From patchwork Thu May 28 14:08:06 2015 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Herbert Xu X-Patchwork-Id: 6499011 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-linux-crypto@patchwork.kernel.org Delivered-To: patchwork-parsemail@patchwork1.web.kernel.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.136]) by patchwork1.web.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 758969F1CC for ; Thu, 28 May 2015 14:08:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2CCB205E7 for ; Thu, 28 May 2015 14:08:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48F2E2062C for ; Thu, 28 May 2015 14:08:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754011AbbE1OIT (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 May 2015 10:08:19 -0400 Received: from helcar.hengli.com.au ([209.40.204.226]:58729 "EHLO helcar.hengli.com.au" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753952AbbE1OIK (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 May 2015 10:08:10 -0400 Received: from gondolin.me.apana.org.au ([192.168.0.6]) by norbury.hengli.com.au with esmtp (Exim 4.80 #3 (Debian)) id 1YxyTf-0000vF-2b; Fri, 29 May 2015 00:08:07 +1000 Received: from herbert by gondolin.me.apana.org.au with local (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1YxyTe-0002Le-1o; Thu, 28 May 2015 22:08:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/10] crypto: aesni - Convert rfc4106 to new AEAD interface References: <20150528140311.GA8423@gondor.apana.org.au> To: Linux Crypto Mailing List , Steffen Klassert , Adrian Hoban , Tadeusz Struk , Stephan Mueller , Timothy McCaffrey , Tim Chen Message-Id: From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 22:08:06 +0800 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on mail.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This patch converts the low-level __gcm-aes-aesni algorithm to the new AEAD interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 246 +++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 167 deletions(-) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index 5660a18..c5fa1e6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -44,13 +44,18 @@ #endif +#define AESNI_ALIGN 16 +#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)) +#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16 + /* This data is stored at the end of the crypto_tfm struct. * It's a type of per "session" data storage location. * This needs to be 16 byte aligned. */ struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx { - u8 hash_subkey[16]; - struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded; + u8 hash_subkey[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN))); + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded + __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN))); u8 nonce[4]; }; @@ -65,10 +70,6 @@ struct aesni_hash_subkey_req_data { struct scatterlist sg; }; -#define AESNI_ALIGN (16) -#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1)) -#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16 - struct aesni_lrw_ctx { struct lrw_table_ctx lrw_table; u8 raw_aes_ctx[sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN - 1]; @@ -282,10 +283,11 @@ static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx, u8 *out, static inline struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm) { - return - (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *) - PTR_ALIGN((u8 *) - crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), AESNI_ALIGN); + unsigned long align = AESNI_ALIGN; + + if (align <= crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) + align = 1; + return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), align); } #endif @@ -838,8 +840,6 @@ rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len) if (IS_ERR(ctr_tfm)) return PTR_ERR(ctr_tfm); - crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(ctr_tfm, ~0); - ret = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(ctr_tfm, key, key_len); if (ret) goto out_free_ablkcipher; @@ -888,56 +888,20 @@ out_free_ablkcipher: static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len) { - int ret = 0; - struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead); struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(aead); - u8 *new_key_align, *new_key_mem = NULL; if (key_len < 4) { - crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); + crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); return -EINVAL; } /*Account for 4 byte nonce at the end.*/ key_len -= 4; - if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) { - crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); - return -EINVAL; - } memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce)); - /*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/ - if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_enc[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN) - return -EINVAL; - - if ((unsigned long)key % AESNI_ALIGN) { - /*key is not aligned: use an auxuliar aligned pointer*/ - new_key_mem = kmalloc(key_len+AESNI_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new_key_mem) - return -ENOMEM; - - new_key_align = PTR_ALIGN(new_key_mem, AESNI_ALIGN); - memcpy(new_key_align, key, key_len); - key = new_key_align; - } - if (!irq_fpu_usable()) - ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded), - key, key_len); - else { - kernel_fpu_begin(); - ret = aesni_set_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded), key, key_len); - kernel_fpu_end(); - } - /*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/ - if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->hash_subkey[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto exit; - } - ret = rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len); -exit: - kfree(new_key_mem); - return ret; + return aes_set_key_common(crypto_aead_tfm(aead), + &ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?: + rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len); } static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key, @@ -960,7 +924,7 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *aead, default: return -EINVAL; } - crypto_aead_crt(aead)->authsize = authsize; + return 0; } @@ -975,20 +939,17 @@ static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent, return crypto_aead_setauthsize(&cryptd_tfm->base, authsize); } -static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) +static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) { u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0; u8 *src, *dst, *assoc; __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1); struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm); - u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length; void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded); unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); - u8 iv_tab[16+AESNI_ALIGN]; - u8* iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_tab, AESNI_ALIGN); + u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN))); struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk; - struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk; struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk; unsigned int i; @@ -997,12 +958,6 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) /* to 8 or 12 bytes */ if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)) return -EINVAL; - if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16)) - return -EINVAL; - if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256)) - return -EINVAL; /* IV below built */ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) @@ -1011,55 +966,55 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) *(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i]; *((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter; - if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) { + if (sg_is_last(req->src) && + req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE && + sg_is_last(req->dst) && + req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) { one_entry_in_sg = 1; scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src); - scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc); - src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); - assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk); + assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); + src = assoc + req->assoclen; dst = src; if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst); - dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk); + dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen; } - } else { /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */ - src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen, + assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (unlikely(!src)) + if (unlikely(!assoc)) return -ENOMEM; - assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len); - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0); - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0, - req->assoclen, 0); + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0); + src = assoc + req->assoclen; dst = src; } + kernel_fpu_begin(); aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, (unsigned long)req->cryptlen, iv, ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, dst + ((unsigned long)req->cryptlen), auth_tag_len); + kernel_fpu_end(); /* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written * back to the packet. */ if (one_entry_in_sg) { if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { - scatterwalk_unmap(dst); - scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0); + scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen); + scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0); } - scatterwalk_unmap(src); scatterwalk_unmap(assoc); - scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0); - scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0); + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0); } else { - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, - req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1); - kfree(src); + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen, + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1); + kfree(assoc); } return 0; } -static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) +static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) { u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0; u8 *src, *dst, *assoc; @@ -1068,26 +1023,16 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) int retval = 0; struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm); - u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length; void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded); unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); - u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN]; - u8 *iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN); - u8 *authTag = iv + 16; + u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN))); + u8 authTag[16]; struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk; - struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk; struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk; unsigned int i; - if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) || - (req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))) + if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)) return -EINVAL; - if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16)) - return -EINVAL; - if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256)) - return -EINVAL; /* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */ /* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */ @@ -1101,33 +1046,36 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) *(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i]; *((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter; - if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) { + if (sg_is_last(req->src) && + req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE && + sg_is_last(req->dst) && + req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) { one_entry_in_sg = 1; scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src); - scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc); - src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); - assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk); + assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk); + src = assoc + req->assoclen; dst = src; if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst); - dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk); + dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen; } } else { /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */ - src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!src) + assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!assoc) return -ENOMEM; - assoc = (src + req->cryptlen); - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0); - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0, - req->assoclen, 0); + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0, + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0); + src = assoc + req->assoclen; dst = src; } + kernel_fpu_begin(); aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv, ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, authTag, auth_tag_len); + kernel_fpu_end(); /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */ retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ? @@ -1135,16 +1083,15 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) if (one_entry_in_sg) { if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) { - scatterwalk_unmap(dst); - scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0); + scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen); + scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0); } - scatterwalk_unmap(src); scatterwalk_unmap(assoc); - scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0); - scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0); + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0); } else { - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, tempCipherLen, 1); - kfree(src); + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen, + tempCipherLen, 1); + kfree(assoc); } return retval; } @@ -1188,36 +1135,6 @@ static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq); } - -static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) -{ - int ret; - - if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context"); - ret = -EINVAL; - } else { - kernel_fpu_begin(); - ret = __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(req); - kernel_fpu_end(); - } - return ret; -} - -static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) -{ - int ret; - - if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context"); - ret = -EINVAL; - } else { - kernel_fpu_begin(); - ret = __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(req); - kernel_fpu_end(); - } - return ret; -} #endif static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { { @@ -1389,27 +1306,6 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { { .geniv = "chainiv", }, }, -}, { - .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni", - .cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni", - .cra_priority = 0, - .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, - .cra_blocksize = 1, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx) + - AESNI_ALIGN, - .cra_alignmask = 0, - .cra_type = &crypto_aead_type, - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .cra_u = { - .aead = { - .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key, - .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize, - .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt, - .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt, - .ivsize = 8, - .maxauthsize = 16, - }, - }, #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC) }, { @@ -1526,6 +1422,22 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] = { { + .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key, + .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize, + .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt, + .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt, + .ivsize = 8, + .maxauthsize = 16, + .base = { + .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni", + .cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni", + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .cra_blocksize = 1, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx), + .cra_alignmask = AESNI_ALIGN - 1, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, +}, { .init = rfc4106_init, .exit = rfc4106_exit, .setkey = rfc4106_set_key,