diff mbox

[3/4] btrfs: lzo: Add header length check to avoid slab out of bounds access

Message ID 20180517062753.25973-4-wqu@suse.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Qu Wenruo May 17, 2018, 6:27 a.m. UTC
James Harvey reported that some corrupted compressed extent data can
lead to various kernel memory corruption.

Such corrupted extent data belongs to inode with NODATASUM flags, thus
data csum won't help us detecting such bug.

If lucky enough, kasan could catch it like:

Comments

Nikolay Borisov May 17, 2018, 8:14 a.m. UTC | #1
On 17.05.2018 09:27, Qu Wenruo wrote:
> James Harvey reported that some corrupted compressed extent data can
> lead to various kernel memory corruption.
> 
> Such corrupted extent data belongs to inode with NODATASUM flags, thus
> data csum won't help us detecting such bug.
> 
> If lucky enough, kasan could catch it like:
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
> Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8800606cb0f8 by task kworker/u16:0/2338
> 
> CPU: 3 PID: 2338 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.0-rc5-custom+ #50
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_endio_helper [btrfs]
> Call Trace:
>  dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b
>  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
>  kasan_report+0x260/0x380
>  memcpy+0x34/0x50
>  lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
>  end_compressed_bio_read+0x99f/0x10b0 [btrfs]
>  bio_endio+0x32e/0x640
>  normal_work_helper+0x15a/0xea0 [btrfs]
>  process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1470
>  worker_thread+0x1b0/0x1170
>  kthread+0x2db/0x390
>  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
> ...
> ==================================================================
> 
> The offending compressed data has the following info:
> 
> Header:			length 32768		(Looks completely valid)
> Segment 0 Header:	length 3472882419	(Obvious out of bounds)
> 
> Then when handling segment 0, since it's over the current page, we need
> the compressed data to workspace, then such large size would trigger
> out-of-bounds memory access, screwing up the whole kernel.
> 
> Fix it by adding extra checks on header and segment headers to ensure we
> won't access out-of-bounds, and even checks the decompressed data won't
> be out-of-bounds.
> 
> Reported-by: James Harvey <jamespharvey20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
> ---
>  fs/btrfs/lzo.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
> index 3d2ae4c08876..78ebc809072f 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
> @@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>  	unsigned long working_bytes;
>  	size_t in_len;
>  	size_t out_len;
> +	size_t max_segment_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
>  	unsigned long in_offset;
>  	unsigned long in_page_bytes_left;
>  	unsigned long tot_in;
> @@ -294,6 +295,18 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>  
>  	data_in = kmap(pages_in[0]);
>  	tot_len = read_compress_length(data_in);
> +	/*
> +	 * Compressed data header check.
> +	 *
> +	 * The real compressed size can't exceed extent length, and all pages
> +	 * should be used (a full pending page is not possible).
> +	 * If this happens it means the compressed extent is corrupted.
> +	 */
> +	if (tot_len > min_t(size_t, BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED, srclen) ||
> +	    tot_len < srclen - PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		ret = -EUCLEAN;
> +		goto done;
> +	}

So tot_len is the compressed size as written in the compressed stream,
whereas srclen is the number of bytes on-disk this compressed extent
take up (as derived from submit_compressed_extents). Shouldn't those two
always be equal, i.e perhaps an assert is in order?

srclen  comes from the async_extent struct, which in turns is
initialized in compress_file_range with the value of "total_compressed",
and the value there is actually initialized by
btrfs_compress_pages->lzo_compress_pages (that code makes me wanna sing
"You spin me right round, baby Right round like a record, baby").


