diff mbox series

[v7,12/16] fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy

Message ID 20190726224141.14044-13-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series fscrypt: key management improvements | expand

Commit Message

Eric Biggers July 26, 2019, 10:41 p.m. UTC 
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than
in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user
to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually
know, then encrypt their files using that key.  Cryptographically this
isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this would be a bit weird.
Thus, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user
has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER).

We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption
policies, however; there is no way around that.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  3 +++
 fs/crypto/keyring.c         | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/policy.c          |  6 +++++
 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+)

Comments

Theodore Ts'o July 28, 2019, 9:24 p.m. UTC | #1 
On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 03:41:37PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than
> in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user
> to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually
> know, then encrypt their files using that key.  Cryptographically this
> isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this would be a bit weird.
> Thus, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user
> has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER).
> 
> We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption
> policies, however; there is no way around that.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

					- Ted
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 2445b0fc4f01c..8d61f410aa677 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -408,6 +408,9 @@  extern struct key *
 fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
 			const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec);
 
+extern int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
+				    const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]);
+
 extern int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void);
 
 /* keysetup.c */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index 307533d4d7c51..258409d0c7409 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -562,6 +562,53 @@  int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key);
 
+/*
+ * Verify that the current user has added a master key with the given identifier
+ * (returns -ENOKEY if not).  This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting
+ * their files using some other user's key which they don't actually know.
+ * Cryptographically this isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this
+ * would be a bit weird, so it's best to just forbid it.
+ *
+ * The system administrator (CAP_FOWNER) can override this, which should be
+ * enough for any use cases where encryption policies are being set using keys
+ * that were chosen ahead of time but aren't available at the moment.
+ *
+ * Note that the key may have already removed by the time this returns, but
+ * that's okay; we just care whether the key was there at some point.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the key is added, -ENOKEY if it isn't, or another -errno code
+ */
+int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
+			     const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
+{
+	struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
+	struct key *key, *mk_user;
+	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+	int err;
+
+	mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
+	memcpy(mk_spec.u.identifier, identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+
+	key = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &mk_spec);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(key);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	mk = key->payload.data[0];
+	mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
+	if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(mk_user);
+	} else {
+		key_put(mk_user);
+		err = 0;
+	}
+	key_put(key);
+out:
+	if (err == -ENOKEY && capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+		err = 0;
+	return err;
+}
+
 static void shrink_dcache_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry;
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index 0141d338c1fdb..60de9048ed4d1 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@  static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
 {
 	union fscrypt_context ctx;
 	int ctxsize;
+	int err;
 
 	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(policy, inode))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -251,6 +252,11 @@  static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
 		 */
 		pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting deprecated v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2.\n",
 			     current->comm, current->pid);
+	} else {
+		err = fscrypt_verify_key_added(inode->i_sb,
+					       policy->v2.master_key_identifier);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy);