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Violators will be prosecuted; Thu, 20 Apr 2017 20:42:36 -0300 Received: from d24av02.br.ibm.com (d24av02.br.ibm.com [9.8.31.93]) by d24relay02.br.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id v3KNgUji16646274; Thu, 20 Apr 2017 20:42:35 -0300 Received: from d24av02.br.ibm.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by d24av02.br.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.14.4/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id v3KNgEIh028224; Thu, 20 Apr 2017 20:42:15 -0300 Received: from morokweng.localnet ([9.85.159.58]) by d24av02.br.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.14.4/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id v3KNgDeY028206; Thu, 20 Apr 2017 20:42:13 -0300 From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: kbuild test robot Cc: kbuild-all@01.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Claudio Carvalho Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/6] ima: Support appended signatures for appraisal Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2017 20:41:59 -0300 User-Agent: KMail/5.2.3 (Linux/4.4.0-72-generic; KDE/5.28.0; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <201704201148.IPsFhl4B%fengguang.wu@intel.com> References: <201704201148.IPsFhl4B%fengguang.wu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-MML: disable x-cbid: 17042023-0020-0000-0000-000002A1E3B7 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17042023-0021-0000-0000-000030BF056E Message-Id: <35565259.p7kmk0rNRg@morokweng> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2017-04-20_21:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=2 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1703280000 definitions=main-1704200248 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Am Donnerstag, 20. April 2017, 11:04:40 BRT schrieb kbuild test robot: > In file included from security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:19:0: > > include/keys/asymmetric-type.h: In function 'asymmetric_key_ids': > >> include/keys/asymmetric-type.h:76:12: error: dereferencing pointer to > >> incomplete type 'const struct key' > return key->payload.data[asym_key_ids]; > ^~ This happens with CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y and CONFIG_KEYS=n. Fixed by only including the new header files in ima_appraise.c if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG=y diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index e4b0ed386bc8..0d58ecfba2ea 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = { [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig", + [VERIFYING_KEXEC_CMS_SIGNATURE] = "kexec CMS sig", [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig", }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index af4cd8649117..e41beda297a8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -673,3 +673,15 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return -ENOMEM; return 0; } + +/** + * pkcs7_get_message_sig - get signature in @pkcs7 + * + * This function doesn't meaningfully support messages with more than one + * signature. It will always return the first signature. + */ +const struct public_key_signature *pkcs7_get_message_sig( + const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + return pkcs7->signed_infos ? pkcs7->signed_infos->sig : NULL; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 2d93d9eccb4d..eee78074580a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -420,6 +420,19 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, return -EKEYREJECTED; } break; + case VERIFYING_KEXEC_CMS_SIGNATURE: + /* Shipping certificates in the CMS message is not allowed. */ + if (pkcs7->certs) { + pr_warn("Signature isn't allowed to contain certificates.\n"); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + /* Shipping CRLs in the CMS message is not allowed. */ + if (pkcs7->crl) { + pr_warn("Signature isn't allowed to contain CRLs.\n"); + return -EBADMSG; + } + break; default: return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h index 583f199400a3..a05a0d7214e6 100644 --- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const void **_data, size_t *_datalen, size_t *_headerlen); +extern const struct public_key_signature *pkcs7_get_message_sig( + const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); + /* * pkcs7_trust.c */ diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index a10549a6c7cd..b7298d804440 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for { VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_CMS_SIGNATURE, NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR }; extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR]; diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index da9565891738..0d642e0317c7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" - depends on KEYS default n + select KEYS select SIGNATURE help This option enables digital signature verification support diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 370eb2f4dd37..13662043bf90 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -155,6 +155,19 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE If unsure, say N. +config IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG + bool "Support appended signatures for appraisal" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + default n + help + Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the + appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules. + The appended_imasig keyword can be used in the IMA policy for this + purpose. + config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 51ef805cf7f3..60a823630d2a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -190,6 +190,8 @@ enum ima_hooks { __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify) }; +extern const char *const func_tokens[]; + /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr); @@ -248,6 +250,12 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG +void ima_read_appended_sig(const void *buf, loff_t *buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len); +#endif + #else static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8c8030a29117..789bcb1b2d89 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ #include #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG +#include +#include +#include +#endif #include "ima.h" @@ -177,6 +182,85 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, return ret; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG +void ima_read_appended_sig(const void *buf, loff_t *buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len) +{ + const size_t marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const struct public_key_signature *pks; + const struct