[v2,5/5] dax: handle media errors in dax_do_io

Commit Message

Verma, Vishal L March 30, 2016, 1:59 a.m. UTC

dax_do_io (called for read() or write() for a dax file system) may fail
in the presence of bad blocks or media errors. Since we expect that a
write should clear media errors on nvdimms, make dax_do_io fall back to
the direct_IO path, which will send down a bio to the driver, which can
then attempt to clear the error.

Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[e-mail]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[e-mail]>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <[e-mail]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[e-mail]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[e-mail]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[e-mail]>
Cc: Al Viro <[e-mail]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <[e-mail]>
---
 fs/block_dev.c     | 17 ++++++++++++++---
 fs/ext2/inode.c    | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
 fs/ext4/indirect.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 fs/ext4/inode.c    | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c  | 14 ++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

Comments

kernel test robot March 30, 2016, 3 a.m. UTC | #1

Hi Vishal,

[auto build test WARNING on linux-nvdimm/libnvdimm-for-next]
[also build test WARNING on v4.6-rc1 next-20160329]
[cannot apply to xfs/for-next]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improving the system]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Vishal-Verma/dax-handling-of-media-errors/20160330-100409
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm libnvdimm-for-next
config: x86_64-randconfig-i0-03300245 (attached as .config)
reproduce:
        # save the attached .config to linux build tree
        make ARCH=x86_64 

Note: it may well be a FALSE warning. FWIW you are at least aware of it now.
http://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/Better_Uninitialized_Warnings

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

   fs/ext4/indirect.c: In function 'ext4_ind_direct_IO':
>> fs/ext4/indirect.c:719:11: warning: 'ret_saved' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
      ssize_t ret_saved = 0;
              ^

vim +/ret_saved +719 fs/ext4/indirect.c

   703			smp_mb();
   704			if (unlikely(ext4_test_inode_state(inode,
   705							    EXT4_STATE_DIOREAD_LOCK))) {
   706				inode_dio_end(inode);
   707				goto locked;
   708			}
   709			if (IS_DAX(inode))
   710				ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
   711						ext4_dio_get_block, NULL, 0);
   712			else
   713				ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode,
   714							   inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter,
   715							   offset, ext4_dio_get_block,
   716							   NULL, NULL, 0);
   717			inode_dio_end(inode);
   718		} else {
 > 719			ssize_t ret_saved = 0;
   720	
   721	locked:
   722			if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
   723				ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
   724						ext4_dio_get_block, NULL, DIO_LOCKING);
   725				if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
   726					ret_saved = ret;
   727				else

---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure                Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all                   Intel Corporation

Christoph Hellwig March 30, 2016, 6:34 a.m. UTC | #2

Hi Vishal,

still NAK to calling the direct I/O code directly from the dax code.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Vishal Verma March 30, 2016, 6:54 a.m. UTC | #3

On Tue, 2016-03-29 at 23:34 -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> Hi Vishal,
> 
> still NAK to calling the direct I/O code directly from the dax code.

Hm, I thought this was what you meant -- do the fallback/retry attempts
at the callers of dax_do_io instead of the new dax wrapper function..
Did I misunderstand you?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Christoph Hellwig March 30, 2016, 6:56 a.m. UTC | #4

On Wed, Mar 30, 2016 at 12:54:37AM -0600, Vishal Verma wrote:
> On Tue, 2016-03-29 at 23:34 -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > Hi Vishal,
> > 
> > still NAK to calling the direct I/O code directly from the dax code.
> 
> Hm, I thought this was what you meant -- do the fallback/retry attempts
> at the callers of dax_do_io instead of the new dax wrapper function..
> Did I misunderstand you?

Sorry, it is.  I misread fs/block_dev.c as fs/dax.c before my first
coffee this morning.  I'll properly review the series in the afternoon..
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer April 15, 2016, 4:11 p.m. UTC | #5

Vishal Verma <[e-mail]> writes:

> dax_do_io (called for read() or write() for a dax file system) may fail
> in the presence of bad blocks or media errors. Since we expect that a
> write should clear media errors on nvdimms, make dax_do_io fall back to
> the direct_IO path, which will send down a bio to the driver, which can
> then attempt to clear the error.

