From patchwork Thu Dec 23 15:40:11 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12698447 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A85F2C433F5 for ; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 15:41:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1349042AbhLWPlb (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Dec 2021 10:41:31 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33950 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349168AbhLWPlJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Dec 2021 10:41:09 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x533.google.com (mail-ed1-x533.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::533]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 81BF9C06179C; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:08 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x533.google.com with SMTP id bm14so22947590edb.5; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:08 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=4iUq/OcSfjWYCqr9JUkzg33/o8TN8G5Po1f+UBWAkdc=; b=BVffC+NmjubKsmKg0fVG3XWKoVupntAcAMgFs4YXFGPNto8HftLmDl6RGM/JrhD4XC EuckqX+ZQ8u2K3mUbrj23lqN0dQd05gRfeSIHruGfRpGwCO44qU/dO3fNHLZWSOCsrC/ SbsBHxdZeUn4uORnXRYICAVqghtcTAnGke0gpmdn7EhH56pjTt+RbzM7YUjOGn0MG7uu fBdSrgzI++xciR+SpEp68eFz8NhgwYimeMEDHfi9kwWQlBQqkrMOhTYIffkIRCG2/hUw Pd4qXBRJAxa9xS/kzTh2s8bcaV3kkI4Hz7lTCeZb8dqGqnH4wgWmI/FNFvMu3cYo0+NP pHFg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=4iUq/OcSfjWYCqr9JUkzg33/o8TN8G5Po1f+UBWAkdc=; b=hlMahct7Ma+Gx6QtLFHNb7HzCgxG58Ttilt01656EdlOjaYRAkE73pRsMMWCj1d4xn kc8OWAl8pmUnK9QBE51JYlucm7opZbCpaR8ma5U6e2BlrGn9+UFW9vj4M9AwpnlrOlLs jruRGHeg46AxVG333/1t1lv/FP1tGXgoCTs2O5HmKI859V4adetjWOw+4OzJPGkw8YyI vhLppx5mQ65PIOR7a908yBd91RJnmzvarGPGAGoyGQyWFLSMiQI9Dr267BYvVPo1LPac /9ESvtRAX7G0GTDBz4rw3ww7+HqSfea3g5MpB66Wq+2SHF7TizqNPu87zfHdov5EbycD 2tJQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530+xhOvSqwNiKviBn6QjoGbjmJ9Uv0/4rtiEnGa1WHb0WLITKQY eRk4lP3+MVpIvjJYa1BhsDU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxJHU3KajZgoUKDODBZwe3SOa5UFbtWtH4URSYNBLyZY4qEWR4/5XOTzkzxShhv08g3xH2tdQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:9b91:: with SMTP id dd17mr2332545ejc.371.1640274067040; Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from ponky.lan ([2a04:241e:501:3870:7c02:dfc6:b554:ab10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id bx6sm2088617edb.78.2021.12.23.07.41.05 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 23 Dec 2021 07:41:06 -0800 (PST) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 16/19] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 17:40:11 +0200 Message-Id: <80510f065b3b17d36626962cd7c7719036a6f9e1.1640273966.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 6520c6d02755..eaf389f99139 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -69,10 +69,20 @@ The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in `tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. +Proc interface +-------------- + +The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The +first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the +future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table:: + + flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index + 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0 + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 64bcb2a38472..22ce68c933a9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -1661,26 +1662,123 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); +struct tcp_authopt_iter_state { + struct seq_net_private p; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_get_key_index(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + int index) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry(key, &net->head, node) { + if (--index < 0) + return key; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) + __acquires(RCU) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (*pos == 0) + return SEQ_START_TOKEN; + else + return tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos - 1); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + __releases(RCU) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + void *ret; + + ret = tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos); + ++*pos; + + return ret; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = v; + + /* FIXME: Document somewhere */ + /* Key is deliberately inaccessible */ + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { + seq_puts(seq, "flags\tsend_id\trecv_id\talg\taddr\tl3index\n"); + return 0; + } + + seq_printf(seq, "0x%x\t%d\t%d\t%d", + key->flags, key->send_id, key->recv_id, (int)key->alg_id); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (key->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI6", &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr)->sin6_addr); + else + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI4", &((struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr)->sin_addr); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) + seq_printf(seq, "/%d", key->prefixlen); + } else { + seq_puts(seq, "\t*"); + } + seq_printf(seq, "\t%d", key->l3index); + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = { + .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start, + .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next, + .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop, + .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show, +}; + +static int __net_init tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(struct net *net) +{ + if (!proc_create_net("tcp_authopt", 0400, net->proc_net, + &tcp_authopt_seq_ops, + sizeof(struct tcp_authopt_iter_state))) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +static void __net_exit tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) +{ + remove_proc_entry("tcp_authopt", net->proc_net); +} + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head); - return 0; + return tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(full_net); } static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; struct hlist_node *n; + tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(full_net); mutex_lock(&net->mutex); hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) { hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); tcp_authopt_key_put(key);