From patchwork Mon Dec 4 12:26:28 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ard Biesheuvel X-Patchwork-Id: 10090073 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E2CB6056E for ; Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:27:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECF352915A for ; Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:27:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id E10B729177; Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:27:06 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, URIBL_DBL_ABUSE_SPAM autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B46C2915A for ; Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:27:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753135AbdLDM1E (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Dec 2017 07:27:04 -0500 Received: from mail-wr0-f196.google.com ([209.85.128.196]:35132 "EHLO mail-wr0-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753092AbdLDM1B (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Dec 2017 07:27:01 -0500 Received: by mail-wr0-f196.google.com with SMTP id g53so17089966wra.2 for ; Mon, 04 Dec 2017 04:27:00 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=LihVXBSIHLub8TadiGHOcXJbFC4M3p/6b/xh6SsRLz4=; b=A3K63UN3kJTg07Aw1OTWX2B0NXAtFutKhy+NSpk6DKoDkA+hziIwo57vKBJqD7gqDZ FgYvD+5wXcrdfdMEWafMPx2LuQXhKRx7BR7cOlqERVQhnGRcIaGkqGDRk1TKFJoZFPps WBEyD94LwKxAbLCs7FrWEdu3GY4g06t665BQQ= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=LihVXBSIHLub8TadiGHOcXJbFC4M3p/6b/xh6SsRLz4=; b=hzAQGDmkCmyeBfTFhdkjWKVqBFTpnEW5LnNuXnBGvD3seQJgP5M7zAIewVAJOk44Co G6ac4neMWk1pUQN1RT+Pzj0WZ2L5H4ymozp4mjPegdOJODcXGJUR8nspyOKaIl7IkM4T j2XAafcuUHDIOnGk1EKBURxAJC3p5wGB0joZfHKiXq/DoukA6aEkuea7ZpQ95ww/BeY6 R5+E4RM8SWFDJcjgbr8i7KAMurT4Tms7DLnm9hsfndtoJEZhxeaJbOEnlr2A6mfm5I98 3GnxTJlTV9C4RF0nvmq0GQhb+8Y4UXsRbh50Dhm7PnqpFCc5RcOkS6DYA+M8t/NQO9o8 ygjg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJaThX42XcO17jJY1A6VGD4fB8xSU4+rJ/Xsji2uqsKeeS43fyponG68 438pN6ZYmHaJ9m6hT7gRsXdcJU8NGKU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGs4zMZ6p6gSi5W1HyfXnU6w3QXR1FxML4iBtPzDCk01TywuycVK1WFoNZo2SKITQ5ByeKwMqTvLUw== X-Received: by 10.223.176.27 with SMTP id f27mr13175759wra.105.1512390419990; Mon, 04 Dec 2017 04:26:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([105.150.171.234]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a8sm7665839wmh.41.2017.12.04.04.26.57 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 04 Dec 2017 04:26:59 -0800 (PST) From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Ard Biesheuvel , Dave Martin , Russell King - ARM Linux , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , Mark Rutland , linux-rt-users@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Steven Rostedt , Thomas Gleixner Subject: [PATCH v2 02/19] crypto: arm64/aes-ce-ccm - move kernel mode neon en/disable into loop Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 12:26:28 +0000 Message-Id: <20171204122645.31535-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <20171204122645.31535-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> References: <20171204122645.31535-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(), and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason, the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with preemption disabled. Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel. So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 47 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c index a1254036f2b1..68b11aa690e4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c @@ -107,11 +107,13 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen) } static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], - u32 abytes, u32 *macp, bool use_neon) + u32 abytes, u32 *macp) { - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc, num_rounds(key)); + kernel_neon_end(); } else { if (*macp > 0 && *macp < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { int added = min(abytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - *macp); @@ -143,8 +145,7 @@ static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], } } -static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], - bool use_neon) +static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) { struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], ltag.len = 6; } - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp, use_neon); + ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp); scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src); do { @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[], n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len); } p = scatterwalk_map(&walk); - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp, use_neon); + ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp); len -= n; scatterwalk_unmap(p); @@ -242,43 +243,42 @@ static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 len = req->cryptlen; - bool use_neon = may_use_simd(); int err; err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len); if (err) return err; - if (likely(use_neon)) - kernel_neon_begin(); - if (req->assoclen) - ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac, use_neon); + ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac); /* preserve the original iv for the final round */ memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, true); - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { while (walk.nbytes) { u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) tail = 0; + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); } - if (!err) + if (!err) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); - - kernel_neon_end(); + kernel_neon_end(); + } } else { err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, true); } @@ -301,43 +301,42 @@ static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u32 len = req->cryptlen - authsize; - bool use_neon = may_use_simd(); int err; err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len); if (err) return err; - if (likely(use_neon)) - kernel_neon_begin(); - if (req->assoclen) - ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac, use_neon); + ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac); /* preserve the original iv for the final round */ memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, true); - if (likely(use_neon)) { + if (may_use_simd()) { while (walk.nbytes) { u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) tail = 0; + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); } - if (!err) + if (!err) { + kernel_neon_begin(); ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); - - kernel_neon_end(); + kernel_neon_end(); + } } else { err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, false); }