From patchwork Mon Aug 6 22:32:51 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10558061 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A37B413AC for ; Mon, 6 Aug 2018 22:35:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92B9E29570 for ; Mon, 6 Aug 2018 22:35:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 876C6297CE; Mon, 6 Aug 2018 22:35:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F304E29570 for ; Mon, 6 Aug 2018 22:35:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729926AbeHGArA (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Aug 2018 20:47:00 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45068 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728198AbeHGAqM (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Aug 2018 20:46:12 -0400 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AC94421A56; Mon, 6 Aug 2018 22:34:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1533594898; bh=jVb/Zs4dTffzVQqDMnz/7zgdmwG89E75pqUBwQx2VnM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=aC+t9vxWar/5yhQ9lf6wmCIzHwWTEomQ0rmLjNdnAlZbaTky9G/2oJIZ0lPKjefX+ ieKUY7ZnJXlJwzTIlBUjWiXlxt5rmoeCSvPCIboKAMhI0rOgHEboJ0qAZJm/jfqiCi LrFZG/5QquFf3Mvtfplytb/mDU8EpbOcnqfx9LQw= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , Michael Halcrow , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/9] crypto: HPolyC support Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 15:32:51 -0700 Message-Id: <20180806223300.113891-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.18.0.597.ga71716f1ad-goog MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Hi all, (Please note that this patchset is a true RFC, i.e. we're not ready for it to be merged quite yet!) It was officially decided to *not* allow Android devices to use Speck encryption [1]. We've been working to find an alternative way to bring storage encryption to entry-level Android devices like the inexpensive "Android Go" devices sold in developing countries. Unfortunately, often these devices still ship with no encryption, since for cost reasons they have to use older CPUs like ARM Cortex-A7; and these CPUs lack the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions, making AES-XTS much too slow. As we explained in detail earlier, e.g. in [2], this is a very challenging problem due to the lack of encryption algorithms that meet the very strict performance requirements, while still being secure and suitable for practical use in dm-crypt and fscrypt. And as we saw with Speck, in this day and age the choice of cryptographic primitives also has a large political element, restricting the options even further. Therefore, we (well, Paul Crowley did the real work) designed a new encryption mode, HPolyC. In essence, HPolyC makes it secure to use the ChaCha stream cipher for disk encryption. HPolyC is specified by our paper here: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf ("HPolyC: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"). Reference code and test vectors are here: https://github.com/google/hpolyc. Many of the high-level concepts of HPolyC are not new; similar existing modes include XCB, HCTR, HCH, and HMC. HPolyC and these modes are true wide-block modes (tweakable super-pseudorandom permutations), so they actually provide a stronger notion of security than XTS. HPolyC encrypts each message using XChaCha12 or XChaCha20 sandwiched between two passes of Poly1305, plus a single block cipher invocation (e.g. AES-256) per message. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages HPolyC-XChaCha12-AES is slightly faster than Speck128/256-XTS. Note that for long messages, the block cipher is not performance-critical since it's only invoked once per message; that's why we can use AES in HPolyC, despite the fully AES-based encryption modes being too slow. HPolyC is a construction, not a primitive. It is proven secure if XChaCha and AES are secure, subject to a security bound. Unless there is a mistake in this proof, one therefore does not need to trust HPolyC; one need only trust XChaCha (which itself has a security reduction to ChaCha) and AES. This RFC patchset implements HPolyC for Linux's crypto API. Patches 1-8 add support for XChaCha20, XChaCha12, and NEON-accelerated Poly1305. The final patch adds the actual HPolyC template. Note: my patches may eventually need to be redone on top of Jason Donenfeld's new crypto library for WireGuard. But, I decided to send them out now anyway since there was a strong desire to give HPolyC a wider audience and I had already written the patches, and to inform the design discussion for the new crypto library. We attest that no "backdoor" or other weakness was inserted into HPolyC, its implementation, or any other aspect of our work; and that to the best of our knowledge, HPolyC's security proof is correct. You don't have to trust us, though: since HPolyC is a construction, not a primitive, its security proof can be independently verified by anyone. We invite additional independent review of HPolyC; and out of caution (since we did publish our paper only very recently, and we are only human, and humans can make mistakes even in proofs), we recommend that this patchset not be merged or used in production quite yet. Also, this proposal is not final, and may yet be changed if improvements are found. This patchset can also be found in git at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git branch "hpolyc-v1". Footnotes: [1] Yes, that means we won't actually be needing my implementations of Speck for the crypto API. So, we no longer have any objection to them being removed. I just ask that if anyone would like to restart that discussion, you please start a new thread rather than using this one, so as to not derail any discussion on HPolyC. [2] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33000.html Eric Biggers (9): crypto: chacha20-generic - add HChaCha20 library function crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support crypto: arm/chacha20 - add XChaCha20 support crypto: arm/chacha20 - refactor to allow varying number of rounds crypto: arm/chacha - add XChaCha12 support crypto: arm/poly1305 - add NEON accelerated Poly1305 implementation crypto: hpolyc - add support for the HPolyC encryption mode arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 7 +- arch/arm/crypto/Makefile | 6 +- ...hacha20-neon-core.S => chacha-neon-core.S} | 107 +- arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 207 +++ arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 127 -- arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-neon-core.S | 1115 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-neon-glue.c | 325 ++++ arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 40 +- arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c | 52 +- crypto/Kconfig | 48 +- crypto/Makefile | 3 +- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 136 -- crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 10 +- crypto/chacha_generic.c | 216 +++ crypto/hpolyc.c | 577 ++++++++ crypto/testmgr.c | 24 + crypto/testmgr.h | 1313 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/char/random.c | 50 +- include/crypto/chacha.h | 56 + include/crypto/chacha20.h | 28 - lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/{chacha20.c => chacha.c} | 61 +- 22 files changed, 4083 insertions(+), 427 deletions(-) rename arch/arm/crypto/{chacha20-neon-core.S => chacha-neon-core.S} (89%) create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c delete mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-neon-core.S create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/poly1305-neon-glue.c delete mode 100644 crypto/chacha20_generic.c create mode 100644 crypto/chacha_generic.c create mode 100644 crypto/hpolyc.c create mode 100644 include/crypto/chacha.h delete mode 100644 include/crypto/chacha20.h rename lib/{chacha20.c => chacha.c} (57%)