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a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=1uiZUrDOH4l2Wn9/hfxprEz0p4Pem0sURNuAWOypjqo=; b=T4NjqKAA5/0A6NO9YZTOjPS2fIi1eBqugLOdFGF3UxG4VNNhYka61j+cCGI8+aL1Q5 jHqa70B6zqxztgU9tt1EJsS1I0qOS6zZzyP2UsBJebHu8WHvKI+uP9Z0HL1Ih7FJM52f 3oYkiC9c/91UaQQiRke9RDiWnY3Xh2B80rOsCcM4yHKyX7bwnaG3EX7WQhcqmt/7OPV2 XVmlnahef9P4IUeVpkzmqrf3fLGKq+LvMIVqOVZGeL2a9gpRCPejs2Xb7MhahT/o5+jF 16zbccVfugC++5AFXRBpxH5Gc+Bidu6RplBv+QGaps4QHRPb9cgv+91Cak4/9eKNh5RR t8TA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532oMxm6n9spdfc8nSEMOWO3T0VM9kjqnWxlzPESdVTrwq8egBVl qRcLxDaohq4hzsZF7hBcbWFnPRAd2oHhWezX X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxM0YWDhurJs1WpBKLMoaxPoJ/qqd11MbVTf9JdahHt7NiSAMtDQztj8x8XtcyYgZ7wjDj+Qmy/cGouumYD X-Received: from andreyknvl3.muc.corp.google.com ([2a00:79e0:15:13:7220:84ff:fe09:7e9d]) (user=andreyknvl job=sendgmr) by 2002:a05:600c:204e:: with SMTP id p14mr2206470wmg.182.1601593932715; Thu, 01 Oct 2020 16:12:12 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 01:10:38 +0200 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <9243986ea34154dd41240ae0e0797a87c42c3106.1601593784.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.709.gb0816b6eb0-goog Subject: [PATCH v4 37/39] kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata From: Andrey Konovalov To: Dmitry Vyukov , Vincenzo Frascino , Catalin Marinas , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201001_191217_354199_D6049E2E X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.27 ) X-Spam-Score: -7.7 (-------) X-Spam-Report: SpamAssassin version 3.4.4 on merlin.infradead.org summary: Content analysis details: (-7.7 points) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [2a00:1450:4864:20:0:0:0:34a listed in] [list.dnswl.org] 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -7.5 USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL From: address is in the default DKIM white-list -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID_EF Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.0 DKIMWL_WL_MED DKIMwl.org - Medium trust sender X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Marco Elver , Elena Petrova , Andrey Konovalov , Kevin Brodsky , Will Deacon , Branislav Rankov , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Evgenii Stepanov Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Kernel allocator code accesses metadata for slab objects, that may lie out-of-bounds of the object itself, or be accessed when an object is freed. Such accesses trigger tag faults and lead to false-positive reports with hardware tag-based KASAN. Software KASAN modes disable instrumentation for allocator code via KASAN_SANITIZE Makefile macro, and rely on kasan_enable/disable_current() annotations which are used to ignore KASAN reports. With hardware tag-based KASAN neither of those options are available, as it doesn't use compiler instrumetation, no tag faults are ignored, and MTE is disabled after the first one. Instead, reset tags when accessing metadata (currently only for SLUB). Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Acked-by: Marco Elver --- Change-Id: I39f3c4d4f29299d4fbbda039bedf230db1c746fb --- mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +++- mm/page_poison.c | 2 +- mm/slub.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index fab5e97dc9ca..e2195602fb38 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -1159,8 +1159,10 @@ static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages) /* s390's use of memset() could override KASAN redzones. */ kasan_disable_current(); - for (i = 0; i < numpages; i++) + for (i = 0; i < numpages; i++) { + page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i); clear_highpage(page + i); + } kasan_enable_current(); } diff --git a/mm/page_poison.c b/mm/page_poison.c index 34b9181ee5d1..d90d342a391f 100644 --- a/mm/page_poison.c +++ b/mm/page_poison.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void poison_page(struct page *page) /* KASAN still think the page is in-use, so skip it. */ kasan_disable_current(); - memset(addr, PAGE_POISON, PAGE_SIZE); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(addr), PAGE_POISON, PAGE_SIZE); kasan_enable_current(); kunmap_atomic(addr); } diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 68c02b2eecd9..1d3f2355df3b 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *ptr, { #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED /* - * When CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is enabled, ptr_addr might be tagged. + * When CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS is enabled, ptr_addr might be tagged. * Normally, this doesn't cause any issues, as both set_freepointer() * and get_freepointer() are called with a pointer with the same tag. * However, there are some issues with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG code. For @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_dereference(const struct kmem_cache *s, static inline void *get_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) { + object = kasan_reset_tag(object); return freelist_dereference(s, object + s->offset); } @@ -304,6 +305,7 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) BUG_ON(object == fp); /* naive detection of double free or corruption */ #endif + freeptr_addr = (unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)freeptr_addr); *(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr); } @@ -538,8 +540,8 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr, unsigned int length) { metadata_access_enable(); - print_hex_dump(level, text, DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, addr, - length, 1); + print_hex_dump(level, kasan_reset_tag(text), DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, + 16, 1, addr, length, 1); metadata_access_disable(); } @@ -570,7 +572,7 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, p = object + get_info_end(s); - return p + alloc; + return kasan_reset_tag(p + alloc); } static void set_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, @@ -583,7 +585,8 @@ static void set_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned int nr_entries; metadata_access_enable(); - nr_entries = stack_trace_save(p->addrs, TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT, 3); + nr_entries = stack_trace_save(kasan_reset_tag(p->addrs), + TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT, 3); metadata_access_disable(); if (nr_entries < TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT) @@ -747,7 +750,7 @@ static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val) { - u8 *p = object; + u8 *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad); @@ -777,7 +780,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *addr = page_address(page); metadata_access_enable(); - fault = memchr_inv(start, value, bytes); + fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(start), value, bytes); metadata_access_disable(); if (!fault) return 1; @@ -873,7 +876,7 @@ static int slab_pad_check(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page) pad = end - remainder; metadata_access_enable(); - fault = memchr_inv(pad, POISON_INUSE, remainder); + fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(pad), POISON_INUSE, remainder); metadata_access_disable(); if (!fault) return 1; @@ -1118,7 +1121,7 @@ void setup_page_debug(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *addr) return; metadata_access_enable(); - memset(addr, POISON_INUSE, page_size(page)); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(addr), POISON_INUSE, page_size(page)); metadata_access_disable(); } @@ -1570,10 +1573,10 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, * Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch * the redzone. */ - memset(object, 0, s->object_size); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size); rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0; - memset((char *)object + s->inuse, 0, + memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(object) + s->inuse, 0, s->size - s->inuse - rsize); } @@ -2884,10 +2887,10 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH); } - maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, object); + maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, kasan_reset_tag(object)); if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object) - memset(object, 0, s->object_size); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size); slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object);