[snip]

> +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
> +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, blkdev_get_block,
>  				NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
> -	return __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter, offset,
> +		if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))
> +			ret_saved = ret;
> +		else
> +			return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter, offset,
>  				    blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,
>  				    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
> +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
> +		return ret_saved;
> +

Hmm, did you just break async DIO?  I think you did!  :)
__blockdev_direct_IO can return -EIOCBQUEUED, and you've now turned that
into -EIO.  Really, I don't see a reason to save that first -EIO.  The
same applies to all instances in this patch.

Cheers,
Jeff


> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  int __sync_blockdev(struct block_device *bdev, int wait)
> diff --git a/fs/ext2/inode.c b/fs/ext2/inode.c
> index 824f249..64792c6 100644
> --- a/fs/ext2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ext2/inode.c
> @@ -859,14 +859,22 @@ ext2_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, loff_t offset)
>  	struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
>  	struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
>  	size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
> -	ssize_t ret;
> +	ssize_t ret, ret_saved = 0;
>  
> -	if (IS_DAX(inode))
> -		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, ext2_get_block, NULL,
> -				DIO_LOCKING);
> -	else
> -		ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
> -					 ext2_get_block);
> +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
> +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, ext2_get_block,
> +				NULL, DIO_LOCKING | DIO_SKIP_HOLES);
> +		if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
> +			ret_saved = ret;
> +		else
> +			goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset, ext2_get_block);
> +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
> +		ret = ret_saved;
> +
> + out:
>  	if (ret < 0 && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
>  		ext2_write_failed(mapping, offset + count);
>  	return ret;
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/indirect.c b/fs/ext4/indirect.c
> index 3027fa6..798f341 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/indirect.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/indirect.c
> @@ -716,14 +716,22 @@ retry:
>  						   NULL, NULL, 0);
>  		inode_dio_end(inode);
>  	} else {
> +		ssize_t ret_saved = 0;
> +
>  locked:
> -		if (IS_DAX(inode))
> +		if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
>  			ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
>  					ext4_dio_get_block, NULL, DIO_LOCKING);
> -		else
> -			ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
> -						 ext4_dio_get_block);
> -
> +			if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
> +				ret_saved = ret;
> +			else
> +				goto skip_dio;
> +		}
> +		ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
> +					 ext4_get_block);
> +		if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
> +			ret = ret_saved;
> +skip_dio:
>  		if (unlikely(iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE && ret < 0)) {
>  			loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode);
>  			loff_t end = offset + count;
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
> index dab84a2..27f07c2 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
> @@ -3341,7 +3341,7 @@ static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
>  {
>  	struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
>  	struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
> -	ssize_t ret;
> +	ssize_t ret, ret_saved = 0;
>  	size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
>  	int overwrite = 0;
>  	get_block_t *get_block_func = NULL;
> @@ -3401,15 +3401,22 @@ static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
>  #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
>  	BUG_ON(ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode));
>  #endif
> -	if (IS_DAX(inode))
> +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
>  		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, get_block_func,
>  				ext4_end_io_dio, dio_flags);
> -	else
> -		ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode,
> -					   inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter, offset,
> -					   get_block_func,
> -					   ext4_end_io_dio, NULL, dio_flags);
> +		if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
> +			ret_saved = ret;
> +		else
> +			goto skip_dio;
> +	}
>  
> +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode,
> +				   inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter, offset,
> +				   get_block_func,
> +				   ext4_end_io_dio, NULL, dio_flags);
> +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
> +		ret = ret_saved;
> + skip_dio:
>  	if (ret > 0 && !overwrite && ext4_test_inode_state(inode,
>  						EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN)) {
>  		int err;
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
> index d445a64..7cfcf86 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
> @@ -1413,6 +1413,7 @@ xfs_vm_direct_IO(
>  	dio_iodone_t		*endio = NULL;
>  	int			flags = 0;
>  	struct block_device	*bdev;
> +	ssize_t 		ret, ret_saved = 0;
>  
>  	if (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE) {
>  		endio = xfs_end_io_direct_write;
> @@ -1420,13 +1421,22 @@ xfs_vm_direct_IO(
>  	}
>  
>  	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
> -		return dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
> +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
>  				 xfs_get_blocks_direct, endio, 0);
> +		if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
> +			ret_saved = ret;
> +		else
> +			return ret;
>  	}
>  
>  	bdev = xfs_find_bdev_for_inode(inode);
> -	return  __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, bdev, iter, offset,
> +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, bdev, iter, offset,
>  			xfs_get_blocks_direct, endio, NULL, flags);
> +
> +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
> +		ret = ret_saved;
> +
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  /*
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Verma, Vishal L April 15, 2016, 4:54 p.m. UTC | #6
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--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer April 15, 2016, 5:11 p.m. UTC | #7

