From patchwork Tue Jul 26 06:15:20 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12928715 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63DCEC43334 for ; Tue, 26 Jul 2022 06:19:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237870AbiGZGTn (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:19:43 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33608 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237822AbiGZGSY (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:18:24 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5A48429CB0; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id z22so16505370edd.6; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=63XV1JEyfLfvMp4fd3jHV3fMN4B3AYaky7boW/3cXuE=; b=byO3lxG8mCixA6S6kVNHleycQ6Seg8FBv8QveV8g1za9OaIZkDYaktD7CEDBpARI/p kQDSgd7dX5u7H0Y5CkB0ycQDZ01RMe4yElmgF0nZBw5dynPL3/58ErXik41/FqxFUaJT X2j++g68rEbwXecfm7tNWXgwTAaZQnMgty65jLSQxx7CsVje3CEthpWQsy0Qf/tyWzk3 2yB+3AmgmtrQjgR74LdEgjZ/BQnLQtK9D0vk5LujBeYeRCt4D83w80CuTsjHTTQMJ9yk Iqu+6HpEM90p4jtWYp6DXPAKtuiS6E3OZuh8L7RmknLMJkcRNo2l4OTd78X1l82GmEJh IRMA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=63XV1JEyfLfvMp4fd3jHV3fMN4B3AYaky7boW/3cXuE=; b=NNwnHaR3fRhdOrY0tSgHoy/SDTSghbuJjo6YVglz9YGVAkA4QPFh5KBYAhCcf79Y49 Pu3hGkxz98jcUIFRpRqUZHTPDKRHImyarD7cbBH3E0VqHJr9HUiA4htEIFsAyPvbwS0N MaZJCYl4X6e2SaYZVrZXq6JNV1Mj7pHXlhoCHSrEGWlU7LV3NRBzGCuTxrzxXJJk7GF0 q2SUYyLfl5e+TfJ+sH9aJQSeS/gkdYEj6AEY0wEVufCVhVcPakzZA0nFhlk30UAukqXO h1fUq+7a2h1I+a8Ai5AoYtzgdIkDhUDO3eeLlKg+Va6cBid587yefAA7gethm14TtGzk v9aQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora9Y6/JLMXNzHgaDj3LN+l0exNNu81ydDxtsoV8anPk3Zgy9mlmM DH+s9F2CoErN3u0h72l0E8k= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1s0jXuxwucMTWDeIxPhyYyH4bw7u8TWsYRZxQeKVuzuIbvCbP6HC9m1+YFZ3d+dJXpNNwyTDQ== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:c9d3:0:b0:43a:67b9:6eea with SMTP id i19-20020aa7c9d3000000b0043a67b96eeamr16571197edt.94.1658816172451; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:2b68:36a:5a94:4ba1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l23-20020a056402345700b0043ba7df7a42sm8133067edc.26.2022.07.25.23.16.10 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:16:12 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 18/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:20 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This provides a very brief summary of all keys for debugging purposes. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 6520c6d02755..eaf389f99139 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -69,10 +69,20 @@ The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in `tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. +Proc interface +-------------- + +The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The +first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the +future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table:: + + flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index + 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0 + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index e4aecd35ffda..00d749aa1025 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -1716,26 +1717,125 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +struct tcp_authopt_iter_state { + struct seq_net_private p; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_get_key_index(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + int index) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry(key, &net->head, node) { + if (--index < 0) + return key; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) + __acquires(RCU) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (*pos == 0) + return SEQ_START_TOKEN; + else + return tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos - 1); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + __releases(RCU) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + void *ret; + + ret = tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos); + ++*pos; + + return ret; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = v; + + /* FIXME: Document somewhere */ + /* Key is deliberately inaccessible */ + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { + seq_puts(seq, "flags\tsend_id\trecv_id\talg\taddr\tl3index\n"); + return 0; + } + + seq_printf(seq, "0x%x\t%d\t%d\t%d", + key->flags, key->send_id, key->recv_id, (int)key->alg_id); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (key->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI6", &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr)->sin6_addr); + else + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI4", &((struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr)->sin_addr); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) + seq_printf(seq, "/%d", key->prefixlen); + } else { + seq_puts(seq, "\t*"); + } + seq_printf(seq, "\t%d", key->l3index); + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = { + .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start, + .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next, + .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop, + .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + +static int __net_init tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(struct net *net) +{ + if (!proc_create_net("tcp_authopt", 0400, net->proc_net, + &tcp_authopt_seq_ops, + sizeof(struct tcp_authopt_iter_state))) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +static void __net_exit tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) +{ + remove_proc_entry("tcp_authopt", net->proc_net); +} + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head); - return 0; + return tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(full_net); } static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; struct hlist_node *n; + tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(full_net); mutex_lock(&net->mutex); hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) { hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); tcp_authopt_key_put(key);