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a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=4nQbhmxnHYBZMr8XvL6GP6Xh98otRrfrKaNSbxyS0Do=; b=F0E/0TM2XTWbR3ngAKvmxo1JizkAFMxbCVSJFHFJvlj3Qa6cXrdW68BwQrVDPh3xml HOLAAlz8g07qi/5n9UxN8RP20Om4r9XTrRnlt4K8pJSaHponrZHh65bIqvF2ADkiiS4o 0QGmUTzAs4NsVdbPlzTldAvgs1Ea2xazQoAeqHrY2XJs4c18yxbkm+lVBa73ICUknyPm GsKV3YUTnzZsqGdLZZh8aHOwuNvQi/K0WPwlXG8MzxEGokx9JfQSSRwAjcWqxKNP86d/ l+NfT39UKOKknmRuGyXABfS39GxApN2vHT22yGJm8PrIM/2Vz+6c85s2+R4GZlkWSze5 Tvvg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5334Xphb6X1uvMlg03SBu1EEoKT6InDp7+q5cph2GyI9CHkxraBZ WV21J67+Wnx1NlcCKserMmWmw/0Rtgxd9I3T X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyuxXDQ5ArolBq8yD7QTyYcZp0ApwYPODpZTIFI/9Dd1YclIT3DQwIqlLe2Qhloqs4T9Aa206BqX4epsiwQ X-Received: from andreyknvl3.muc.corp.google.com ([2a00:79e0:15:13:7220:84ff:fe09:7e9d]) (user=andreyknvl job=sendgmr) by 2002:a7b:c044:: with SMTP id u4mr601060wmc.1.1609871308429; Tue, 05 Jan 2021 10:28:28 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 19:27:54 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog Subject: [PATCH 10/11] kasan: fix bug detection via ksize for HW_TAGS mode From: Andrey Konovalov To: Catalin Marinas , Vincenzo Frascino , Dmitry Vyukov , Alexander Potapenko , Marco Elver X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210105_132832_071652_EF5F2AD2 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 24.44 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Branislav Rankov , Andrey Konovalov , Kevin Brodsky , Will Deacon , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Evgenii Stepanov Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org The currently existing kasan_check_read/write() annotations are intended to be used for kernel modules that have KASAN compiler instrumentation disabled. Thus, they are only relevant for the software KASAN modes that rely on compiler instrumentation. However there's another use case for these annotations: ksize() checks that the object passed to it is indeed accessible before unpoisoning the whole object. This is currently done via __kasan_check_read(), which is compiled away for the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation. This leads to KASAN missing detecting some memory corruptions. Provide another annotation called kasan_check_byte() that is available for all KASAN modes. As the implementation rename and reuse kasan_check_invalid_free(). Use this new annotation in ksize(). Also add a new ksize_uaf() test that checks that a use-after-free is detected via ksize() itself, and via plain accesses that happen later. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iaabf771881d0f9ce1b969f2a62938e99d3308ec5 --- include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/kasan.h | 13 +++++++++++++ lib/test_kasan.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/common.c | 11 ++++++++++- mm/kasan/generic.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 10 +++++----- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 6 +++--- mm/slab_common.c | 15 +++++++++------ 8 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h index ca5e89fb10d3..3d6d22a25bdc 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h @@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ #include +/* + * The annotations present in this file are only relevant for the software + * KASAN modes that rely on compiler instrumentation, and will be optimized + * away for the hardware tag-based KASAN mode. Use kasan_check_byte() instead. + */ + /* * __kasan_check_*: Always available when KASAN is enabled. This may be used * even in compilation units that selectively disable KASAN, but must use KASAN diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h index 5e0655fb2a6f..992ba5c653a3 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -243,6 +243,18 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip); } +/* + * Unlike kasan_check_read/write(), kasan_check_byte() is performed even for + * the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation. + */ +bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr, unsigned long ip); +static __always_inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *addr, unsigned long ip) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + return __kasan_check_byte(addr, ip); + return true; +} + bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void); void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled); @@ -299,6 +311,7 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size, return (void *)object; } static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) {} +static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip) {} #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c index 3ea52da52714..6261521e57ad 100644 --- a/lib/test_kasan.c +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c @@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ static void kasan_global_oob(struct kunit *test) KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p); } +/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test) { char *ptr; @@ -508,6 +509,24 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test) kfree(ptr); } +/* + * Check that a use-after-free is detected by ksize() and via normal accesses + * after it. + */ +static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test) +{ + char *ptr; + int size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; + + ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + kfree(ptr); + + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = *ptr); + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = *(ptr + size)); +} + static void kasan_stack_oob(struct kunit *test) { char stack_array[10]; @@ -937,6 +956,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = { KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_left), KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_right), KUNIT_CASE(ksize_unpoisons_memory), + KUNIT_CASE(ksize_uaf), KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_free), KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_invalid_free), KUNIT_CASE(kasan_memchr), diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index eedc3e0fe365..45ab2c7073a8 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) return false; - if (kasan_check_invalid_free(tagged_object)) { + if (!kasan_check(tagged_object)) { kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip); return true; } @@ -490,3 +490,12 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip); /* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */ } + +bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip) +{ + if (!kasan_check(address)) { + kasan_report_invalid_free((void *)address, ip); + return false; + } + return true; +} diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c index acab8862dc67..b3631ad9a8ef 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c @@ -185,11 +185,11 @@ bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, return check_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip); } -bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr) +bool kasan_check(const void *addr) { s8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr)); - return shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; + return shadow_byte >= 0 && shadow_byte < KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; } void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache) diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index 292dfbc37deb..f17591545279 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -329,20 +329,20 @@ static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size) round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); } -static inline bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr) +static inline bool kasan_check(const void *addr) { u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr); - u8 mem_tag = hw_get_mem_tag(addr); + u8 mem_tag = hw_get_mem_tag((void *)addr); - return (mem_tag == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) || - (ptr_tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && ptr_tag != mem_tag); + return (mem_tag != KASAN_TAG_INVALID) && + (ptr_tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || ptr_tag == mem_tag); } #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value); void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size); -bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr); +bool kasan_check(const void *addr); #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c index cc271fceb5d5..e326caaaaca3 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c @@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, return true; } -bool kasan_check_invalid_free(void *addr) +bool kasan_check(const void *addr) { u8 tag = get_tag(addr); u8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(kasan_reset_tag(addr))); - return (shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) || - (tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && tag != shadow_byte); + return (shadow_byte != KASAN_TAG_INVALID) && + (tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte); } #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size) \ diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index e981c80d216c..a3bb44516623 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -1157,11 +1157,13 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) size_t size; /* - * We need to check that the pointed to object is valid, and only then - * unpoison the shadow memory below. We use __kasan_check_read(), to - * generate a more useful report at the time ksize() is called (rather - * than later where behaviour is undefined due to potential - * use-after-free or double-free). + * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and + * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is + * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could + * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free. + * + * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for hardware tag-based + * KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write(). * * If the pointed to memory is invalid we return 0, to avoid users of * ksize() writing to and potentially corrupting the memory region. @@ -1169,7 +1171,8 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) * We want to perform the check before __ksize(), to avoid potentially * crashing in __ksize() due to accessing invalid metadata. */ - if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1)) + if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || + !kasan_check_byte(objp, _RET_IP_)) return 0; size = __ksize(objp);