From patchwork Thu Aug 20 08:42:49 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stephan Mueller X-Patchwork-Id: 11725909 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B757E722 for ; Thu, 20 Aug 2020 08:53:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BBC522CAD for ; Thu, 20 Aug 2020 08:53:49 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=chronox.de header.i=@chronox.de header.b="cEVHxzI/" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726816AbgHTIxs (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Aug 2020 04:53:48 -0400 Received: from mo4-p04-ob.smtp.rzone.de ([85.215.255.120]:28442 "EHLO mo4-p04-ob.smtp.rzone.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726788AbgHTIxB (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Aug 2020 04:53:01 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1597913573; s=strato-dkim-0002; d=chronox.de; h=References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From: X-RZG-CLASS-ID:X-RZG-AUTH:From:Subject:Sender; bh=2TWzYfbKv5CeL/P1ywHw8oQlEiDCwQ1rLuujHdrVeDI=; b=cEVHxzI/1CtVGJ0nRxT4NTZ8zVLhcFdC8ulvWAwFplY5smq79tdvJCnh23a7Tz+lPW WDiNYlrcYI5TCzK8StqRd5WfmIMIqVrtWnjYTQyr+JJzEJw0kXzqiyYqgJSCvNzRRTa5 7Mz+OEoyE4EInmRBDPpOiiqo2nX9+ZUszP8CY03XFFhAjYrI4K6gnNFTO4iHdxsSl3tj MM9cCYkd0zvRA5m2RWCHD4tUwAOdwI7E6EdFILsnUXP86B5G2/vClTNtI5y3duazNDHG ByogwaCSaR65HoEImIuQjaN/XcalnfAG5fyRCt0p7nnvVFJhOwu4saQk9Dapy3aB05i8 2ZCg== X-RZG-AUTH: ":P2ERcEykfu11Y98lp/T7+hdri+uKZK8TKWEqNyiHySGSa9k9xm0dNS3IdRAZAL+p6A==" X-RZG-CLASS-ID: mo00 Received: from positron.chronox.de by smtp.strato.de (RZmta 46.10.7 DYNA|AUTH) with ESMTPSA id 002e9aw7K8nbBSr (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate); Thu, 20 Aug 2020 10:49:37 +0200 (CEST) From: Stephan =?iso-8859-1?q?M=FCller?= To: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, LKML , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Willy Tarreau , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Andy Lutomirski , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Nicolai Stange , "Peter, Matthias" , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Roman Drahtmueller , Neil Horman , Randy Dunlap , Julia Lawall , Dan Carpenter Subject: [PATCH v32 06/12] LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 10:42:49 +0200 Message-ID: <1733393.atdPhlSkOF@positron.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: <2544450.mvXUDI8C0e@positron.chronox.de> References: <2544450.mvXUDI8C0e@positron.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Using the LRNG switchable DRNG support, the SP800-90A DRBG extension is implemented. The DRBG uses the kernel crypto API DRBG implementation. In addition, it uses the kernel crypto API SHASH support to provide the hashing operation. The DRBG supports the choice of either a CTR DRBG using AES-256, HMAC DRBG with SHA-512 core or Hash DRBG with SHA-512 core. The used core can be selected with the module parameter lrng_drbg_type. The default is the CTR DRBG. When compiling the DRBG extension statically, the DRBG is loaded at late_initcall stage which implies that with the start of user space, the user space interfaces of getrandom(2), /dev/random and /dev/urandom provide random data produced by an SP800-90A DRBG. CC: "Eric W. Biederman" CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" CC: Willy Tarreau CC: Matthew Garrett CC: Vito Caputo CC: Andreas Dilger CC: Jan Kara CC: Ray Strode CC: William Jon McCann CC: zhangjs CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Florian Weimer CC: Lennart Poettering CC: Nicolai Stange Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri Tested-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Reported-by: kernel test robot --- drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 12 ++ drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 + drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c | 259 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 272 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig index d3138458fd8b..4ad26fdfbe7e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig @@ -72,4 +72,16 @@ menuconfig LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH accessible via the external interfaces. With this configuration option other DRNGs can be selected and loaded at runtime. +if LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH +config LRNG_DRBG + tristate "SP800-90A support for the LRNG" + depends on CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + help + Enable the SP800-90A DRBG support for the LRNG. Once the + module is loaded, output from /dev/random, /dev/urandom, + getrandom(2), or get_random_bytes is provided by a DRBG. +endif # LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH + endif # LRNG diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile index 31cfe87c999e..0d320fcb7b9e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile @@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..06590438f88f --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause +/* + * Backend for the LRNG providing the cryptographic primitives using the + * kernel crypto API and its DRBG. + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2020, Stephan Mueller + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Define a DRBG plus a hash / MAC used to extract data from the entropy pool. + * For LRNG_HASH_NAME you can use a hash or a MAC (HMAC or CMAC) of your choice + * (Note, you should use the suggested selections below -- using SHA-1 or MD5 + * is not wise). The idea is that the used cipher primitive can be selected to + * be the same as used for the DRBG. I.e. the LRNG only uses one cipher + * primitive using the same cipher implementation with the options offered in + * the following. This means, if the CTR DRBG is selected and AES-NI is present, + * both the CTR DRBG and the selected cmac(aes) use AES-NI. + * + * The security strengths of the DRBGs are all 256 bits according to + * SP800-57 section 5.6.1. + * + * This definition is allowed to be changed. