| Message ID | 1456487051-14652-1-git-send-email-gmazyland@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
| Headers | show |
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:44:08PM +0100, Milan Broz wrote: > From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> > > commit dd504589577d8e8e70f51f997ad487a4cb6c026f upstream. > > Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them > without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that > the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been > done on the socket yet. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> > Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > [backported to 4.1 by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>] Ack to all four patches. Thanks Milan!
On 02/26/2016 06:44 AM, Milan Broz wrote: > From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> > > commit dd504589577d8e8e70f51f997ad487a4cb6c026f upstream. > > Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them > without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that > the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been > done on the socket yet. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> > Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > [backported to 4.1 by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>] Thanks Milan. Can I add your Signed-off-by to this series? Thanks, Sasha -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 02/27/2016 10:40 PM, Sasha Levin wrote: > On 02/26/2016 06:44 AM, Milan Broz wrote: >> From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> >> >> commit dd504589577d8e8e70f51f997ad487a4cb6c026f upstream. >> >> Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them >> without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that >> the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been >> done on the socket yet. >> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> >> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> >> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> >> [backported to 4.1 by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>] > > Thanks Milan. Can I add your Signed-off-by to this series? yes, Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Thanks, Milan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index 5bc42f9..1c9879d 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ struct skcipher_sg_list { struct scatterlist sg[0]; }; +struct skcipher_tfm { + struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher; + bool has_key; +}; + struct skcipher_ctx { struct list_head tsgl; struct af_alg_sgl rsgl; @@ -752,17 +757,41 @@ static struct proto_ops algif_skcipher_ops = { static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask) { - return crypto_alloc_ablkcipher(name, type, mask); + struct skcipher_tfm *tfm; + struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher; + + tfm = kzalloc(sizeof(*tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tfm) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + skcipher = crypto_alloc_ablkcipher(name, type, mask); + if (IS_ERR(skcipher)) { + kfree(tfm); + return ERR_CAST(skcipher); + } + + tfm->skcipher = skcipher; + + return tfm; } static void skcipher_release(void *private) { - crypto_free_ablkcipher(private); + struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private; + + crypto_free_ablkcipher(tfm->skcipher); + kfree(tfm); } static int skcipher_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { - return crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(private, key, keylen); + struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private; + int err; + + err = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(tfm->skcipher, key, keylen); + tfm->has_key = !err; + + return err; } static void skcipher_wait(struct sock *sk) @@ -794,20 +823,25 @@ static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk) { struct skcipher_ctx *ctx; struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); - unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(private); + struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private; + struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher = tfm->skcipher; + unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(skcipher); + + if (!tfm->has_key) + return -ENOKEY; ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; - ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(private), + ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(skcipher), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx->iv) { sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len); return -ENOMEM; } - memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(private)); + memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(skcipher)); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl); ctx->len = len; @@ -820,7 +854,7 @@ static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk) ask->private = ctx; - ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, private); + ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, skcipher); ablkcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);