diff mbox series

[v1,22/26] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe

Message ID 20231230161954.569267-23-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support | expand

Commit Message

Michael Roth Dec. 30, 2023, 4:19 p.m. UTC 
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the
RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.

When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
SNP-Active VMs.

If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
hardware, if an in-use page is 2MB-aligned and software accesses any
part of the associated 2MB region with a hugepage, the CPU will
incorrectly treat the entire 2MB region as in-use and signal a an RMP
violation #PF.

To avoid this, the recommendation is to not use a 2MB-aligned page for
the VMCB, VMSA or AVIC pages. Add a generic allocator that will ensure
that the page returned is not 2MB-aligned and is safe to be used when
SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the VMCB/VMSA
pages of nested guests.

Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com> # for nested VMSA case
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
[mdr: squash in nested guest handling from Ashish, commit msg fixups]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c               |  5 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             | 17 +++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h             |  1 +
 7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Comments

Borislav Petkov Jan. 21, 2024, 11:51 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Sat, Dec 30, 2023 at 10:19:50AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c               |  5 ++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c          |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             | 17 +++++++++++++---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h             |  1 +
>  7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

This one belongs in the second part, the KVM set.
Michael Roth Jan. 26, 2024, 3:44 a.m. UTC | #2 
On Sun, Jan 21, 2024 at 12:51:21PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 30, 2023 at 10:19:50AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
> >  arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c               |  5 ++++-
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c          |  2 +-
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             | 17 +++++++++++++---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h             |  1 +
> >  7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> This one belongs in the second part, the KVM set.

If we enable the RMP table (the following patch) without this patch in
place, it can still cause crashes for legacy guests.

I'd moved it earlier into this part of the series based on Paolo's concerns
about that, so my hope was that he'd be willing to give it an Acked-by if
needed so it can go through your tree.

-Mike

> 
> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 378ed944b849..ab24ce207988 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@  KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
 KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
 
 #undef KVM_X86_OP
 #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 7bc1daf68741..9b0f18d096ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1794,6 +1794,7 @@  struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	gva_t (*get_untagged_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned int flags);
+	void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 3242f3da2457..1edf93ee3395 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -2815,7 +2815,10 @@  int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
 
 	vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
 
-	apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page)
+		apic->regs = static_call(kvm_x86_alloc_apic_backing_page)(vcpu);
+	else
+		apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!apic->regs) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
 		       vcpu->vcpu_id);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index dee62362a360..55b9a6d96bcf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@  int svm_allocate_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	if (svm->nested.initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	vmcb02_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	vmcb02_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(&svm->vcpu);
 	if (!vmcb02_page)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr = page_address(vmcb02_page);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 58e19d023d70..2efe3ed89808 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3144,3 +3144,35 @@  void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
 
 	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
 }
+
+struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long pfn;
+	struct page *p;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+		return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate an SNP-safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where
+	 * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a
+	 * hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the RMP entry of a
+	 * 2MB-aligned VMCB, VMSA, or AVIC backing page.
+	 *
+	 * Allocate one extra page, choose a page which is not
+	 * 2MB-aligned, and free the other.
+	 */
+	p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
+	if (!p)
+		return NULL;
+
+	split_page(p, 1);
+
+	pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
+	if (IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD))
+		__free_page(p++);
+	else
+		__free_page(p + 1);
+
+	return p;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 13cacaba229c..b6179696861a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@  static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 
 	memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
-	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	sd->save_area = snp_safe_alloc_page(NULL);
 	if (!sd->save_area)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@  static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
-	vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
 	if (!vmcb01_page)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@  static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
 		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
 		 */
-		vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
 		if (!vmsa_page)
 			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
 
@@ -4899,6 +4899,16 @@  static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
+
+	if (!page)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return page_address(page);
+}
+
 static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
 
@@ -5030,6 +5040,7 @@  static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
 	.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+	.alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 59adff7bbf55..9ed9d72546b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@  void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
 void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 /* vmenter.S */