Message ID | 20241112033539.105989-1-kent.overstreet@linux.dev (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | io path options + reflink (mild security implications) | expand |
On Mon 11-11-24 22:35:32, Kent Overstreet wrote: > so, I've been fleshing out various things at the intersection of io path > options + rebalance + reflink, and this is the last little bit > > background: bcachefs has io path options that can be set filesystem > wide, or per inode, and when changed rebalance automatically picks them > up and does the right thing > > reflink adds a wrinkle, which is that we'd like e.g. recursively setting > the foreground/background targets on some files to move them to the > appropriate device (or nr_replicas etc.), like other data - but if a > user did a reflink copy of some other user's data and then set > nr_replicas=1, that would be bad. > > so this series adds a flag to reflink pointers for "may propagate option > changes", which can then be set at remap_file_range() time based on > vfs level permission checks. > > so, question for everyone: is write access to the source file what we > want? or should it be stricter, i.e. ownership matches? Well, if I understand the impact properly, this seems similar to the effects vfs_fileattr_set() can have on a file and there we have: if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode)) return -EPERM; So I'd say ownership match would be more consistent. > then, we're currently missing mnt_idmap plumbing to remap_file_range() > to do said permissions checks - do we want to do that? or is there an > easier way? Well, if you have struct file, you have the mount and thus idmap through file_mnt_idmap(file). And struct file is available in remap_file_range() call stack so I'm not sure what is the problem exactly. Honza