diff mbox series

[39/82] crypto: Refactor intentional wrap-around test

Message ID 20240123002814.1396804-39-keescook@chromium.org (mailing list archive)
State Changes Requested
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series None | expand

Commit Message

Kees Cook Jan. 23, 2024, 12:27 a.m. UTC 
In an effort to separate intentional arithmetic wrap-around from
unexpected wrap-around, we need to refactor places that depend on this
kind of math. One of the most common code patterns of this is:

	VAR + value < VAR

Notably, this is considered "undefined behavior" for signed and pointer
types, which the kernel works around by using the -fno-strict-overflow
option in the build[1] (which used to just be -fwrapv). Regardless, we
want to get the kernel source to the position where we can meaningfully
instrument arithmetic wrap-around conditions and catch them when they
are unexpected, regardless of whether they are signed[2], unsigned[3],
or pointer[4] types.

Refactor open-coded wrap-around addition test to use add_would_overflow().
This paves the way to enabling the wrap-around sanitizers in the future.

Link: https://git.kernel.org/linus/68df3755e383e6fecf2354a67b08f92f18536594 [1]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [3]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [4]
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@axis.com
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c
index dbc1d483f2af..cbec539f0e20 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@  artpec6_crypto_ctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool encrypt)
 	 * the whole IV is a counter.  So fallback if the counter is going to
 	 * overlow.
 	 */
-	if (counter + nblks < counter) {
+	if (add_would_overflow(counter, nblks)) {
 		int ret;
 
 		pr_debug("counter %x will overflow (nblks %u), falling back\n",