[05/35] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*

Message ID	d4f7c14e57341ae52df4fde5425e2ae5d24534dd.1597425745.git.andreyknvl@google.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Return-Path: <SRS0=uP9R=BY=lists.infradead.org=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@kernel.org> DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AC44020708 Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2020 19:26:47 +0200 In-Reply-To: <cover.1597425745.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Message-Id: <d4f7c14e57341ae52df4fde5425e2ae5d24534dd.1597425745.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <cover.1597425745.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Subject: [PATCH 05/35] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com summary: Content analysis details: (-7.7 points) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [2a00:1450:4864:20:0:0:0:349 listed in] [list.dnswl.org] -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -7.5 USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL From: address is in the default DKIM white-list 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID_EF Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature -0.0 DKIMWL_WL_MED DKIMwl.org - Medium sender Precedence: list Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>, Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" <linux-arm-kernel-bounces@lists.infradead.org> Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org
Series	kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 \| expand [00/35] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 [01/35] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC [02/35] kasan: group vmalloc code [03/35] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes [04/35] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory [05/35] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* [06/35] kasan: only build init.c for software modes [07/35] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c [08/35] kasan: rename generic/tags_report.c files [09/35] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies [10/35] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation [11/35] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE [12/35] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes [13/35] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth for software modes [14/35] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata [15/35] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata [16/35] kasan: kasan_non_canonical_hook only for software modes [17/35] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META [18/35] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode [19/35] kasan: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE [20/35] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers [21/35] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler [22/35] arm64: mte: Enable in-kernel MTE [23/35] arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask [24/35] arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit [25/35] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS [26/35] kasan, arm64: Enable TBI EL1 [27/35] kasan, arm64: align allocations for HW_TAGS [28/35] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS [29/35] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN [30/35] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks [31/35] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime [32/35] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler [33/35] kasan, slub: reset tags when accessing metadata [34/35] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS [35/35] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst index 38fd5681fade..a3030fc6afe5 100644 --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to -``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``. +``KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``. Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c index 5d3f496893ef..247a14f40016 100644 --- a/lib/test_kasan.c +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h" -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) /* * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 65933b27df81..c9daf2c33651 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) /* * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'. - * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE. + * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. */ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) { @@ -143,13 +143,13 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag); - if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) { + if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) { u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) *shadow = tag; else - *shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK; + *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK; } } @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) { kasan_poison_memory(object, - round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE), + round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); } @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) return shadow_byte < 0 || - shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; /* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */ if ((u8)shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID) @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, return true; } - rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) || @@ -445,9 +445,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, return NULL; redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size), - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size, - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag); @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, page = virt_to_page(ptr); redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page); kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size); @@ -589,8 +589,8 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT; shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size; - if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) || - WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT))) + if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) || + WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT))) return NOTIFY_BAD; switch (action) { @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size) if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start)) return; - size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID); } @@ -861,22 +861,22 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long region_start, region_end; unsigned long size; - region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); - region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); + region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); free_region_start = ALIGN(free_region_start, - PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); if (start != region_start && free_region_start < region_start) - region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; free_region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(free_region_end, - PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); if (end != region_end && free_region_end > region_end) - region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_start); shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_end); @@ -902,7 +902,8 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) unsigned long shadow_start; shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); - scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; + scaled_size = (size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) >> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE); if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start))) diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c index 4b5f905198d8..f6d68aa9872f 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr) s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr); if (unlikely(shadow_value)) { - s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK; + s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK; return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value); } @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr, * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both. */ - if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) < size - 1)) + if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1)) return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1); return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1); @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr) u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr); /* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */ - if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE))) + if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE))) return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15); return *shadow_addr; @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr, s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte); if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow || - ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow))) + ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow))) return true; } return false; @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache) static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global) { - size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size); @@ -279,10 +279,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return); /* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size) { - size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) - rounded_up_size; - size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr - KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE); diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c index a38c7a9e192a..4dce1633b082 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size) void *p = addr; while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))) - p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; return p; } @@ -51,14 +51,14 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr); /* - * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look + * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access. */ - if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1) + if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) shadow_addr++; switch (*shadow_addr) { - case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1: + case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1: /* * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values * due to a data race in the kernel code. diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c index fe6be0be1f76..754b641c83c7 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/init.c +++ b/mm/kasan/init.c @@ -447,8 +447,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) end = addr + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT); if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start % - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) || - WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE))) + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) || + WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE))) return; for (; addr < end; addr = next) { @@ -482,8 +482,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT); if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start % - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) || - WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE))) + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) || + WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE))) return -EINVAL; ret = kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end); diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index 03450d3b31f7..c31e2c739301 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) -#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1) +#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) +#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) #define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL 0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */ #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID 0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */ diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c index 4f49fa6cd1aa..7c025d792e2f 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -317,24 +317,24 @@ static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr, return false; aligned_addr = round_down((unsigned long)addr, sizeof(long)); - mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); shadow_ptr = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)aligned_addr); shadow_bottom = kasan_mem_to_shadow(end_of_stack(current)); while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr != KASAN_STACK_LEFT) { shadow_ptr--; - mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; } while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr == KASAN_STACK_LEFT) { shadow_ptr--; - mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; } if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom) return false; - frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE); + frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); if (frame[0] != KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC) { pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n", frame[0]); @@ -572,6 +572,6 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) else bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access"; pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type, - orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK); + orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); } #endif diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c index bee43717d6f0..6ddb55676a7c 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size) void *end = p + size; while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)) - p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE; + p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE; return p; }

[05/35] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*

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Patch