[v3,082/110] may_follow_link(): trim arguments

Commit Message

Al Viro May 11, 2015, 6:07 p.m. UTC

From: Al Viro <[e-mail]>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[e-mail]>
---
 fs/namei.c | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 05efcc0..82cb1bc 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -765,7 +765,6 @@  int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
 
 /**
  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
- * @link: The path of the symlink
  * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
  *
  * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
@@ -779,7 +778,7 @@  int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
  *
  * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error.
  */
-static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	const struct inode *inode;
 	const struct inode *parent;
@@ -788,7 +787,7 @@  static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
-	inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
+	inode = nd->link.dentry->d_inode;
 	if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -801,8 +800,8 @@  static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
-	audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", link);
-	path_put(link);
+	audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", &nd->link);
+	path_put(&nd->link);
 	path_put(&nd->path);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -1985,7 +1984,7 @@  static void path_cleanup(struct nameidata *nd)
 static int trailing_symlink(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	const char *s;
-	int error = may_follow_link(&nd->link, nd);
+	int error = may_follow_link(nd);
 	if (unlikely(error))
 		return error;
 	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;