| Message ID | 1389806152-14297-1-git-send-email-dsterba@suse.cz (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Headers | show |
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 21da5762b0b1..9f831bb3dbee 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -1545,6 +1545,12 @@ static noinline int btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid(struct file *file, printk(KERN_INFO "btrfs: Snapshot src from " "another FS\n"); ret = -EINVAL; + } else if (!inode_owner_or_capable(src_inode)) { + /* + * Subvolume creation is not restricted, but snapshots + * are limited to own subvolumes only + */ + ret = -EPERM; } else { ret = btrfs_mksubvol(&file->f_path, name, namelen, BTRFS_I(src_inode)->root,
Currently, any user can snapshot any subvolume if the path is accessible and thus indirectly create and keep files he does not own under his direcotries. This is not possible with traditional directories. In security context, a user can snapshot root filesystem and pin any potentially buggy binaries, even if the updates are applied. All the snapshots are visible to the administrator, so it's possible to verify if there are suspicious snapshots. Another more practical problem is that any user can pin the space used by eg. root and cause ENOSPC. Original report: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apparmor/+bug/484786 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> --- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)