From patchwork Wed Jan 12 21:12:47 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Chang S. Bae" X-Patchwork-Id: 12711955 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16C7DC433EF for ; Wed, 12 Jan 2022 21:20:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230187AbiALVUj (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Jan 2022 16:20:39 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:1416 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230077AbiALVUi (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Jan 2022 16:20:38 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1642022438; x=1673558438; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references; bh=VnKbDj9INci9I8jOiGqny0phPxxQrd50d9zB9AWtByI=; b=Bc4gkGuuFnZn3ucPzAtO1WkeRDC8r9/pV3w8BLd9YvOQj5iXdeDfOzbs x9VzJuo+Wj6P6YqTQibNTfprI0VRHxsxcDync2AOcp3mBdt9XSJWBy6vy Y+PGmUgxxZlXrrDdBDesUtwT0jBhizhzi2mFMGtHc58SdxPb/5F0jNci7 SjLt45lCcFNa/+AmccAkIQN9LPashNi8z09vGBeyG69/6rt/DijdhGvvH Vt06w/f32yqYmyTdydsFX9I+4LxK+lXbuBraatJuWSGFjw4P7wkiKnHdx 9uyap9SgZ3bQu2kRCvSSnqTRwFp+1zNqjApJsgdq/lPy9tQHnxpw5vlP3 g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10225"; a="243810782" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,284,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="243810782" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Jan 2022 13:20:38 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,284,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="529378223" Received: from chang-linux-3.sc.intel.com ([172.25.66.175]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Jan 2022 13:20:37 -0800 From: "Chang S. Bae" To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ebiggers@kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@suse.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mingo@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dan.j.williams@intel.com, charishma1.gairuboyina@intel.com, kumar.n.dwarakanath@intel.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, chang.seok.bae@intel.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 01/12] Documentation/x86: Document Key Locker Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 13:12:47 -0800 Message-Id: <20220112211258.21115-2-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20220112211258.21115-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> References: <20220112211258.21115-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Document the overview of the feature along with relevant consideration when provisioning dm-crypt volumes with AES-KL instead of AES-NI. Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- Changes from RFC v2: * Add as a new patch. --- Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/keylocker.rst | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/keylocker.rst diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst index f498f1d36cd3..bbea47ea10f6 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst @@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation features elf_auxvec xstate + keylocker diff --git a/Documentation/x86/keylocker.rst b/Documentation/x86/keylocker.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e65d936ef199 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/keylocker.rst @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============== +x86 Key Locker +============== + +Introduction +============ + +Key Locker is a CPU feature feature to reduce key exfiltration +opportunities while maintaining a programming interface similar to AES-NI. +It converts the AES key into an encoded form, called the 'key handle'. The +key handle is a wrapped version of the clear-text key where the wrapping +key has limited exposure. Once converted, all subsequent data encryption +using new AES instructions (AES-KL) uses this key handle, reducing the +exposure of private key material in memory. + +Internal Wrapping Key (IWKey) +============================= + +The CPU-internal wrapping key is an entity in a software-invisible CPU +state. On every system boot, a new key is loaded. So the key handle that +was encoded by the old wrapping key is no longer usable on system shutdown +or reboot. + +And the key may be lost on the following exceptional situation upon wakeup: + +IWKey Restore Failure +--------------------- + +The CPU state is volatile with the ACPI S3/4 sleep states. When the system +supports those states, the key has to be backed up so that it is restored +on wake up. The kernel saves the key in non-volatile media. + +The event of an IWKey restore failure upon resume from suspend, all +established key handles become invalid. In flight dm-crypt operations +receive error results from pending operations. In the likely scenario that +dm-crypt is hosting the root filesystem the recovery is identical to if a +storage controller failed to resume from suspend, reboot. If the volume +impacted by an IWKey restore failure is a data-volume then it is possible +that I/O errors on that volume do not bring down the rest of the system. +However, a reboot is still required because the kernel will have +soft-disabled Key Locker. Upon the failure, the crypto library code will +return -ENODEV on every AES-KL function call. The Key Locker implementation +only loads a new IWKey at initial boot, not any time after like resume from +suspend. + +Use Case and Non-use Cases +========================== + +Bare metal disk encryption is the only intended use case. + +Userspace usage is not supported because there is no ABI provided to +communicate and coordinate wrapping-key restore failure to userspace. For +now, key restore failures are only coordinated with kernel users. But the +kernel can not prevent userspace from using the feature's AES instructions +('AES-KL') when the feature has been enabled. So, the lack of userspace +support is only documented, not actively enforced. + +Key Locker is not expected to be advertised to guest VMs and the kernel +implementation ignores it even if the VMM enumerates the capability. The +expectation is that a guest VM wants private IWKey state, but the +architecture does not provide that. An emulation of that capability, by +caching per VM IWKeys in memory, defeats the purpose of Key Locker. The +backup / restore facility is also not performant enough to be suitable for +guest VM context switches. + +AES Instruction Set +=================== + +The feature accompanies a new AES instruction set. This instruction set is +analogous to AES-NI. A set of AES-NI instructions can be mapped to an +AES-KL instruction. For example, AESENC128KL is responsible for ten rounds +of transformation, which is equivalent to nine times AESENC and one +AESENCLAST in AES-NI. + +But they have some notable differences: + +* AES-KL provides a secure data transformation using an encrypted key. + +* If an invalid key handle is provided, e.g. a corrupted one or a handle + restriction failure, the instruction fails with setting RFLAGS.ZF. The + crypto library implementation includes the flag check to return an error + code. Note that the flag is also set when the internal wrapping key is + changed because of missing backup. + +* AES-KL implements support for 128-bit and 256-bit keys, but there is no + AES-KL instruction to process an 192-bit key. But there is no AES-KL + instruction to process a 192-bit key. The AES-KL cipher implementation + logs a warning message with a 192-bit key and then falls back to AES-NI. + So, this 192-bit key-size limitation is only documented, not enforced. It + means the key will remain in clear-text in memory. This is to meet Linux + crypto-cipher expectation that each implementation must support all the + AES-compliant key sizes. + +* Some AES-KL hardware implementation may have noticeable performance + overhead when compared with AES-NI instructions. +