From patchwork Tue Aug 25 07:23:40 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stephan Mueller X-Patchwork-Id: 11735081 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 962FD16B1 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 07:37:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74BAC2074D for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2020 07:37:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=chronox.de header.i=@chronox.de header.b="JFvsIdbO" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729612AbgHYHh3 (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Aug 2020 03:37:29 -0400 Received: from mo4-p04-ob.smtp.rzone.de ([85.215.255.120]:16014 "EHLO mo4-p04-ob.smtp.rzone.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729446AbgHYHgl (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Aug 2020 03:36:41 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1598340996; s=strato-dkim-0002; d=chronox.de; h=References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From: X-RZG-CLASS-ID:X-RZG-AUTH:From:Subject:Sender; bh=7EPfKm4bONRKvGNiPWE251KoUKcr4PmmMFG3HTladI8=; b=JFvsIdbOx1c7Ss/Pwkx9mBJYAatARnE35ZovvIlMflPdBDL/IzzPXp4I3i+imb4/Vr 473C8gcDluR3CGNNiFvWHJFAVPGogPbE+V0tteUMgJb2w0bJZdzLgwom/ikhsHXthP7z lodUbyTaApDcUqfiEJsGKjxlPtFIWiJtkraH8R5he4tsQhMnQ5y88byOWg31hIzWNBZ1 amdu7T4mYK2HYrRpldokEa/QMsEEohVPjvotNqMLpGQRZ0HMpY0BIy+/IduymOEWCXv0 ovhQ3CBkdfbUMOEqe3+DXR7GBew6OWjlQA5oss7EfQ99/HvIuvIzEoeQX6C74GOxw17C dn7Q== X-RZG-AUTH: ":P2ERcEykfu11Y98lp/T7+hdri+uKZK8TKWEqNyiHySGSa9k9xmwdNnzHHXDaIvSXRbo=" X-RZG-CLASS-ID: mo00 Received: from positron.chronox.de by smtp.strato.de (RZmta 46.10.7 DYNA|AUTH) with ESMTPSA id 002e9aw7P7ZNZGU (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate); Tue, 25 Aug 2020 09:35:23 +0200 (CEST) From: Stephan =?iso-8859-1?q?M=FCller?= To: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, LKML , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Willy Tarreau , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Andy Lutomirski , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Nicolai Stange , "Peter, Matthias" , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Roman Drahtmueller , Neil Horman , Randy Dunlap , Julia Lawall , Dan Carpenter , Andy Lavr Subject: [PATCH v34 03/12] LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 09:23:40 +0200 Message-ID: <4621114.GXAFRqVoOG@positron.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: <11649613.O9o76ZdvQC@positron.chronox.de> References: <2544450.mvXUDI8C0e@positron.chronox.de> <5532247.MhkbZ0Pkbq@positron.chronox.de> <11649613.O9o76ZdvQC@positron.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The LRNG sysctl interface provides the same controls as the existing /dev/random implementation. These sysctls behave identically and are implemented identically. The goal is to allow a possible merge of the existing /dev/random implementation with this implementation which implies that this patch tries have a very close similarity. Yet, all sysctls are documented at [1]. In addition, it provides the file lrng_type which provides details about the LRNG: - the name of the DRNG that produces the random numbers for /dev/random, /dev/urandom, getrandom(2) - the hash used to produce random numbers from the entropy pool - the number of secondary DRNG instances - indicator whether the LRNG operates SP800-90B compliant - indicator whether a high-resolution timer is identified - only with a high-resolution timer the interrupt noise source will deliver sufficient entropy - indicator whether the LRNG has been minimally seeded (i.e. is the secondary DRNG seeded with at least 128 bits of of entropy) - indicator whether the LRNG has been fully seeded (i.e. is the secondary DRNG seeded with at least 256 bits of entropy) [1] https://www.chronox.de/lrng.html CC: "Eric W. Biederman" CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" CC: Willy Tarreau CC: Matthew Garrett CC: Vito Caputo CC: Andreas Dilger CC: Jan Kara CC: Ray Strode CC: William Jon McCann CC: zhangjs CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Florian Weimer CC: Lennart Poettering CC: Nicolai Stange Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri Tested-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller --- drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 + drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c | 1 - drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h | 4 + drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile index 0a32f22c2c1a..e69c176f0161 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile @@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \ lrng_interfaces.o \ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c index ff8b73e4c936..78ebbfd20f0c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_write_wait); static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; -struct ctl_table random_table[]; /********************************** Helper ***********************************/ /* Is the DRNG seed level too low? */ diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h index de034260c323..4ccfe53e6ce9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h @@ -117,7 +117,11 @@ void lrng_cc20_init_state_boot(struct chacha20_state *state); /********************************** /proc *************************************/ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void); +#else static inline void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void) { } +#endif /****************************** LRNG interfaces *******************************/ diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e5aba75968c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause +/* + * LRNG proc and sysctl interfaces + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2020, Stephan Mueller + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "lrng_internal.h" + +/* + * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random + * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, + * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. + * + * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be + * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the + * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data. + */ +static int lrng_proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct ctl_table fake_table; + unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid; + + uuid = table->data; + if (!uuid) { + uuid = tmp_uuid; + generate_random_uuid(uuid); + } else { + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock); + + spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock); + if (!uuid[8]) + generate_random_uuid(uuid); + spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock); + } + + sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid); + + fake_table.data = buf; + fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf); + + return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + +static int lrng_proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct ctl_table fake_table; + int entropy_count; + + entropy_count = lrng_avail_entropy(); + + fake_table.data = &entropy_count; + fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count); + + return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + +static int lrng_sysctl_poolsize = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS; +static int lrng_min_write_thresh; +static int lrng_max_write_thresh = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS; +static char lrng_sysctl_bootid[16]; +static int lrng_drng_reseed_max_min; + +struct ctl_table random_table[] = { + { + .procname = "poolsize", + .data = &lrng_sysctl_poolsize, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0444, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .procname = "entropy_avail", + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0444, + .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_entropy, + }, + { + .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", + .data = &lrng_write_wakeup_bits, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &lrng_min_write_thresh, + .extra2 = &lrng_max_write_thresh, + }, + { + .procname = "boot_id", + .data = &lrng_sysctl_bootid, + .maxlen = 16, + .mode = 0444, + .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_uuid, + }, + { + .procname = "uuid", + .maxlen = 16, + .mode = 0444, + .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_uuid, + }, + { + .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", + .data = &lrng_drng_reseed_max_time, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + .extra1 = &lrng_drng_reseed_max_min, + }, + { } +}; + +/* Number of online DRNGs */ +static u32 numa_drngs = 1; + +void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void) +{ + numa_drngs++; +} + +static int lrng_proc_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + struct lrng_drng *lrng_drng_init = lrng_drng_init_instance(); + unsigned long flags = 0; + unsigned char buf[300]; + + lrng_drng_lock(lrng_drng_init, &flags); + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "DRNG name: %s\n" + "Hash for reading entropy pool: %s\n" + "DRNG security strength: %d bits\n" + "number of DRNG instances: %u\n" + "SP800-90B compliance: %s\n" + "High-resolution timer: %s\n" + "LRNG minimally seeded: %s\n" + "LRNG fully seeded: %s\n", + lrng_drng_init->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_name(), + lrng_drng_init->crypto_cb->lrng_hash_name(), + LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS, numa_drngs, + lrng_sp80090b_compliant() ? "true" : "false", + lrng_pool_highres_timer() ? "true" : "false", + lrng_state_min_seeded() ? "true" : "false", + lrng_state_fully_seeded() ? "true" : "false"); + lrng_drng_unlock(lrng_drng_init, &flags); + + seq_write(m, buf, strlen(buf)); + + return 0; +} + +static int __init lrng_proc_type_init(void) +{ + proc_create_single("lrng_type", 0444, NULL, &lrng_proc_type_show); + return 0; +} + +module_init(lrng_proc_type_init);