From patchwork Thu Dec 23 15:40:09 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12698445 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 529C6C433F5 for ; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 15:41:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1349242AbhLWPlW (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Dec 2021 10:41:22 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33916 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349102AbhLWPlF (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Dec 2021 10:41:05 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x535.google.com (mail-ed1-x535.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::535]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5CB1C06175C; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:04 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x535.google.com with SMTP id bm14so22946861edb.5; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:04 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=TeRKucehsWGRQRB4QdxreoInCb5o1eayi99lDN4kmfs=; b=ShoE4C3BJ2bZ1XkL3fDxB+GL2U8hd0mO0ooTgg3Hkdpb0HcHc3m7a88VcLOsaknqTH KExbihYLxc37V09/DGE6ZlhwzSFFPrQOPlB+qDWfrJahudS9tLR9luxxeEzZTqVx2m0q /vkX5S/A2HaEAlfLg6Fi7OKOgvH1AZzTh1EXH/4skVewkxi+r25+PSwqqItTIYaK+moL 14+qCEQpp1brPQ2BneuZ7KzGt9hnO84W2KgDjnAglQsFW2JvaDvVBDgi7piRq07UKUgE jE70/w3M9BukYfA3v/TtV+R0IU/yD7tEYHLF2hV1b1Ecvnh5+5HHhv8ibObIKzKBYmbM ZZCQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=TeRKucehsWGRQRB4QdxreoInCb5o1eayi99lDN4kmfs=; b=tj4dzwB8rZTKByzkbC9x9IBd8h2U0qKqp9gaFz5rFtZ0su9Tb7s0XIHXg8nS7tHSRg sWWPCk7InGVUuzptxsS3NJiSxS25Qr8dyM6rAHA0futjZJF8Gy1ItZIV/1bcqqJmW+F6 SKeTOzaqjLEmT6Xlfe/hulW+ZwqZTnso4TtihasihaC/6mx+j9HgBmWuuas1jmw58p5p f+Ba4G13GlSLd3st4z5Y1lmk/DUs/NttO6xj4/kf6wiCgvcQtGMJLIx0HhqNc4IajI+b l09XTilmWaqR+jqbuuVfs/S+nkuuIv/zeKhqgET76joUKHH3g/hmLxblVpLFDhX6NJIE mcbw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5336ZUrkrI/nSSpoF69CaZp0dtMCscUGbTFjGcntfbyTj4S7JrLj FZ7AYGWSWm6406L7OBHMoTM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxthFan6y+KWhGlhqflHHV2+HpQOtwMFkGMq2yw6m+ZqatCst3ceYdpwSNFB/STsWgeG0N/6Q== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:a406:: with SMTP id sg6mr2352872ejc.171.1640274063520; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:7c02:dfc6:b554:ab10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id bx6sm2088617edb.78.2021.12.23.07.41.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:03 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 14/19] tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 17:40:09 +0200 Message-Id: <4e3efe908b6c56bbb80f931333c3c32f6a68733a.1640273966.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add flags to allow marking individual keys and invalid for send or recv. Making keys assymetric this way is not mentioned in RFC5925 but RFC8177 requires that keys inside a keychain have independent "accept" and "send" lifetimes. Flag names are negative so that the default behavior is for keys to be valid for both send and recv. Setting both NOSEND and NORECV for a certain peer address can be used on a listen socket can be used to mean "TCP-AO is required from this peer but no keys are currently valid". Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index a7f5f918ed5a..ed27feb93b0e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -401,16 +401,20 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index f3e244d036c3..c598f3cf72d5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -358,10 +358,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_aut int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) + continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { if (l3index < 0) @@ -607,11 +609,13 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -1492,10 +1496,13 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, if (l3index != key->l3index) continue; } *anykey = true; + // If only keys with norecv flag are present still consider that + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) + continue; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result)