"Verma, Vishal L" <[e-mail]> writes:

> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 12:11 -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
>> Vishal Verma <[e-mail]> writes:
>> > +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
>> > +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
>> > blkdev_get_block,
>> >  				NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
>> > -	return __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode),
>> > iter, offset,
>> > +		if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))
>> > +			ret_saved = ret;
>> > +		else
>> > +			return ret;
>> > +	}
>> > +
>> > +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode),
>> > iter, offset,
>> >  				    blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,
>> >  				    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
>> > +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
>> > +		return ret_saved;
>> > +
>> Hmm, did you just break async DIO?  I think you did!  :)
>> __blockdev_direct_IO can return -EIOCBQUEUED, and you've now turned
>> that
>> into -EIO.  Really, I don't see a reason to save that first
>> -EIO.  The
>> same applies to all instances in this patch.
>
> The reason I saved it was if __blockdev_direct_IO fails for some
> reason, we should return the original cause o the error, which was an
> EIO.. i.e. we shouldn't be hiding the EIO if the direct_IO fails with
> something else..

OK.

> But, how does _EIOCBQUEUED work? Maybe we need an exception for it?

For async direct I/O, only the setup phase of the I/O is performed and
then we return to the caller.  -EIOCBQUEUED signifies this.

You're heading towards code that looks like this:

        if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
                ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, blkdev_get_block,
                                NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
                if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))
                        ret_saved = ret;
                else
                        return ret;
        }

        ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter, offset,
                                    blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,
                                    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
        if (ret < 0 && ret != -EIOCBQUEUED && ret_saved)
                return ret_saved;

There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider adding
comments.

Cheers,
Jeff
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Verma, Vishal L April 15, 2016, 5:37 p.m. UTC | #8

On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 13:11 -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
> "Verma, Vishal L" <[e-mail]> writes:

> 

> > 

> > On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 12:11 -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:

> > > 

> > > Vishal Verma <[e-mail]> writes:

> > > > 

> > > > +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {

> > > > +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,

> > > > blkdev_get_block,

> > > >  				NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);

> > > > -	return __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode,

> > > > I_BDEV(inode),

> > > > iter, offset,

> > > > +		if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) ==

> > > > WRITE))

> > > > +			ret_saved = ret;

> > > > +		else

> > > > +			return ret;

> > > > +	}

> > > > +

> > > > +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode),

> > > > iter, offset,

> > > >  				    blkdev_get_block, NULL,

> > > > NULL,

> > > >  				    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);

> > > > +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)

> > > > +		return ret_saved;

> > > > +

> > > Hmm, did you just break async DIO?  I think you did!  :)

> > > __blockdev_direct_IO can return -EIOCBQUEUED, and you've now

> > > turned

> > > that

> > > into -EIO.  Really, I don't see a reason to save that first

> > > -EIO.  The

> > > same applies to all instances in this patch.

