From patchwork Thu Feb 11 22:53:38 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Satya Tangirala X-Patchwork-Id: 12084305 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-21.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 113FFC433E0 for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 22:54:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5B0964E4A for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 22:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229694AbhBKWyd (ORCPT ); Thu, 11 Feb 2021 17:54:33 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35508 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229478AbhBKWya (ORCPT ); Thu, 11 Feb 2021 17:54:30 -0500 Received: from mail-pj1-x1049.google.com (mail-pj1-x1049.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1049]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B67A0C061574 for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 14:53:50 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-pj1-x1049.google.com with SMTP id l2so4828996pjy.4 for ; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 14:53:50 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=sender:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=jgTl8HOP9GM18XfRYz277pGhBjYc+zv87YQb2bimXpw=; b=p2T3A4Da3KQOdUROBiBifIStd+F5qBc2/oCKY833PEG5+a+dpbw4vjOTA0v1/Yn9OV WE/7y4XO2RpHdJI+30h7tVq3yOZAmOSkE2ncW81BsMu1mmdNihKDYovbop5biy9zLa7z oUmakWoh9GymMII1aa3NRKm6nNMPJ/cdEYIB/UktFT+wJAojvlEn1qfFL36yno/I3Mtd WSkjFZs79ZxrRGIj0vxUfYIrO4oy/XGcYEg4QgVmHZb3Pi3qGc/NQCk5iTJA60hJPO5O +T9bC/BR0Rrhu7Cd6rd8+60UfwFHiF81FTA1T8yYHodz7DXGZHCgbTZFKuzUk3LYq8KM 7NIA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from :to:cc; bh=jgTl8HOP9GM18XfRYz277pGhBjYc+zv87YQb2bimXpw=; b=WeZPeRCHUiCPnAcuHFe3eOaQcbowNfj6g9F+YXnO7tf9N+ccQmTtvdrGE9EKWNQvFu mIbjJxKTu22+DVXvXtBJ4dDMelHuzzgp6XcWqLMJSe3D0Z+2YOMcZ3mSPDekXbOy0xUC s84jl/ZkvCfEPHV/OZxHpJ+ywSXANhudlh8K8AwDAI2UlYdeb50JJ+SjwCSFc1zl+RAM 6cJ4kXyOpOWPPHQamWZy3foGo6iUexQLmBDF3FvgvEwy9Q0JsszsaxoIGE6VretxJIuw OihfRxnLrTVjhZPu7RYBzjJdqBicvuz5gPzo7jphaDe6Lt9CNZ6ax2Unmwqa9tf8KZo2 kLjQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530HlwBAlXlfFZu/UvoXVEccsiGd1vafzfwVzKrGmgOAtBGZjnrb 8RIKu9tI9vT6SN+j3e1sPVBQncWYvEeZ0obMo8xJdZSMFo9X1xjDBtFHFQqkqcA3imWyz8AcfMj nOq4WWo7z5eVQaT0tH0Ch/boUmyP2e1WIKbjt+MZNAqROzwBtsDluCVHEMMk7Lz+LJnqN X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzfwo/8a/bSVuYIMnlpx1GGcdii3CgTj7ldLWLqnoYJfWs4kYT7l1Ch0bCELfnR/kssZ4Swk8K8kyI= Sender: "satyat via sendgmr" X-Received: from satyaprateek.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:10:24:72f4:c0a8:1092]) (user=satyat job=sendgmr) by 2002:a17:903:2292:b029:de:45c0:7005 with SMTP id b18-20020a1709032292b02900de45c07005mr238153plh.75.1613084028970; Thu, 11 Feb 2021 14:53:48 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 22:53:38 +0000 Message-Id: <20210211225343.3145732-1-satyat@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.0.478.g8a0d178c01-goog Subject: [PATCH v5 0/5] add support for inline encryption to device mapper From: Satya Tangirala To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Jens Axboe , Alasdair Kergon , Mike Snitzer , Eric Biggers , Satya Tangirala Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org This patch series adds support for inline encryption to the device mapper. Patch 1 introduces the "passthrough" keyslot manager. The regular keyslot manager is designed for inline encryption hardware that have only a small fixed number of keyslots. A DM device itself does not actually have only a small fixed number of keyslots - it doesn't actually have any keyslots in the first place, and programming an encryption context into a DM device doesn't make much semantic sense. It is possible for a DM device to set up a keyslot manager with some "sufficiently large" number of keyslots in its request queue, so that upper layers can use the inline encryption capabilities of the DM device's underlying devices, but the memory being allocated for the DM device's keyslots is a waste since they won't actually be used by the DM device. The passthrough keyslot manager solves this issue - when the block layer sees that a request queue has a passthrough keyslot manager, it doesn't attempt to program any encryption context into the keyslot manager. The passthrough keyslot manager only allows the device to expose its inline encryption capabilities, and a way for upper layers to evict keys if necessary. There also exist inline encryption hardware that can handle encryption contexts directly, and allow users to pass them a data request along with the encryption context (as opposed to inline encryption hardware that require users to first program a keyslot with an encryption context, and then require