>  
>  	tot_in = LZO_LEN;
>  	in_offset = LZO_LEN;
> @@ -308,6 +321,17 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>  		in_offset += LZO_LEN;
>  		tot_in += LZO_LEN;
>  
> +		/*
> +		 * Segment header check.
> +		 *
> +		 * The segment length must not exceed max lzo compression
> +		 * size, nor the total compressed size
> +		 */
> +		if (in_len > max_segment_len || tot_in + in_len > tot_len) {
> +			ret = -EUCLEAN;
> +			goto done;
> +		}
> +
>  		tot_in += in_len;
>  		working_bytes = in_len;
>  		may_late_unmap = need_unmap = false;
> @@ -358,7 +382,7 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>  			}
>  		}
>  
> -		out_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
> +		out_len = max_segment_len;
>  		ret = lzo1x_decompress_safe(buf, in_len, workspace->buf,
>  					    &out_len);
>  		if (need_unmap)
> @@ -368,6 +392,15 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>  			ret = -EIO;
>  			break;
>  		}
> +		/*
> +		 * Decompressed data length check.
> +		 * The uncompressed data should not exceed uncompressed extent
> +		 * size.
> +		 */
> +		if (tot_out + out_len > cb->len) {
> +			ret = -EUCLEAN;
> +			break;
> +		}
>  
>  		buf_start = tot_out;
>  		tot_out += out_len;
> 
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Qu Wenruo May 17, 2018, 8:19 a.m. UTC | #2
On 2018年05月17日 16:14, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> 
> 
> On 17.05.2018 09:27, Qu Wenruo wrote:
>> James Harvey reported that some corrupted compressed extent data can
>> lead to various kernel memory corruption.
>>
>> Such corrupted extent data belongs to inode with NODATASUM flags, thus
>> data csum won't help us detecting such bug.
>>
>> If lucky enough, kasan could catch it like:
>> ==================================================================
>> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
>> Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8800606cb0f8 by task kworker/u16:0/2338
>>
>> CPU: 3 PID: 2338 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.0-rc5-custom+ #50
>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
>> Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_endio_helper [btrfs]
>> Call Trace:
>>  dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b
>>  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
>>  kasan_report+0x260/0x380
>>  memcpy+0x34/0x50
>>  lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
>>  end_compressed_bio_read+0x99f/0x10b0 [btrfs]
>>  bio_endio+0x32e/0x640
>>  normal_work_helper+0x15a/0xea0 [btrfs]
>>  process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1470
>>  worker_thread+0x1b0/0x1170
>>  kthread+0x2db/0x390
>>  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
>> ...
>> ==================================================================
>>
>> The offending compressed data has the following info:
>>
>> Header:			length 32768		(Looks completely valid)
>> Segment 0 Header:	length 3472882419	(Obvious out of bounds)
>>
>> Then when handling segment 0, since it's over the current page, we need
>> the compressed data to workspace, then such large size would trigger
>> out-of-bounds memory access, screwing up the whole kernel.
>>
>> Fix it by adding extra checks on header and segment headers to ensure we
>> won't access out-of-bounds, and even checks the decompressed data won't
>> be out-of-bounds.
>>
>> Reported-by: James Harvey <jamespharvey20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
>> ---
>>  fs/btrfs/lzo.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
>> index 3d2ae4c08876..78ebc809072f 100644
>> --- a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
>> +++ b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
>> @@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>  	unsigned long working_bytes;
>>  	size_t in_len;
>>  	size_t out_len;
>> +	size_t max_segment_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
>>  	unsigned long in_offset;
>>  	unsigned long in_page_bytes_left;
>>  	unsigned long tot_in;
>> @@ -294,6 +295,18 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>  
>>  	data_in = kmap(pages_in[0]);
>>  	tot_len = read_compress_length(data_in);
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Compressed data header check.
>> +	 *
>> +	 * The real compressed size can't exceed extent length, and all pages
>> +	 * should be used (a full pending page is not possible).
>> +	 * If this happens it means the compressed extent is corrupted.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (tot_len > min_t(size_t, BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED, srclen) ||
>> +	    tot_len < srclen - PAGE_SIZE) {
>> +		ret = -EUCLEAN;
>> +		goto done;
>> +	}
> 
> So tot_len is the compressed size as written in the compressed stream,
> whereas srclen is the number of bytes on-disk this compressed extent
> take up (as derived from submit_compressed_extents). Shouldn't those two
> always be equal, i.e perhaps an assert is in order?

