Message ID | 20220503134052.646325-1-Jason@zx2c4.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Not Applicable |
Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
Headers | show |
Series | [RFC,v1] random: use static branch for crng_ready() | expand |
On Tue, May 03, 2022 at 03:40:52PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > +static bool crng_ready_slowpath(void) > +{ > + if (crng_init <= 1) > + return false; > + if (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled() || cmpxchg(&crng_init, 2, 3) != 2) > + return true; Nobody chimed in here, but for posterity I thought I should point out that this approach actually won't work, since in_atomic() doesn't work with CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT=n kernels. So back to the drawing board in trying to figure out the best way to do this... Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote: > On Tue, May 03, 2022 at 03:40:52PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: >> +static bool crng_ready_slowpath(void) >> +{ >> + if (crng_init <= 1) >> + return false; >> + if (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled() || cmpxchg(&crng_init, 2, 3) != 2) >> + return true; > > Nobody chimed in here, but for posterity I thought I should point out > that this approach actually won't work, since in_atomic() doesn't work > with CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT=n kernels. > > So back to the drawing board in trying to figure out the best way to do > this... Well the standard solution to code paths that require sleeping is to use a work queue. So any reason why you can't just schedule a work to do the static_branch_enable? Cheers,
Hi Herbert, On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 12:35:51PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote: > > On Tue, May 03, 2022 at 03:40:52PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > >> +static bool crng_ready_slowpath(void) > >> +{ > >> + if (crng_init <= 1) > >> + return false; > >> + if (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled() || cmpxchg(&crng_init, 2, 3) != 2) > >> + return true; > > > > Nobody chimed in here, but for posterity I thought I should point out > > that this approach actually won't work, since in_atomic() doesn't work > > with CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT=n kernels. > > > > So back to the drawing board in trying to figure out the best way to do > > this... > > Well the standard solution to code paths that require sleeping is > to use a work queue. So any reason why you can't just schedule > a work to do the static_branch_enable? Yea, that would work but becomes kind of messier than most cases, because the transition from not-init'd to init'd can happen before workqueues are even initialized, which means some logic is necessary for detecting this and then deferring that to happen later on in initialization. I thought this was pretty "meh", hence looking for other solutions. But maybe you're right and it's the best we can do here. For the sake of discussion, below is what the code for that would approximately look like, modulo whatever details I'm missing. I guess it's not _that_ bad, if I just rely on the obscure property that rand_initialize() is called before IRQs are enabled system-wide but after system_wq has been initialized, but I just hate having the deferred state be implicit like that. If we go that route, it'll need comments I suppose. Jason diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8fa7a5b9aa93..809ee3c1cf78 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static enum { CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */ } crng_init = CRNG_EMPTY; -#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY)) +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready); +#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || unlikely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY)) /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; @@ -109,6 +110,12 @@ bool rng_is_initialized(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized); +static void crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work) +{ + static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready); +} +static DECLARE_WORK(crng_set_ready_work, crng_set_ready); + /* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); @@ -268,6 +275,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); + if (!crng_ready() && system_wq) + schedule_work(&crng_set_ready_work); crng_init = CRNG_READY; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key)); @@ -945,9 +954,18 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - if (crng_ready()) + if (crng_ready()) { + /* + * If rand_initialize() is called with the crng already + * initialized, then it means it was done so prior to + * system_wq being available, which means we should now + * schedule the work to change the static key. + */ + schedule_work(&crng_set_ready_work); + + /* Immediately use the above architectural contributions. */ crng_reseed(); - else if (arch_init && trust_cpu) + } else if (arch_init && trust_cpu) credit_init_bits(BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8); WARN_ON(register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier));
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 845f610b6611..977093022430 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -75,12 +75,13 @@ * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized * 1 --> Initialized * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool + * 3 --> Initialized from input_pool and static key set * * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases - * its value (from 0->1->2). + * its value (from 0->1->2->3). */ static int crng_init = 0; -#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_ready_static); /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; @@ -96,6 +97,17 @@ static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly; module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression"); +static bool crng_ready_slowpath(void) +{ + if (crng_init <= 1) + return false; + if (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled() || cmpxchg(&crng_init, 2, 3) != 2) + return true; + static_branch_enable(&crng_ready_static); + return true; +} +#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_ready_static) || unlikely(crng_ready_slowpath())) + /* * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
Since crng_ready() is only false briefly during initialization and then forever after becomes true, we don't need to evaluate it after, making it a prime candidate for a static branch. One complication, however, is that it changes state in a particular call to credit_entropy_bits(), which might be made from atomic context. So rather than changing it then, we keep around the same state variable we had before, but the next time it's used from non-atomic context, we change it lazily then. This is an RFC for now because it seems a bit complicated and fiddly, and potentially not worth the complexity. I'm interested to hear if people have opinions about this or if there's a better way to do it. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> --- drivers/char/random.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)