diff mbox series

[v11,10/35] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests

Message ID 20231230172351.574091-11-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand

Commit Message

Michael Roth Dec. 30, 2023, 5:23 p.m. UTC
When intercepts are enabled for MSR_IA32_XSS, the host will swap in/out
the guest-defined values while context-switching to/from guest mode.
However, in the case of SEV-ES, vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected is set,
so the guest-defined value is effectively ignored when switching to
guest mode with the understanding that the VMSA will handle swapping
in/out this register state.

However, SVM is still configured to intercept these accesses for SEV-ES
guests, so the values in the initial MSR_IA32_XSS are effectively
read-only, and a guest will experience undefined behavior if it actually
tries to write to this MSR. Fortunately, only CET/shadowstack makes use
of this register on SEV-ES-capable systems currently, which isn't yet
widely used, but this may become more of an issue in the future.

Additionally, enabling intercepts of MSR_IA32_XSS results in #VC
exceptions in the guest in certain paths that can lead to unexpected #VC
nesting levels. One example is SEV-SNP guests when handling #VC
exceptions for CPUID instructions involving leaf 0xD, subleaf 0x1, since
they will access MSR_IA32_XSS as part of servicing the CPUID #VC, then
generate another #VC when accessing MSR_IA32_XSS, which can lead to
guest crashes if an NMI occurs at that point in time. Running perf on a
guest while it is issuing such a sequence is one example where these can
be problematic.

Address this by disabling intercepts of MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests
if the host/guest configuration allows it. If the host/guest
configuration doesn't allow for MSR_IA32_XSS, leave it intercepted so
that it can be caught by the existing checks in
kvm_{set,get}_msr_common() if the guest still attempts to access it.

Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 2efe3ed89808..f99435b6648f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2978,6 +2978,25 @@  static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 
 		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_TSC_AUX, v_tsc_aux, v_tsc_aux);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
+	 * the host/guest supports its use.
+	 *
+	 * guest_can_use() checks a number of requirements on the host/guest to
+	 * ensure that MSR_IA32_XSS is available, but it might report true even
+	 * if X86_FEATURE_XSAVES isn't configured in the guest to ensure host
+	 * MSR_IA32_XSS is always properly restored. For SEV-ES, it is better
+	 * to further check that the guest CPUID actually supports
+	 * X86_FEATURE_XSAVES so that accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS by misbehaved
+	 * guests will still get intercepted and caught in the normal
+	 * kvm_emulate_rdmsr()/kvm_emulated_wrmsr() paths.
+	 */
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1);
+	else
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 0, 0);
 }
 
 void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index b6179696861a..18d55df7fa5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@  static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP,		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_XSS,			.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_EFER,				.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_CR_PAT,			.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB,		.always = true  },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 9ed9d72546b3..7f1fbd874c45 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ 
 #define	IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3
 #define	MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2
 
-#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS	46
+#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS	47
 #define MSRPM_OFFSETS	32
 extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
 extern bool npt_enabled;