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Subject: [PATCH v7 0/9] Landlock: IOCTL support
From: " =?utf-8?q?G=C3=BCnther_Noack?= " <gnoack@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, " =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala?=
=?utf-8?q?=C3=BCn?= " <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>, Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
Allen Webb <allenwebb@google.com>, Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
Matt Bobrowski <repnop@google.com>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, "
=?utf-8?q?G=C3=BCnther_Noack?= " <gnoack@google.com>
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|
| Series |
Landlock: IOCTL support
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expand
|
Hello! These patches add simple ioctl(2) support to Landlock. Objective ~~~~~~~~~ Make ioctl(2) requests restrictable with Landlock, in a way that is useful for real-world applications. Proposed approach ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL right, which restricts the use of ioctl(2) on file descriptors. We attach IOCTL access rights to opened file descriptors, as we already do for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE. If LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL is handled (restricted in the ruleset), the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL access right governs the use of all IOCTL commands. We make an exception for the common and known-harmless IOCTL commands FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIONREAD. These IOCTL commands are always permitted. Their functionality is already available through fcntl(2). If additionally(!), the access rights LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE or LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR are handled, these access rights also unlock some IOCTL commands which are considered safe for use with files opened in these ways. As soon as these access rights are handled, the affected IOCTL commands can not be permitted through LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL any more, but only be permitted through the respective more specific access rights. A full list of these access rights is listed below in this cover letter and in the documentation. I believe that this approach works for the majority of use cases, and offers a good trade-off between Landlock API and implementation complexity and flexibility when the feature is used. Current limitations ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ With this patch set, ioctl(2) requests can *not* be filtered based on file type, device number (dev_t) or on the ioctl(2) request number. On the initial RFC patch set [1], we have reached consensus to start with this simpler coarse-grained approach, and build additional IOCTL restriction capabilities on top in subsequent steps. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/d4f1395c-d2d4-1860-3a02-2a0c023dd761@digikod.net/ Notable implications of this approach ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Existing inherited file descriptors stay unaffected when a program enables Landlock. This means in particular that in common scenarios, the terminal's IOCTLs (ioctl_tty(2)) continue to work. * ioctl(2) continues to be available for file descriptors acquired through means other than open(2). Example: Network sockets, memfd_create(2), file descriptors that are already open before the Landlock ruleset is enabled. Examples ~~~~~~~~ Starting a sandboxed shell from $HOME with samples/landlock/sandboxer: LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=. ./sandboxer /bin/bash The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL right is part of the "read-write" rights here, so we expect that newly opened files outside of $HOME don't work with most IOCTL commands. * "stty" works: It probes terminal properties * "stty </dev/tty" fails: /dev/tty can be reopened, but the IOCTL is denied. * "eject" fails: ioctls to use CD-ROM drive are denied. * "ls /dev" works: It uses ioctl to get the terminal size for columnar layout * The text editors "vim" and "mg" work. (GNU Emacs fails because it attempts to reopen /dev/tty.) IOCTL groups ~~~~~~~~~~~~ To decide which IOCTL commands should be blanket-permitted we went through the list of IOCTL commands mentioned in fs/ioctl.c and looked at them individually to understand what they are about. The following list is for reference. We should always allow the following IOCTL commands, which are also available through fcntl(2) with the F_SETFD and F_SETFL commands: * FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX - these work on the file descriptor and manipulate the close-on-exec flag * FIONBIO, FIOASYNC - these work on the struct file and enable nonblocking-IO and async flags The following command is guarded and enabled by either of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE or LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR (G2), once one of them is handled (otherwise by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL): * FIOQSIZE - get the size of the opened file The following commands are guarded and enabled by either of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE or LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE (G2), once one of them is handled (otherwise by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL): These are commands that read file system internals: * FS_IOC_FIEMAP - get information about file extent mapping (c.f. https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/filesystems/fiemap.txt) * FIBMAP - get a file's file system block number * FIGETBSZ - get file system blocksize The following commands are guarded and enabled by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE (G3), if it is handled (otherwise by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL): * FIONREAD - get the number of bytes available for reading (the implementation is defined per file type) * FIDEDUPRANGE - manipulating shared physical storage between files. The following commands are guarded and enabled by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE (G4), if it is handled (otherwise by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL): * FICLONE, FICLONERANGE - making files share physical storage between multiple files. These only work on some file systems, by design. * FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE: Backwards compatibility with legacy XFS preallocation syscalls which predate fallocate(2). The following commands are also mentioned in fs/ioctl.c, but are not handled specially and are managed by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL together with all other remaining IOCTL commands: * FIFREEZE, FITHAW - work on superblock(!) to freeze/thaw the file system. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. * Accessing file attributes: * FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS - manipulate inode flags (ioctl_iflags(2)) * FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR, FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR - more attributes Related Work ~~~~~~~~~~~~ OpenBSD's pledge(2) [2] restricts ioctl(2) independent of the file descriptor which is used. The implementers maintain multiple allow-lists of predefined ioctl(2) operations required for different application domains such as "audio", "bpf", "tty" and "inet". OpenBSD does not guarantee ABI backwards compatibility to the same extent as Linux does, so it's easier for them to update these lists in later versions. It might not be a feasible approach for Linux though. [2] https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-7.3/pledge.2 Changes ~~~~~~~ V7: * in “landlock: Add IOCTL access right”: * Make IOCTL_GROUPS a #define so that static_assert works even on old compilers (bug reported by Intel about PowerPC GCC9 config) * Adapt indentation of IOCTL_GROUPS definition * Add missing dots in kernel-doc comments. * in “landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files”: * explain reasoning in commit message V6: * Implementation: * Check that only publicly visible access rights can be used when adding a rule (rather than the synthetic ones). Thanks Mickaël for spotting that! * Move all functionality related to IOCTL groups and synthetic access rights into the same place at the top of fs.c * Move kernel doc to the .c file in one instance * Smaller code style issues (upcase IOCTL, vardecl at block start) * Remove inline modifier from functions in .c files * Tests: * use SKIP * Rename 'fd' to dir_fd and file_fd where appropriate * Remove duplicate "ioctl" mentions from test names * Rename "permitted" to "allowed", in ioctl and ftruncate tests * Do not add rules if access is 0, in test helper V5: * Implementation: * move IOCTL group expansion logic into fs.c (implementation suggested by mic) * rename IOCTL_CMD_G* constants to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_GROUP* * fs.c: create ioctl_groups constant * add "const" to some variables * Formatting and docstring fixes (including wrong kernel-doc format) * samples/landlock: fix ABI version and fallback attribute (mic) * Documentation * move header documentation changes into the implementation commit * spell out how FIFREEZE, FITHAW and attribute-manipulation ioctls from fs/ioctl.c are handled * change ABI 4 to ABI 5 in some missing places V4: * use "synthetic" IOCTL access rights, as previously discussed * testing changes * use a large fixture-based test, for more exhaustive coverage, and replace some of the earlier tests with it * rebased on mic-next V3: * always permit the IOCTL commands FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO, FIOASYNC and FIONREAD, independent of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL * increment ABI version in the same commit where the feature is introduced * testing changes * use FIOQSIZE instead of TTY IOCTL commands (FIOQSIZE works with regular files, directories and memfds) * run the memfd test with both Landlock enabled and disabled * add a test for the always-permitted IOCTL commands V2: * rebased on mic-next * added documentation * exercise ioctl(2) in the memfd test * test: Use layout0 for the test --- V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230502171755.9788-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com/ V2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230623144329.136541-1-gnoack@google.com/ V3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230814172816.3907299-1-gnoack@google.com/ V4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231103155717.78042-1-gnoack@google.com/ V5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231117154920.1706371-1-gnoack@google.com/ V6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231124173026.3257122-1-gnoack@google.com/ Günther Noack (9): landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files selftests/landlock: Rename "permitted" to "allowed" in ftruncate tests landlock: Optimize the number of calls to get_access_mask slightly landlock: Add IOCTL access right selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL landlock: Document IOCTL support Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 74 ++- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 58 +- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 13 +- security/landlock/fs.c | 202 ++++++- security/landlock/fs.h | 2 + security/landlock/limits.h | 5 +- security/landlock/ruleset.c | 7 +- security/landlock/ruleset.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 19 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 523 ++++++++++++++++++- 11 files changed, 833 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) base-commit: 413e638fb4dfee94933e28fd9a6a8ed294447279