> > The reason I saved it was if __blockdev_direct_IO fails for some

> > reason, we should return the original cause o the error, which was

> > an

> > EIO.. i.e. we shouldn't be hiding the EIO if the direct_IO fails

> > with

> > something else..

> OK.

> 

> > 

> > But, how does _EIOCBQUEUED work? Maybe we need an exception for it?

> For async direct I/O, only the setup phase of the I/O is performed

> and

> then we return to the caller.  -EIOCBQUEUED signifies this.

> 

> You're heading towards code that looks like this:

> 

>         if (IS_DAX(inode)) {

>                 ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,

> blkdev_get_block,

>                                 NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);

>                 if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))

>                         ret_saved = ret;

>                 else

>                         return ret;

>         }

> 

>         ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter,

> offset,

>                                     blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,

>                                     DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);

>         if (ret < 0 && ret != -EIOCBQUEUED && ret_saved)

>                 return ret_saved;

> 

> There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider adding

> comments.


Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)

Thanks for the explanation and for catching this. I'll fix it for the
next revision.

> 

> Cheers,

> Jeff

Dan Williams April 15, 2016, 5:57 p.m. UTC | #9

On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 10:37 AM, Verma, Vishal L
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 13:11 -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
[..]
>> >
>> > But, how does _EIOCBQUEUED work? Maybe we need an exception for it?
>> For async direct I/O, only the setup phase of the I/O is performed
>> and
>> then we return to the caller.  -EIOCBQUEUED signifies this.
>>
>> You're heading towards code that looks like this:
>>
>>         if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
>>                 ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
>> blkdev_get_block,
>>                                 NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
>>                 if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))
>>                         ret_saved = ret;
>>                 else
>>                         return ret;
>>         }
>>
>>         ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter,
>> offset,
>>                                     blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,
>>                                     DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
>>         if (ret < 0 && ret != -EIOCBQUEUED && ret_saved)
>>                 return ret_saved;
>>
>> There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider adding
>> comments.
>
> Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)

Another option is just to skip dax_do_io() and this special casing
fallback entirely if errors are present.  I.e. only attempt dax_do_io
when: IS_DAX() && gendisk->bb && bb->count == 0.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer April 15, 2016, 6:06 p.m. UTC | #10

Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:

>>> There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider adding
>>> comments.
>>
>> Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)
>
> Another option is just to skip dax_do_io() and this special casing
> fallback entirely if errors are present.  I.e. only attempt dax_do_io
> when: IS_DAX() && gendisk->bb && bb->count == 0.

So, if there's an error anywhere on the device, penalize all I/O (not
just writes, and not just on sectors that are bad)?  I'm not sure that's
a great plan, either.

-Jeff
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dan Williams April 15, 2016, 6:17 p.m. UTC | #11

On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:06 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
> Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:
>
>>>> There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider adding
>>>> comments.
>>>
>>> Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)
>>
>> Another option is just to skip dax_do_io() and this special casing
>> fallback entirely if errors are present.  I.e. only attempt dax_do_io
>> when: IS_DAX() && gendisk->bb && bb->count == 0.
>
> So, if there's an error anywhere on the device, penalize all I/O (not
> just writes, and not just on sectors that are bad)?  I'm not sure that's
> a great plan, either.
>

If errors are rare how much are we actually losing in practice?
Moreover, we're going to do the full badblocks lookup anyway when we
call ->direct_access().  If we had that information earlier we can
avoid this fallback dance.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer April 15, 2016, 6:24 p.m. UTC | #12

Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:

> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:06 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:
>>
>>>>> There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider adding
>>>>> comments.
>>>>
>>>> Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)
>>>
>>> Another option is just to skip dax_do_io() and this special casing
>>> fallback entirely if errors are present.  I.e. only attempt dax_do_io
>>> when: IS_DAX() && gendisk->bb && bb->count == 0.
>>
>> So, if there's an error anywhere on the device, penalize all I/O (not
>> just writes, and not just on sectors that are bad)?  I'm not sure that's
>> a great plan, either.
>>
>
> If errors are rare how much are we actually losing in practice?