Nope, and in most case, tot_len is smaller than srclen (extent size).

The compressed data can have pending zeros, and in fact, for 8K all
"0xcd" lzo compressed data, tot_len is 100 bytes, and the remaining
bytes are all pending zeros.
While compressed extent size is always rounded up to sector size, and in
that 8K all "0xcd" case, @srclen will be 4K.

Thanks,
Qu

> 
> srclen  comes from the async_extent struct, which in turns is
> initialized in compress_file_range with the value of "total_compressed",
> and the value there is actually initialized by
> btrfs_compress_pages->lzo_compress_pages (that code makes me wanna sing
> "You spin me right round, baby Right round like a record, baby").
> 
> 
>>  
>>  	tot_in = LZO_LEN;
>>  	in_offset = LZO_LEN;
>> @@ -308,6 +321,17 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>  		in_offset += LZO_LEN;
>>  		tot_in += LZO_LEN;
>>  
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Segment header check.
>> +		 *
>> +		 * The segment length must not exceed max lzo compression
>> +		 * size, nor the total compressed size
>> +		 */
>> +		if (in_len > max_segment_len || tot_in + in_len > tot_len) {
>> +			ret = -EUCLEAN;
>> +			goto done;
>> +		}
>> +
>>  		tot_in += in_len;
>>  		working_bytes = in_len;
>>  		may_late_unmap = need_unmap = false;
>> @@ -358,7 +382,7 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>  			}
>>  		}
>>  
>> -		out_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
>> +		out_len = max_segment_len;
>>  		ret = lzo1x_decompress_safe(buf, in_len, workspace->buf,
>>  					    &out_len);
>>  		if (need_unmap)
>> @@ -368,6 +392,15 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>  			ret = -EIO;
>>  			break;
>>  		}
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Decompressed data length check.
>> +		 * The uncompressed data should not exceed uncompressed extent
>> +		 * size.
>> +		 */
>> +		if (tot_out + out_len > cb->len) {
>> +			ret = -EUCLEAN;
>> +			break;
>> +		}
>>  
>>  		buf_start = tot_out;
>>  		tot_out += out_len;
>>
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Qu Wenruo May 17, 2018, 9:05 a.m. UTC | #3
On 2018年05月17日 16:19, Qu Wenruo wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2018年05月17日 16:14, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17.05.2018 09:27, Qu Wenruo wrote:
>>> James Harvey reported that some corrupted compressed extent data can
>>> lead to various kernel memory corruption.
>>>
>>> Such corrupted extent data belongs to inode with NODATASUM flags, thus
>>> data csum won't help us detecting such bug.
>>>
>>> If lucky enough, kasan could catch it like:
>>> ==================================================================
>>> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
>>> Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8800606cb0f8 by task kworker/u16:0/2338
>>>
>>> CPU: 3 PID: 2338 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.0-rc5-custom+ #50
>>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
>>> Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_endio_helper [btrfs]
>>> Call Trace:
>>>  dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b
>>>  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
>>>  kasan_report+0x260/0x380
>>>  memcpy+0x34/0x50
>>>  lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
>>>  end_compressed_bio_read+0x99f/0x10b0 [btrfs]
>>>  bio_endio+0x32e/0x640
>>>  normal_work_helper+0x15a/0xea0 [btrfs]
>>>  process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1470
>>>  worker_thread+0x1b0/0x1170
>>>  kthread+0x2db/0x390
>>>  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
>>> ...
>>> ==================================================================
>>>
>>> The offending compressed data has the following info:
>>>
>>> Header:			length 32768		(Looks completely valid)
>>> Segment 0 Header:	length 3472882419	(Obvious out of bounds)
>>>
>>> Then when handling segment 0, since it's over the current page, we need
>>> the compressed data to workspace, then such large size would trigger
>>> out-of-bounds memory access, screwing up the whole kernel.
>>>
>>> Fix it by adding extra checks on header and segment headers to ensure we
>>> won't access out-of-bounds, and even checks the decompressed data won't
>>> be out-of-bounds.
>>>
>>> Reported-by: James Harvey <jamespharvey20@gmail.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
>>> ---
>>>  fs/btrfs/lzo.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
>>> index 3d2ae4c08876..78ebc809072f 100644
>>> --- a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
>>> +++ b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
>>> @@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>>  	unsigned long working_bytes;
>>>  	size_t in_len;
>>>  	size_t out_len;
>>> +	size_t max_segment_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
>>>  	unsigned long in_offset;
>>>  	unsigned long in_page_bytes_left;
>>>  	unsigned long tot_in;
>>> @@ -294,6 +295,18 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>>  
>>>  	data_in = kmap(pages_in[0]);
>>>  	tot_len = read_compress_length(data_in);
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * Compressed data header check.
>>> +	 *
>>> +	 * The real compressed size can't exceed extent length, and all pages
>>> +	 * should be used (a full pending page is not possible).
>>> +	 * If this happens it means the compressed extent is corrupted.
>>> +	 */
>>> +	if (tot_len > min_t(size_t, BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED, srclen) ||
>>> +	    tot_len < srclen - PAGE_SIZE) {
>>> +		ret = -EUCLEAN;
>>> +		goto done;
>>> +	}
>>
>> So tot_len is the compressed size as written in the compressed stream,
>> whereas srclen is the number of bytes on-disk this compressed extent
>> take up (as derived from submit_compressed_extents). Shouldn't those two
>> always be equal, i.e perhaps an assert is in order?
> 
> Nope, and in most case, tot_len is smaller than srclen (extent size).
> 
> The compressed data can have pending zeros, and in fact, for 8K all
> "0xcd" lzo compressed data, tot_len is 100 bytes, and the remaining
> bytes are all pending zeros.
> While compressed extent size is always rounded up to sector size, and in
> that 8K all "0xcd" case, @srclen will be 4K.
> 
> Thanks,
> Qu
> 
>>
>> srclen  comes from the async_extent struct, which in turns is
>> initialized in compress_file_range with the value of "total_compressed",
>> and the value there is actually initialized by
>> btrfs_compress_pages->lzo_compress_pages (that code makes me wanna sing
>> "You spin me right round, baby Right round like a record, baby").