module_signature *sig; + struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + int i, hdr_len; + loff_t file_len = *buf_len; + size_t sig_len; + const void *p; + + if (file_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig)) + return; + + p = buf + file_len - marker_len; + if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len)) + return; + + file_len -= marker_len; + sig = (const struct module_signature *) (p - sizeof(*sig)); + + if (validate_module_signature(sig, file_len)) + return; + + sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len); + file_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig); + + pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(buf + file_len, sig_len); + if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) + return; + + if (pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, VERIFYING_KEXEC_CMS_SIGNATURE)) + goto out; + + pks = pkcs7_get_message_sig(pkcs7); + if (!pks) + goto out; + + /* IMA only supports RSA keys. */ + if (strcmp(pks->pkey_algo, "rsa")) + goto out; + + if (!pks->auth_ids[0]) + goto out; + + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) + if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], pks->hash_algo)) + break; + + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + goto out; + + hdr_len = sizeof(*hdr) + pks->s_size; + hdr = kmalloc(hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hdr) + goto out; + + hdr->type = EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG; + hdr->version = 2; + hdr->hash_algo = i; + memcpy(hdr->sig, pks->s, pks->s_size); + hdr->sig_size = cpu_to_be16(pks->s_size); + + p = pks->auth_ids[0]->data + pks->auth_ids[0]->len - sizeof(hdr->keyid); + memcpy(&hdr->keyid, p, sizeof(hdr->keyid)); + + *xattr_value = (typeof(*xattr_value)) hdr; + *xattr_len = hdr_len; + *buf_len = file_len; + + out: + pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG */ + /* * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement * @@ -205,7 +289,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, if (rc && rc != -ENODATA) goto out; - cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ? + cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED_MASK ? "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash"; status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; if (opened & FILE_CREATED) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2aebb7984437..994ee420b2ec 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap, * and ima_file_check. */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include #include #include @@ -228,9 +231,30 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || - strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) - /* read 'security.ima' */ - xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); + strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG + unsigned long digsig_req; + + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + if (!buf || !size) + pr_err("%s doesn't support appended_imasig\n", + func_tokens[func]); + else + ima_read_appended_sig(buf, &size, &xattr_value, + &xattr_len); + } + + /* + * Don't try to read the xattr if we require an appended + * signature but failed to get one. + */ + digsig_req = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED_MASK; + if (!xattr_len && digsig_req != IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG */ + /* read 'security.ima' */ + xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), + &xattr_value); + } hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 39d43a5beb5a..fb652f5e3999 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -777,8 +777,15 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) } ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from); - if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG + else if (!strcmp(args[0].from, "appended_imasig")) + entry->flags |= IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; + else if (!strcmp(args[0].from, "appended_imasig|imasig")) + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED + | IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG */ else result = -EINVAL; break; @@ -884,6 +891,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) #str, + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { + __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify) +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append @@ -896,12 +909,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" }; -#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) #str, - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { - __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify) -}; - void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { loff_t l = *pos; @@ -1049,7 +1056,13 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } } - if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + if ((entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED_MASK) == IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED_MASK) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG + seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=appended_imasig|imasig "); + else if (entry->flags & IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=appended_imasig "); + else if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG */ seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index a53e7e4ab06c..de2a666740c1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -27,12 +27,20 @@ #define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080 /* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 -#define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS 0x06000000 -#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000 -#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 -#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000 -#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000 +#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 +#define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS 0x16000000 +#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000 +#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 +#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000 +#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000 +#define IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x10000000 + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG +#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED_MASK (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | \ + IMA_APPENDED_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) +#else +#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED_MASK IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_APPENDED_SIG */ #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)