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR +static unsigned int lrng_drbg_type = 0; +#elif defined CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC +static unsigned int lrng_drbg_type = 1; +#elif defined CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH +static unsigned int lrng_drbg_type = 2; +#else +#error "Unknown DRBG in use" +#endif + +/* The parameter must be r/o in sysfs as otherwise races appear. */ +module_param(lrng_drbg_type, uint, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(lrng_drbg_type, "DRBG type used for LRNG (0->CTR_DRBG, 1->HMAC_DRBG, 2->Hash_DRBG)"); + +struct lrng_drbg { + const char *hash_name; + const char *drbg_core; +}; + +static const struct lrng_drbg lrng_drbg_types[] = { + { /* CTR_DRBG with AES-256 using derivation function */ + .hash_name = "sha512", + .drbg_core = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256", + }, { /* HMAC_DRBG with SHA-512 */ + .hash_name = "sha512", + .drbg_core = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512", + }, { /* Hash_DRBG with SHA-512 using derivation function */ + .hash_name = "sha512", + .drbg_core = "drbg_nopr_sha512" + } +}; + +struct lrng_hash_info { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static int lrng_drbg_drng_seed_helper(void *drng, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = (struct drbg_state *)drng; + LIST_HEAD(seedlist); + struct drbg_string data; + int ret; + + drbg_string_fill(&data, inbuf, inbuflen); + list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist); + ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, &seedlist, drbg->seeded); + + if (ret >= 0) + drbg->seeded = true; + + return ret; +} + +static int lrng_drbg_drng_generate_helper(void *drng, u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = (struct drbg_state *)drng; + + return drbg->d_ops->generate(drbg, outbuf, outbuflen, NULL); +} + +static void *lrng_drbg_drng_alloc(u32 sec_strength) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg; + int coreref = -1; + bool pr = false; + int ret; + + drbg_convert_tfm_core(lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].drbg_core, + &coreref, &pr); + if (coreref < 0) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + drbg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct drbg_state), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref]; + drbg->seeded = false; + ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg); + if (ret) + goto err; + + if (sec_strength > drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags)) { + pr_err("Security strength of DRBG (%u bits) lower than requested by LRNG (%u bits)\n", + drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags) * 8, + sec_strength * 8); + goto dealloc; + } + + if (sec_strength < drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags)) + pr_warn("Security strength of DRBG (%u bits) higher than requested by LRNG (%u bits)\n", + drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags) * 8, + sec_strength * 8); + + pr_info("DRBG with %s core allocated\n", drbg->core->backend_cra_name); + + return drbg; + +dealloc: + if (drbg->d_ops) + drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg); + drbg_dealloc_state(drbg); +err: + kfree(drbg); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); +} + +static void lrng_drbg_drng_dealloc(void *drng) +{ + struct drbg_state *drbg = (struct drbg_state *)drng; + + if (drbg && drbg->d_ops) + drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg); + drbg_dealloc_state(drbg); + kzfree(drbg); + pr_info("DRBG deallocated\n"); +} + +static void *lrng_drbg_hash_alloc(const u8 *key, u32 keylen) +{ + struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int size, ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name, + 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("could not allocate hash %s\n", + lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name); + return ERR_CAST(tfm); + } + + size = sizeof(struct lrng_hash_info) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm); + lrng_hash = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!lrng_hash) { + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + + lrng_hash->shash.tfm = tfm; + + /* If the used hash is no MAC, ignore the ENOSYS return code */ + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen); + if (ret && ret != -ENOSYS) { + pr_err("could not set the key for MAC\n"); + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + kfree(lrng_hash); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + pr_info("Hash %s allocated\n", + lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name); + + return lrng_hash; +} + +static void lrng_drbg_hash_dealloc(void *hash) +{ + struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash; + struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash; + struct crypto_shash *tfm = shash->tfm; + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + kfree(lrng_hash); + pr_info("Hash deallocated\n"); +} + +static u32 lrng_drbg_hash_digestsize(void *hash) +{ + struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash; + struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash; + + return crypto_shash_digestsize(shash->tfm); +} + +static int lrng_drbg_hash_buffer(void *hash, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen, + u8 *digest) +{ + struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash; + struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash; + + return crypto_shash_digest(shash, inbuf, inbuflen, digest); +} + +static const char *lrng_drbg_name(void) +{ + return lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].drbg_core; +} + +static const char *lrng_hash_name(void) +{ + return lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name; +} + +const static struct lrng_crypto_cb lrng_drbg_crypto_cb = { + .lrng_drng_name = lrng_drbg_name, + .lrng_hash_name = lrng_hash_name, + .lrng_drng_alloc = lrng_drbg_drng_alloc, + .lrng_drng_dealloc = lrng_drbg_drng_dealloc, + .lrng_drng_seed_helper = lrng_drbg_drng_seed_helper, + .lrng_drng_generate_helper = lrng_drbg_drng_generate_helper, + .lrng_hash_alloc = lrng_drbg_hash_alloc, + .lrng_hash_dealloc = lrng_drbg_hash_dealloc, + .lrng_hash_digestsize = lrng_drbg_hash_digestsize, + .lrng_hash_buffer = lrng_drbg_hash_buffer, +}; + +static int __init lrng_drbg_init(void) +{ + if (lrng_drbg_type >= ARRAY_SIZE(lrng_drbg_types)) { + pr_err("lrng_drbg_type parameter too large (given %u - max: %lu)", + lrng_drbg_type, + (unsigned long)ARRAY_SIZE(lrng_drbg_types) - 1); + return -EAGAIN; + } + return lrng_set_drng_cb(&lrng_drbg_crypto_cb); +} + +static void __exit lrng_drbg_exit(void) +{ + lrng_set_drng_cb(NULL); +} + +late_initcall(lrng_drbg_init); +module_exit(lrng_drbg_exit); +MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller "); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Linux Random Number Generator - SP800-90A DRBG backend");