Forgot to mention, that call sites are all *write* sites, not *read* sites.

For read, cb->compressed_len will just be the extent size.

Anyway, the check works fine for both sites.

Thanks,
Qu

>>
>>
>>>  
>>>  	tot_in = LZO_LEN;
>>>  	in_offset = LZO_LEN;
>>> @@ -308,6 +321,17 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>>  		in_offset += LZO_LEN;
>>>  		tot_in += LZO_LEN;
>>>  
>>> +		/*
>>> +		 * Segment header check.
>>> +		 *
>>> +		 * The segment length must not exceed max lzo compression
>>> +		 * size, nor the total compressed size
>>> +		 */
>>> +		if (in_len > max_segment_len || tot_in + in_len > tot_len) {
>>> +			ret = -EUCLEAN;
>>> +			goto done;
>>> +		}
>>> +
>>>  		tot_in += in_len;
>>>  		working_bytes = in_len;
>>>  		may_late_unmap = need_unmap = false;
>>> @@ -358,7 +382,7 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>>  			}
>>>  		}
>>>  
>>> -		out_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
>>> +		out_len = max_segment_len;
>>>  		ret = lzo1x_decompress_safe(buf, in_len, workspace->buf,
>>>  					    &out_len);
>>>  		if (need_unmap)
>>> @@ -368,6 +392,15 @@ static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
>>>  			ret = -EIO;
>>>  			break;
>>>  		}
>>> +		/*
>>> +		 * Decompressed data length check.
>>> +		 * The uncompressed data should not exceed uncompressed extent
>>> +		 * size.
>>> +		 */
>>> +		if (tot_out + out_len > cb->len) {
>>> +			ret = -EUCLEAN;
>>> +			break;
>>> +		}
>>>  
>>>  		buf_start = tot_out;
>>>  		tot_out += out_len;
>>>
> --
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David Sterba May 22, 2018, 2:14 p.m. UTC | #4
On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:14:46AM +0300, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> srclen  comes from the async_extent struct, which in turns is
> initialized in compress_file_range with the value of "total_compressed",
> and the value there is actually initialized by
> btrfs_compress_pages->lzo_compress_pages (that code makes me wanna sing
> "You spin me right round, baby Right round like a record, baby").