How long is a piece of string?

> Moreover, we're going to do the full badblocks lookup anyway when we
> call ->direct_access().  If we had that information earlier we can
> avoid this fallback dance.

None of the proposed approaches looks clean to me.  I'll go along with
whatever you guys think is best.  I am in favor of wrapping up all that
duplicated code, though.

Cheers,
Jeff
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dan Williams April 15, 2016, 6:56 p.m. UTC | #13

On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:24 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> Moreover, we're going to do the full badblocks lookup anyway when we
>> call ->direct_access().  If we had that information earlier we can
>> avoid this fallback dance.
>
> None of the proposed approaches looks clean to me.  I'll go along with
> whatever you guys think is best.  I am in favor of wrapping up all that
> duplicated code, though.

Christoph originally pushed for open coding this fallback decision
per-filesystem.  I agree with you on the "none the above" options are
clean.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Kani, Toshi April 15, 2016, 7:01 p.m. UTC | #14

On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 11:17 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:06 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > 
> > Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:
> > 
> > > > > There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider
> > > > > adding comments.
> > > > Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)
> > > Another option is just to skip dax_do_io() and this special casing
> > > fallback entirely if errors are present.  I.e. only attempt dax_do_io
> > > when: IS_DAX() && gendisk->bb && bb->count == 0.
> >
> > So, if there's an error anywhere on the device, penalize all I/O (not
> > just writes, and not just on sectors that are bad)?  I'm not sure
> > that's a great plan, either.
> > 
> If errors are rare how much are we actually losing in practice?
> Moreover, we're going to do the full badblocks lookup anyway when we
> call ->direct_access().  If we had that information earlier we can
> avoid this fallback dance.

A system running with DAX may have active data set in NVDIMM lager than RAM
size.  In this case, falling back to non-DAX will allocate page cache for
the data, which will saturate the system with memory pressure.

Thanks,
-Toshi  

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Kani, Toshi April 15, 2016, 7:08 p.m. UTC | #15

On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 13:01 -0600, Toshi Kani wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 11:17 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > 
> > On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:06 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > > 
> > > Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:
> > >  
> > > > > > There's a lot of special casing here, so you might consider
> > > > > > adding comments.
> > > > > Correct - maybe we should reconsider wrapper-izing this? :)
> > > > Another option is just to skip dax_do_io() and this special casing
> > > > fallback entirely if errors are present.  I.e. only attempt
> > > > dax_do_io when: IS_DAX() && gendisk->bb && bb->count == 0.
> > >
> > > So, if there's an error anywhere on the device, penalize all I/O (not
> > > just writes, and not just on sectors that are bad)?  I'm not sure
> > > that's a great plan, either.
> > > 
> > If errors are rare how much are we actually losing in practice?
> > Moreover, we're going to do the full badblocks lookup anyway when we
> > call ->direct_access().  If we had that information earlier we can
> > avoid this fallback dance.
>
> A system running with DAX may have active data set in NVDIMM lager than
> RAM size.  In this case, falling back to non-DAX will allocate page cache
> for the data, which will saturate the system with memory pressure.

Oh, sorry, we are still in DIO path.  Falling back to DIO should not cause
this issue.

-Toshi
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer April 15, 2016, 7:13 p.m. UTC | #16

Dan Williams <[e-mail]> writes:

> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:24 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> Moreover, we're going to do the full badblocks lookup anyway when we
>>> call ->direct_access().  If we had that information earlier we can
>>> avoid this fallback dance.
>>
>> None of the proposed approaches looks clean to me.  I'll go along with
>> whatever you guys think is best.  I am in favor of wrapping up all that
>> duplicated code, though.
>
> Christoph originally pushed for open coding this fallback decision
> per-filesystem.  I agree with you on the "none the above" options are
> clean.

I don't recall him saying "open code".  Rather, the sentiment was to
leave the fallback to the callers.  That doesn't mean you can't wrap it
up in a convenience function.

