From patchwork Fri Apr 26 20:41:49 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10919711 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23AEC15A6 for ; Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:45:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1488428E6F for ; Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:45:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 08C3828E9B; Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:45:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB62C28E7D for ; Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:45:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726322AbfDZUpw (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Apr 2019 16:45:52 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45070 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726505AbfDZUpk (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Apr 2019 16:45:40 -0400 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.mtv.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.1.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0987B208CA; Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:45:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1556311540; bh=kxup9pbeMPrz441sCfHJyiiNF+VtDmn60MbeOTeDNvk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CqhrcanCfiXHpWEU8uEnozukmiq0BzwXNIaY3attDg6CJtO+rb6va9EiBle1sEFzM VV0QJ+wY/cZuTfuEE5Ie0JCCvG+wPjgx07Fxf2IYH/7QtpjGclkTBoMaDENG/m4ugc fUDWVKyJ597//Sha47nWTZZ2g8jg7S5cNN+AJSSg= From: Eric Biggers To: fstests@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: [RFC PATCH 3/7] common/encrypt: support requiring other encryption settings Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 13:41:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20190426204153.101861-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.593.g511ec345e18-goog In-Reply-To: <20190426204153.101861-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20190426204153.101861-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Update _require_scratch_encryption() to support checking for kernel support for contents and filenames encryption modes besides the default. This will be used by some of the ciphertext verification tests. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- common/encrypt | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+) diff --git a/common/encrypt b/common/encrypt index 54d873fa..37f16b94 100644 --- a/common/encrypt +++ b/common/encrypt @@ -4,6 +4,15 @@ # # Functions for setting up and testing file encryption +# +# _require_scratch_encryption [-c CONTENTS_MODE] [-n FILENAMES_MODE] +# +# Require encryption support on the scratch device. +# +# This checks for support for the default type of encryption policy (AES-256-XTS +# and AES-256-CTS). Options can be specified to also require support for a +# different type of encryption policy. +# _require_scratch_encryption() { _require_scratch @@ -44,9 +53,58 @@ _require_scratch_encryption() _notrun "kernel does not support $FSTYP encryption" fi rmdir $SCRATCH_MNT/tmpdir + + # If required, check for support for the specific type of encryption + # policy required by the test. + if [ $# -ne 0 ]; then + _require_encryption_policy_support $SCRATCH_MNT "$@" + fi + _scratch_unmount } +_require_encryption_policy_support() +{ + local mnt=$1 + local dir=$mnt/tmpdir + local set_encpolicy_args="" + local c + + OPTIND=2 + while getopts "c:n:" c; do + case $c in + c|n) + set_encpolicy_args+=" -$c $OPTARG" + ;; + *) + _fail "Unrecognized option '$c'" + ;; + esac + done + set_encpolicy_args=${set_encpolicy_args# } + + echo "Checking whether kernel supports encryption policy: $set_encpolicy_args" \ + >> $seqres.full + + mkdir $dir + _require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl + _new_session_keyring + local keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key) + if _set_encpolicy $dir $keydesc $set_encpolicy_args \ + 2>&1 >>$seqres.full | egrep -q 'Invalid argument'; then + _notrun "kernel does not support encryption policy: '$set_encpolicy_args'" + fi + # fscrypt allows setting policies with modes it knows about, even + # without kernel crypto API support. E.g. a policy using Adiantum + # encryption can be set on a kernel without CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM. + # But actually trying to use such an encrypted directory will fail. + if ! touch $dir/file; then + _notrun "encryption policy '$set_encpolicy_args' is unusable; probably missing kernel crypto API support" + fi + $KEYCTL_PROG clear @s + rm -r $dir +} + _scratch_mkfs_encrypted() { case $FSTYP in