I have a dusted patch that reworks the whole loop to something more
understandable, I can post it with some other pending compression
updates.
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diff mbox

Patch

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8800606cb0f8 by task kworker/u16:0/2338

CPU: 3 PID: 2338 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.0-rc5-custom+ #50
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_endio_helper [btrfs]
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xc2/0x16b
 print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
 kasan_report+0x260/0x380
 memcpy+0x34/0x50
 lzo_decompress_bio+0x384/0x7a0 [btrfs]
 end_compressed_bio_read+0x99f/0x10b0 [btrfs]
 bio_endio+0x32e/0x640
 normal_work_helper+0x15a/0xea0 [btrfs]
 process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1470
 worker_thread+0x1b0/0x1170
 kthread+0x2db/0x390
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
...
==================================================================

The offending compressed data has the following info:

Header:			length 32768		(Looks completely valid)
Segment 0 Header:	length 3472882419	(Obvious out of bounds)

Then when handling segment 0, since it's over the current page, we need
the compressed data to workspace, then such large size would trigger
out-of-bounds memory access, screwing up the whole kernel.

Fix it by adding extra checks on header and segment headers to ensure we
won't access out-of-bounds, and even checks the decompressed data won't
be out-of-bounds.

Reported-by: James Harvey <jamespharvey20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/lzo.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
index 3d2ae4c08876..78ebc809072f 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/lzo.c
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@  static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
 	unsigned long working_bytes;
 	size_t in_len;
 	size_t out_len;
+	size_t max_segment_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
 	unsigned long in_offset;
 	unsigned long in_page_bytes_left;
 	unsigned long tot_in;
@@ -294,6 +295,18 @@  static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
 
 	data_in = kmap(pages_in[0]);
 	tot_len = read_compress_length(data_in);
+	/*
+	 * Compressed data header check.
+	 *
+	 * The real compressed size can't exceed extent length, and all pages
+	 * should be used (a full pending page is not possible).
+	 * If this happens it means the compressed extent is corrupted.
+	 */
+	if (tot_len > min_t(size_t, BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED, srclen) ||
+	    tot_len < srclen - PAGE_SIZE) {
+		ret = -EUCLEAN;
+		goto done;
+	}
 
 	tot_in = LZO_LEN;
 	in_offset = LZO_LEN;
@@ -308,6 +321,17 @@  static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
 		in_offset += LZO_LEN;
 		tot_in += LZO_LEN;
 
+		/*
+		 * Segment header check.
+		 *
+		 * The segment length must not exceed max lzo compression
+		 * size, nor the total compressed size
+		 */
+		if (in_len > max_segment_len || tot_in + in_len > tot_len) {
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
+			goto done;
+		}
+
 		tot_in += in_len;
 		working_bytes = in_len;
 		may_late_unmap = need_unmap = false;
@@ -358,7 +382,7 @@  static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
 			}
 		}
 
-		out_len = lzo1x_worst_compress(PAGE_SIZE);
+		out_len = max_segment_len;
 		ret = lzo1x_decompress_safe(buf, in_len, workspace->buf,
 					    &out_len);
 		if (need_unmap)
@@ -368,6 +392,15 @@  static int lzo_decompress_bio(struct list_head *ws, struct compressed_bio *cb)
 			ret = -EIO;
 			break;
 		}
+		/*
+		 * Decompressed data length check.
+		 * The uncompressed data should not exceed uncompressed extent
+		 * size.
+		 */
+		if (tot_out + out_len > cb->len) {
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
+			break;
+		}
 
 		buf_start = tot_out;
 		tot_out += out_len;