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a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=vEdvtaim2+A9VptC1VB9MgtNlk8EGvB8Qh1XAtSBRGw=; b=Va24ZlHJk9Zd7RchiOQ61Dm0tMXSTtGMjB1HGGmYenZzQvRAnqVmy2Ewt788LKoP0I PO4AVxR+RjlyXjMvpZ5m+x5RsEMow9no3eyzatu9Qba6xulWL6Lk9L1UGfp9xv7DXTyk M14xmpyLO7QWRg/KZTekpw6HuFh8Fdw/W/ij3KTQ1yxQ4ayi7t6WxFzhVhkTYvDq+nb1 Y2ZuciMP7kQqPAHEJt4W7eh2DEZ2DeiOzmCaKEb9HO4CH7/e7FQVLMupRlt2JIjdCu8i xXLytzHI3HrHh8R0xmBpvH0olJEudP1wOh2b+IRoc2IGFaPtSsMswoQkmKAqxM41DXrO X0Lw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530uzwzyuTzUkIK+jY0EDKb68w/l+UFlveEq+b29qgfInFSTGQ2m wtwU+bgrduT7XXQe+XAXtrvUmplOY5PtMryD X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzHsevSD49pXMTlTEY5ZiLNYrd6akTsMGxwYPXQVMOyoDTrAAXCYQD9VSnoB05A35A+zJ4o3cScx+7e4cyD X-Received: from andreyknvl3.muc.corp.google.com ([2a00:79e0:15:13:7220:84ff:fe09:7e9d]) (user=andreyknvl job=sendgmr) by 2002:a50:fb98:: with SMTP id e24mr10723448edq.130.1601593851505; Thu, 01 Oct 2020 16:10:51 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 01:10:04 +0200 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.709.gb0816b6eb0-goog Subject: [PATCH v4 03/39] kasan: group vmalloc code From: Andrey Konovalov To: Dmitry Vyukov , Vincenzo Frascino , Catalin Marinas , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201001_191054_430350_B28B1295 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.64 ) X-Spam-Score: -7.7 (-------) X-Spam-Report: SpamAssassin version 3.4.4 on merlin.infradead.org summary: Content analysis details: (-7.7 points) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [2a00:1450:4864:20:0:0:0:649 listed in] [list.dnswl.org] 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -7.5 USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL From: address is in the default DKIM white-list -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID_EF Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.0 DKIMWL_WL_MED DKIMwl.org - Medium trust sender X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Marco Elver , Elena Petrova , Andrey Konovalov , Kevin Brodsky , Will Deacon , Branislav Rankov , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Evgenii Stepanov Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. Group all vmalloc-related function declarations in include/linux/kasan.h, and their implementations in mm/kasan/common.c. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Reviewed-by: Marco Elver --- Change-Id: Ie20b6c689203cd6de4fd7f2c465ec081c00c5f15 --- include/linux/kasan.h | 41 +++++++++++++---------- mm/kasan/common.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h index 087fba34b209..bd5b4965a269 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -69,19 +69,6 @@ struct kasan_cache { int free_meta_offset; }; -/* - * These functions provide a special case to support backing module - * allocations with real shadow memory. With KASAN vmalloc, the special - * case is unnecessary, as the work is handled in the generic case. - */ -#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC -int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size); -void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm); -#else -static inline int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) { return 0; } -static inline void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {} -#endif - int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size); void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size); @@ -150,9 +137,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, return false; } -static inline int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) { return 0; } -static inline void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {} - static inline int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) { return 0; @@ -205,13 +189,16 @@ static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr) #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC + int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size); void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size); void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size); void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end); -#else + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ + static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long size) { @@ -226,7 +213,25 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end) {} -#endif + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC) + +/* + * These functions provide a special case to support backing module + * allocations with real shadow memory. With KASAN vmalloc, the special + * case is unnecessary, as the work is handled in the generic case. + */ +int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size); +void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm); + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ + +static inline int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) { return 0; } +static inline void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr); diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 33d863f55db1..89e5ef9417a7 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -536,44 +536,6 @@ void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) /* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */ } -#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC -int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) -{ - void *ret; - size_t scaled_size; - size_t shadow_size; - unsigned long shadow_start; - - shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); - scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; - shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE); - - if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start))) - return -EINVAL; - - ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, 1, shadow_start, - shadow_start + shadow_size, - GFP_KERNEL, - PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD, NUMA_NO_NODE, - __builtin_return_address(0)); - - if (ret) { - __memset(ret, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_size); - find_vm_area(addr)->flags |= VM_KASAN; - kmemleak_ignore(ret); - return 0; - } - - return -ENOMEM; -} - -void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) -{ - if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN) - vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr)); -} -#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG static bool shadow_mapped(unsigned long addr) { @@ -685,6 +647,7 @@ core_initcall(kasan_memhotplug_init); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC + static int kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *unused) { @@ -923,4 +886,43 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, (unsigned long)shadow_end); } } + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ + +int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) +{ + void *ret; + size_t scaled_size; + size_t shadow_size; + unsigned long shadow_start; + + shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); + scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; + shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE); + + if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start))) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, 1, shadow_start, + shadow_start + shadow_size, + GFP_KERNEL, + PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD, NUMA_NO_NODE, + __builtin_return_address(0)); + + if (ret) { + __memset(ret, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_size); + find_vm_area(addr)->flags |= VM_KASAN; + kmemleak_ignore(ret); + return 0; + } + + return -ENOMEM; +} + +void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) +{ + if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN) + vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr)); +} + #endif