From patchwork Sun Jul 9 18:53:38 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sweet Tea Dorminy X-Patchwork-Id: 13306041 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61886EB64DD for ; Sun, 9 Jul 2023 18:54:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229933AbjGISyA (ORCPT ); Sun, 9 Jul 2023 14:54:00 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57806 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229900AbjGISx7 (ORCPT ); Sun, 9 Jul 2023 14:53:59 -0400 Received: from box.fidei.email (box.fidei.email [71.19.144.250]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7DCDB128; Sun, 9 Jul 2023 11:53:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from authenticated-user (box.fidei.email [71.19.144.250]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by box.fidei.email (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EA06280B12; Sun, 9 Jul 2023 14:53:57 -0400 (EDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=dorminy.me; s=mail; t=1688928838; bh=oOvzWavp9q8pjjvCmgnJz1nKe1na598tMbJz3v9zZrY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=kR2JFeOI/qtu1iT52/o83iGZAn4zwZgCuQBYx3YHewzVICNStxNSr2JrR44TF2SUE mNqsDcPf3KVQiW2ESoZDe2p7G7LPsX/LrNi2FdbRe7JjNDjrPZpE2sYo9D/KrudOHA mpb5QhiOihEkbzMwE0ZoTcP3Jc3Xp976NpA4bQdQ0P7WLhIwMSFMRaP+91Uz0+cpSJ HkxnvlSSfNLew60tbIO+vJg+5LCXhlCsVo/x50UnH6znmnmK6tTqS5MjDK+oM6HQCS LMvWq+jZybZTJS2up4X3cmm9wOcYJtByp5GtAkUvkYkvl8FjKjZtTPsyELeW7b4Agm Yb1hR3yN/w+zA== From: Sweet Tea Dorminy To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Jaegeuk Kim , Eric Biggers , Chris Mason , Josef Bacik , David Sterba , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com Cc: Sweet Tea Dorminy Subject: [PATCH v2 05/14] fscrypt: setup leaf inodes for extent encryption Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2023 14:53:38 -0400 Message-Id: <9a4890026719e5d6dc16ee9338f309f3fa452d16.1688927487.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org For extent-based encryption, leaf/regular file inodes are special: it's useful to set their i_crypt_info field so that it's easy to inherit their encryption policy for a new extent, but they never need to do any encyption themselves. Additionally, since encryption can only be set up on a directory, not a single file, their encryption policy can always duplicate their parent inode's policy. Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 17 +++++++++++++ fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index c04454c289fd..260635e8b558 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -308,6 +308,23 @@ fscrypt_get_lblk_info(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 *offset, return inode->i_crypt_info; } +/** + * fscrypt_uses_extent_encryption() -- whether an inode uses per-extent + * encryption + * + * @inode: the inode in question + * + * Return: true if the inode uses per-extent fscrypt_infos, false otherwise + */ +static inline bool fscrypt_uses_extent_encryption(const struct inode *inode) +{ + // Non-regular files don't have extents + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return false; + + // No filesystems currently use per-extent infos + return false; +} /* crypto.c */ extern struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_info_cachep; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index c5f68cf65a6f..7469b2d8ac87 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -747,27 +747,48 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported) { int res; - union fscrypt_context ctx; + union fscrypt_context ctx = { 0 }; union fscrypt_policy policy; if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) return 0; - res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); - if (res < 0) { - if (res == -ERANGE && allow_unsupported) - return 0; - fscrypt_warn(inode, "Error %d getting encryption context", res); - return res; - } + if (fscrypt_uses_extent_encryption(inode)) { + /* + * Nothing will be encrypted with this info, so we can borrow + * the parent (dir) inode's policy and use a zero nonce. + */ + struct dentry *dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); + struct dentry *parent_dentry = dget_parent(dentry); + struct inode *dir = parent_dentry->d_inode; + bool found = false; - res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&policy, &ctx, res); - if (res) { - if (allow_unsupported) + if (dir->i_crypt_info) { + found = true; + policy = dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy; + nonce = dir->i_crypt_info->ci_nonce; + } + dput(parent_dentry); + dput(dentry); + if (!found) return 0; - fscrypt_warn(inode, - "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context"); - return res; + } else { + res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); + if (res < 0) { + if (res == -ERANGE && allow_unsupported) + return 0; + fscrypt_warn(inode, "Error %d getting encryption context", res); + return res; + } + + res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&policy, &ctx, res); + if (res) { + if (allow_unsupported) + return 0; + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context"); + return res; + } } if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&policy, inode)) {