diff mbox series

[net-next,v2] crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)

Message ID 427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series [net-next,v2] crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE) | expand

Commit Message

David Howells June 16, 2023, 11:10 a.m. UTC
If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length
message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first
sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops
will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in
advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the
hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message
is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.

Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg()
function.  If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore
the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are
continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not
set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be
ignored.

Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if
we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.

Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
 crypto/algif_hash.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

Comments

Herbert Xu June 20, 2023, 4:51 a.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 12:10:32PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length
> message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first
> sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops
> will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in
> advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the
> hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message
> is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
> 
> Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg()
> function.  If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore
> the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are
> continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not
> set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be
> ignored.
> 
> Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if
> we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.
> 
> Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
> Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/
> Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/
> Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/
> Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  crypto/algif_hash.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
>  1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
> index dfb048cefb60..0ab43e149f0e 100644
> --- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
> +++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
> @@ -76,13 +76,30 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>  
>  	lock_sock(sk);
>  	if (!continuing) {
> -		if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
> -			hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
> +		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
> +		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);

Please revert this change as I explained in the other message.

> +		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
> +			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */

This is still broken in the case of a zero-length message with
MSG_MORE set.  Here you will short-circuit out without ever calling
crypto_ahash_init.  However, hash_recvmsg will directly call
crypto_ahash_final on this, which is undefined.

Cheers,
David Howells June 20, 2023, 7:42 a.m. UTC | #2
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:

> > +		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
> 
> Please revert this change as I explained in the other message.
> 
> > +		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
> > +			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */
> 
> This is still broken in the case of a zero-length message with
> MSG_MORE set.  Here you will short-circuit out without ever calling
> crypto_ahash_init.  However, hash_recvmsg will directly call
> crypto_ahash_final on this, which is undefined.

Not so.  hash_recvmsg() will call crypto_ahash_init() first because ctx->more
is false (hence why we came down this branch in hash_sendmsg()) and the result
was released on the previous line (which you're objecting to).  If it goes to
the "done" label, it will skip setting ctx->more to true if MSG_MORE is
passed.

However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length
data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes
a pass of the loop even with no data.

David
Herbert Xu June 20, 2023, 8:20 a.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, Jun 20, 2023 at 08:42:15AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>
> Not so.  hash_recvmsg() will call crypto_ahash_init() first because ctx->more
> is false (hence why we came down this branch in hash_sendmsg()) and the result
> was released on the previous line (which you're objecting to).  If it goes to
> the "done" label, it will skip setting ctx->more to true if MSG_MORE is
> passed.

I see, yes it should work.

> However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length
> data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes
> a pass of the loop even with no data.

Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.

Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Thanks,
David Howells June 20, 2023, 8:31 a.m. UTC | #4
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:

> > However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length
> > data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes
> > a pass of the loop even with no data.
> 
> Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.
> 
> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Um.  Is that against this patch or the old version?

David
Herbert Xu June 20, 2023, 8:34 a.m. UTC | #5
On Tue, Jun 20, 2023 at 09:31:56AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> 
> > > However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length
> > > data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes
> > > a pass of the loop even with no data.
> > 
> > Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.
> > 
> > Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> 
> Um.  Is that against this patch or the old version?

This is against v2 which started this thread.

Cheers,
patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org June 20, 2023, 7:20 p.m. UTC | #6
Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net-next.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>:

On Fri, 16 Jun 2023 12:10:32 +0100 you wrote:
> If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length
> message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first
> sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops
> will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in
> advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the
> hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message
> is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net-next,v2] crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/b6d972f68983

You are awesome, thank you!
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index dfb048cefb60..0ab43e149f0e 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -76,13 +76,30 @@  static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (!continuing) {
-		if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
-			hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
+		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
+			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */
 		need_init = true;
+	} else if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
+		/*
+		 * No data - finalise the prev req if MSG_MORE so any error
+		 * comes out here.
+		 */
+		if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
+			err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
+			ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL,
+						ctx->result, 0);
+			err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
+					      &ctx->wait);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
+		}
+		goto done_more;
 	}
 
-	ctx->more = false;
-
 	while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
@@ -93,15 +110,6 @@  static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		if (npages == 0)
 			goto unlock_free;
 
-		if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sgl.sgl)) {
-			err = -ENOMEM;
-			ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl =
-				kvmalloc(array_size(npages,
-						    sizeof(*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)),
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)
-				goto unlock_free;
-		}
 		sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
 
 		ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
@@ -150,7 +158,9 @@  static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
 	}
 
+done_more:
 	ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
+done:
 	err = 0;
 unlock:
 	release_sock(sk);
@@ -158,6 +168,8 @@  static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 unlock_free:
 	af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
+	hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+	ctx->more = false;
 	goto unlock;
 }