Cheers,
Jeff
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Christoph Hellwig April 20, 2016, 8:59 p.m. UTC | #17

On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 12:11:36PM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
> > +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
> > +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, blkdev_get_block,
> >  				NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
> > +		if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))
> > +			ret_saved = ret;
> > +		else
> > +			return ret;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter, offset,
> >  				    blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,
> >  				    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
> > +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
> > +		return ret_saved;
> > +
> 
> Hmm, did you just break async DIO?  I think you did!  :)
> __blockdev_direct_IO can return -EIOCBQUEUED, and you've now turned that
> into -EIO.  Really, I don't see a reason to save that first -EIO.  The
> same applies to all instances in this patch.

Yes, there is no point in saving the earlier error - just return the
second error all the time.

E.g.

	ret = dax_io();
	if (dax_need_dio_retry(ret))
		ret = direct_IO();

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Verma, Vishal L April 23, 2016, 6:08 p.m. UTC | #18

On Wed, 2016-04-20 at 13:59 -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 12:11:36PM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:

> > 

> > > 

> > > +	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {

> > > +		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,

> > > blkdev_get_block,

> > >  				NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);

> > > +		if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))

> > > +			ret_saved = ret;

> > > +		else

> > > +			return ret;

> > > +	}

> > > +

> > > +	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode),

> > > iter, offset,

> > >  				    blkdev_get_block, NULL,

> > > NULL,

> > >  				    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);

> > > +	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)

> > > +		return ret_saved;

> > > +

> > Hmm, did you just break async DIO?  I think you did!  :)

> > __blockdev_direct_IO can return -EIOCBQUEUED, and you've now turned

> > that

> > into -EIO.  Really, I don't see a reason to save that first

> > -EIO.  The

> > same applies to all instances in this patch.

> Yes, there is no point in saving the earlier error - just return the

> second error all the time.


Is it ok to do that?

direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM due
to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the original
-EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the information
that the bad block is actually causing the error.

> 

> E.g.

> 

> 	ret = dax_io();

> 	if (dax_need_dio_retry(ret))

> 		ret = direct_IO();

>

Christoph Hellwig April 25, 2016, 8:31 a.m. UTC | #19

On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM due
> to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the original
> -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the information
> that the bad block is actually causing the error.

EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.

I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
fallback.

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer April 25, 2016, 3:32 p.m. UTC | #20

"[e-mail]" <[e-mail]> writes:

> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
>> direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM due
>> to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the original
>> -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the information
>> that the bad block is actually causing the error.
>
> EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
> because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
> need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
> alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
>
> I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
> don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
> fallback.

The only callers of dax_do_io are direct_IO methods.

Cheers,
Jeff
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Verma, Vishal L April 25, 2016, 5:14 p.m. UTC | #21

On Mon, 2016-04-25 at 01:31 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:

> > 

> > direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM

> > due

> > to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the

> > original

> > -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the

> > information

> > that the bad block is actually causing the error.

> EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but

> because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we

> need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to

> alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.

> 

> I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I

> don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO

> fallback.

> 

Agreed that DAX I/O can happen with any size/alignment, but how else do
we send an IO through the driver without alignment restrictions? Also,
the granularity at which we store badblocks is 512B sectors, so it
seems natural that to clear such a sector, you'd expect to send a write
to the whole sector.

The expected usage flow is:

- Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io

- It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data

- It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
fiemap)
    * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
entire sector

- Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
mmap+stores)
    * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will be
done through the driver and will clear errors


I think if we want to keep allowing arbitrary alignments for the
dax_do_io path, we'd need:
1. To represent badblocks at a finer granularity (likely cache lines)
2. To allow the driver to do IO to a *block device* at sub-sector
granularity

Can we do that?

