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Mon, 02 Nov 2020 08:04:38 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 17:03:45 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <94b6b7faeb6741a712ea6357c103e02260caa770.1604333009.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog Subject: [PATCH v7 05/41] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler From: Andrey Konovalov To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201102_110441_870416_EA183670 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 23.07 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Marco Elver , Elena Petrova , Andrey Konovalov , Kevin Brodsky , Branislav Rankov , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko , Evgenii Stepanov , Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Vincenzo Frascino , Dmitry Vyukov Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Vincenzo Frascino Add the implementation of the in-kernel fault handler. When a tag fault happens on a kernel address: * MTE is disabled on the current CPU, * the execution continues. When a tag fault happens on a user address: * the kernel executes do_bad_area() and panics. The tag fault handler for kernel addresses is currently empty and will be filled in by a future commit. Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Co-developed-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- Change-Id: I9b8aa79567f7c45f4d6a1290efcf34567e620717 --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 991dd5f031e4..c7fff8daf2a7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -200,13 +200,36 @@ do { \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \ } while (0) +/* + * The Tag Check Flag (TCF) mode for MTE is per EL, hence TCF0 + * affects EL0 and TCF affects EL1 irrespective of which TTBR is + * used. + * The kernel accesses TTBR0 usually with LDTR/STTR instructions + * when UAO is available, so these would act as EL0 accesses using + * TCF0. + * However futex.h code uses exclusives which would be executed as + * EL1, this can potentially cause a tag check fault even if the + * user disables TCF0. + * + * To address the problem we set the PSTATE.TCO bit in uaccess_enable() + * and reset it in uaccess_disable(). + * + * The Tag check override (TCO) bit disables temporarily the tag checking + * preventing the issue. + */ static inline void uaccess_disable(void) { + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(0), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); + __uaccess_disable(ARM64_HAS_PAN); } static inline void uaccess_enable(void) { + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(1), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); + __uaccess_enable(ARM64_HAS_PAN); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 1ee94002801f..fbceb14d93b1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -296,6 +297,44 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr, do_exit(SIGKILL); } +static void report_tag_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +} + +static void do_tag_recovery(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + static bool reported = false; + + if (!READ_ONCE(reported)) { + report_tag_fault(addr, esr, regs); + WRITE_ONCE(reported, true); + } + + /* + * Disable MTE Tag Checking on the local CPU for the current EL. + * It will be done lazily on the other CPUs when they will hit a + * tag fault. + */ + sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, SCTLR_ELx_TCF_MASK, SCTLR_ELx_TCF_NONE); + isb(); +} + +static bool is_el1_mte_sync_tag_check_fault(unsigned int esr) +{ + unsigned int ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr); + unsigned int fsc = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC; + + if (ec != ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR) + return false; + + if (fsc == ESR_ELx_FSC_MTE) + return true; + + return false; +} + static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -312,6 +351,12 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, "Ignoring spurious kernel translation fault at virtual address %016lx\n", addr)) return; + if (is_el1_mte_sync_tag_check_fault(esr)) { + do_tag_recovery(addr, esr, regs); + + return; + } + if (is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) { if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) msg = "write to read-only memory";