@@ -672,7 +672,8 @@ open_file:
}
/* FIXME: should we abort opening if the link count goes to 0? */
if (status == nfs_ok)
- status = nfsd_open(rqstp, fhp, S_IFREG, may_flags, &nf->nf_file);
+ status = nfsd_open_verified(rqstp, fhp, S_IFREG, may_flags,
+ &nf->nf_file);
clear_bit_unlock(NFSD_FILE_PENDING, &nf->nf_flags);
smp_mb__after_atomic();
wake_up_bit(&nf->nf_flags, NFSD_FILE_PENDING);
@@ -635,9 +635,9 @@ nfsd_open_break_lease(struct inode *inode, int access)
* and additional flags.
* N.B. After this call fhp needs an fh_put
*/
-__be32
-nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
- int may_flags, struct file **filp)
+static __be32
+__nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
+ int may_flags, struct file **filp)
{
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
@@ -646,24 +646,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
__be32 err;
int host_err = 0;
- validate_process_creds();
-
- /*
- * If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
- * and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
- * in case a chmod has now revoked permission.
- *
- * Arguably we should also allow the owner override for
- * directories, but we never have and it doesn't seem to have
- * caused anyone a problem. If we were to change this, note
- * also that our filldir callbacks would need a variant of
- * lookup_one_len that doesn't check permissions.
- */
- if (type == S_IFREG)
- may_flags |= NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE;
- err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags);
- if (err)
- goto out;
+ BUG_ON(!fhp->fh_dentry);
path.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt;
path.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
@@ -718,6 +701,44 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+__be32
+nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
+ int may_flags, struct file **filp)
+{
+ __be32 err;
+
+ validate_process_creds();
+ /*
+ * If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
+ * and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
+ * in case a chmod has now revoked permission.
+ *
+ * Arguably we should also allow the owner override for
+ * directories, but we never have and it doesn't seem to have
+ * caused anyone a problem. If we were to change this, note
+ * also that our filldir callbacks would need a variant of
+ * lookup_one_len that doesn't check permissions.
+ */
+ if (type == S_IFREG)
+ may_flags |= NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE;
+ err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags);
+ if (!err)
+ err = __nfsd_open(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags, filp);
+ validate_process_creds();
+ return err;
+}
+
+__be32
+nfsd_open_verified(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
+ int may_flags, struct file **filp)
+{
+ __be32 err;
+
+ validate_process_creds();
+ err = __nfsd_open(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags, filp);
validate_process_creds();
return err;
}
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ __be32 nfsd_commit(struct svc_rqst *, struct svc_fh *,
int nfsd_open_break_lease(struct inode *, int);
__be32 nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *, struct svc_fh *, umode_t,
int, struct file **);
+__be32 nfsd_open_verified(struct svc_rqst *, struct svc_fh *, umode_t,
+ int, struct file **);
struct raparms;
__be32 nfsd_splice_read(struct svc_rqst *,
struct file *, loff_t, unsigned long *);
Currently, we call fh_verify twice on the filehandle. Once when we call into nfsd_file_acquire, and then again from nfsd_open. The second one is completely superfluous though, and fh_verify can do some things that require a fair bit of work (checking permissions, for instance). Create a new nfsd_open_verified function that will do an nfsd_open on a filehandle that has already been verified. Call that from the filecache code. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> --- fs/nfsd/filecache.c | 3 ++- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/nfsd/vfs.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)