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
> To: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
> To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> To: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
> Changes in v6:
> - Rebase onto v6.14-rc1.
> - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v5-1-995c8dd1025b@kernel.org
> 
> Changes in v5:
> - Rebase onto v6.13-rc1.
> - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240930-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v4-1-3c9df71db688@kernel.org
> 
> Changes in v4:
> - Rebase onto v6.12-rc1
> - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240730-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v3-1-8699454e5cb8@kernel.org
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - Rebase onto v6.11-rc1.
> - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240605-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v2-1-54391b0032f4@kernel.org
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - Commit message tweaks.
> - Change the assert to WARN_ON_ONCE().
> - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604-kvm-arm64-sme-assert-v1-1-5d98348d00f8@kernel.org
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 11 +++++++----
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
> index 4d3d1a2eb157047b4b2488e9c4ffaabc6f5a0818..f3455641e9c8a65470cdeb9d7daba7d59d78748e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
> @@ -93,11 +93,14 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	}
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * If normal guests gain SME support, maintain this behavior for pKVM
> -	 * guests, which don't support SME.
> +	 * The pKVM hypervisor does not yet understand how to save or
> +	 * restore SME state for the host so double check that if we
> +	 * are running with pKVM we have disabled SME.  The hypervisor
> +	 * enforces this when the guest is run, this check is for
> +	 * clearer diagnostics.
>  	 */
> -	WARN_ON(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sme() &&
> -		read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR));
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sme() &&
> +		     read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR));

This implies that non-protected modes do understand how to save/restore
SME state, and the wording is somewhat clunky.

Given we've just queued up patches requiring that the host has saved
away the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, I reckon it'd make more sense to simplify
this to:

	/*
	 * Protected and non-protected KVM modes require that
	 * SVCR.{SM,ZA} == {0,0} when entering a guest so that no
	 * host/guest SME state needs to be saved/restored by hyp code.
	 *
	 * In protected mode, hyp code will verify this later.
	 */
	WARN_ON_ONCE(system_supports-sme() && read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR));

... and then if/when we enable SME for non-protected modes we can
constrain that further.

Mark.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index 4d3d1a2eb157047b4b2488e9c4ffaabc6f5a0818..f3455641e9c8a65470cdeb9d7daba7d59d78748e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -93,11 +93,14 @@  void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If normal guests gain SME support, maintain this behavior for pKVM
-	 * guests, which don't support SME.
+	 * The pKVM hypervisor does not yet understand how to save or
+	 * restore SME state for the host so double check that if we
+	 * are running with pKVM we have disabled SME.  The hypervisor
+	 * enforces this when the guest is run, this check is for
+	 * clearer diagnostics.
 	 */
-	WARN_ON(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sme() &&
-		read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sme() &&
+		     read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR));
 }
 
 /*