the users to pass the keyslot index with the data request). Such devices can also make use of the passthrough keyslot manager. Patch 2 introduces some keyslot manager functions useful for the device mapper. Patch 3 introduces the changes for inline encryption support for the device mapper. A DM device only exposes the intersection of the crypto capabilities of its underlying devices. This is so that in case a bio with an encryption context is eventually mapped to an underlying device that doesn't support that encryption context, the blk-crypto-fallback's cipher tfms are allocated ahead of time by the call to blk_crypto_start_using_key. Each DM target can now also specify the "DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO" flag in the target type features to opt-in to supporting passing through the underlying inline encryption capabilities. This flag is needed because it doesn't make much semantic sense for certain targets like dm-crypt to expose the underlying inline encryption capabilities to the upper layers. Again, the DM exposes inline encryption capabilities of the underlying devices only if all of them opt-in to passing through inline encryption support. A keyslot manager is created for a table when it is loaded. However, the mapped device's exposed capabilities *only* updated once the table is swapped in (until the new table is swapped in, the mapped device continues to expose the old table's crypto capabilities). This patch only allows the keyslot manager's capabilities to *expand* because of table changes. Any attempt to load a new table that doesn't support a crypto capability that the old table did is rejected. This patch also only exposes the intersection of the underlying device's capabilities, which has the effect of causing en/decryption of a bio to fall back to the kernel crypto API (if the fallback is enabled) whenever any of the underlying devices doesn't support the encryption context of the bio - it might be possible to make the bio only fall back to the kernel crypto API if the bio's target underlying device doesn't support the bio's encryption context, but the use case may be uncommon enough in the first place not to warrant worrying about it right now. Patch 4 makes DM evict a key from all its underlying devices when asked to evict a key. Patch 5 makes some DM targets opt-in to passing through inline encryption support. It does not (yet) try to enable this option with dm-raid, since users can "hot add" disks to a raid device, which makes this not completely straightforward (we'll need to ensure that any "hot added" disks must have a superset of the inline encryption capabilities of the rest of the disks in the raid device, due to the way Patch 2 of this series works). Changes v4 => v5: - Fixup/improve comments as suggested by Eric - add Acked-bys and Reviewed-bys Changes v3 => v4: - Allocate the memory for the ksm of the mapped device in dm_table_complete(), and install the ksm in the md queue in __bind() (as suggested by Mike). Also drop patch 5 from v3 since it's no longer needed. - Some cleanups Changes v2 => v3: - Split up the main DM patch into 4 separate patches - Removed the priv variable added to struct keyslot manager in v2 - Use a flag in target type features for opting-in to inline encryption support, instead of using "may_passthrough_inline_crypto" - cleanups, improve docs and restructure code Changes v1 => v2: - Introduce private field to struct blk_keyslot_manager - Allow the DM keyslot manager to expand its crypto capabilities if the table is changed. - Make DM reject table changes that would otherwise cause crypto capabilities to be dropped. - Allocate the DM device's keyslot manager only when at least one crypto capability is supported (since a NULL value for q->ksm represents "no crypto support" anyway). - Remove the struct blk_keyslot_manager field from struct mapped_device. This patch now relies on just directly setting up the keyslot manager in the request queue, since each DM device is tied to only 1 queue. Satya Tangirala (5): block: keyslot-manager: Introduce passthrough keyslot manager block: keyslot-manager: Introduce functions for device mapper support dm: add support for passing through inline crypto support dm: support key eviction from keyslot managers of underlying devices dm: set DM_TARGET_PASSES_CRYPTO feature for some targets block/blk-crypto.c | 1 + block/keyslot-manager.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/md/dm-core.h | 12 ++ drivers/md/dm-flakey.c | 4 +- drivers/md/dm-linear.c | 5 +- drivers/md/dm-table.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/md/dm.c | 18 ++- include/linux/device-mapper.h | 12 ++ include/linux/keyslot-manager.h | 11 ++ 9 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)