Dan Williams April 25, 2016, 5:21 p.m. UTC | #22

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 10:14 AM, Verma, Vishal L
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-04-25 at 01:31 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
>> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
>> >
>> > direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM
>> > due
>> > to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the
>> > original
>> > -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the
>> > information
>> > that the bad block is actually causing the error.
>> EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
>> because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
>> need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
>> alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
>>
>> I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
>> don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
>> fallback.
>>
> Agreed that DAX I/O can happen with any size/alignment, but how else do
> we send an IO through the driver without alignment restrictions? Also,
> the granularity at which we store badblocks is 512B sectors, so it
> seems natural that to clear such a sector, you'd expect to send a write
> to the whole sector.
>
> The expected usage flow is:
>
> - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
>
> - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
>
> - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
> fiemap)
>     * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
> this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
> entire sector
>
> - Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
> mmap+stores)
>     * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
> reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will be
> done through the driver and will clear errors
>
>
> I think if we want to keep allowing arbitrary alignments for the
> dax_do_io path, we'd need:
> 1. To represent badblocks at a finer granularity (likely cache lines)
> 2. To allow the driver to do IO to a *block device* at sub-sector
> granularity

3. Arrange for O_DIRECT to bypass dax_do_io(), and leave the
optimization only for the dax "buffered I/O" case.

4. Skip dax_do_io() entirely in the presence of errors

I think 3 is the most closely aligned with the typical block device
model.  In the typical case a buffered write may fail due to a
badblock read when filling the page cache, but an O_DIRECT write would
bypass the page cache and potentially clear the error / cause the
block to be reallocated internally to the drive.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner April 25, 2016, 11:25 p.m. UTC | #23

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 05:14:36PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-04-25 at 01:31 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
> > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> > > 
> > > direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM
> > > due
> > > to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the
> > > original
> > > -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the
> > > information
> > > that the bad block is actually causing the error.
> > EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
> > because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
> > need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
> > alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
> > 
> > I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
> > don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
> > fallback.
> > 
> Agreed that DAX I/O can happen with any size/alignment, but how else do
> we send an IO through the driver without alignment restrictions? Also,
> the granularity at which we store badblocks is 512B sectors, so it
> seems natural that to clear such a sector, you'd expect to send a write
> to the whole sector.
> 
> The expected usage flow is:
> 
> - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
> 
> - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data

Lots of hand-waving here. How does the application map a bad
"sector" to a file without scanning the entire filesystem to find
the owner of the bad sector?

> - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
> fiemap)
>     * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
> this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
> entire sector

Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
rewrite it?

> - Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
> mmap+stores)
>     * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
> reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will be
> done through the driver and will clear errors

There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
automatically repair it? And then there's the implicit assumption
that it will unlink and free the entire file before writing a new
copy, and that then assumes the the filesystem will zero blocks if
they get reused to clear errors on that LBA sector mapping before
they are accessible again to userspace..

It seems to me that there are a number of assumptions being made
across multiple layers here. Maybe I've missed something - can you
point me to the design/architecture description so I can see how
"app does data recovery itself" dance is supposed to work?

Cheers,

Dave.

Darrick J. Wong April 25, 2016, 11:34 p.m. UTC | #24

On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 09:25:52AM +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 05:14:36PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> > On Mon, 2016-04-25 at 01:31 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
> > > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM
> > > > due
> > > > to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the
> > > > original
> > > > -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the
> > > > information
> > > > that the bad block is actually causing the error.
> > > EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
> > > because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
> > > need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
> > > alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
> > > 
> > > I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
> > > don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
> > > fallback.
> > > 
> > Agreed that DAX I/O can happen with any size/alignment, but how else do
> > we send an IO through the driver without alignment restrictions? Also,
> > the granularity at which we store badblocks is 512B sectors, so it
> > seems natural that to clear such a sector, you'd expect to send a write
> > to the whole sector.
> > 
> > The expected usage flow is:
> > 
> > - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
> > 
> > - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
> 
> Lots of hand-waving here. How does the application map a bad
> "sector" to a file without scanning the entire filesystem to find
> the owner of the bad sector?

FWIW there was some discussion @ LSF about using (XFS) rmap to figure out
which parts of a file (on XFS) have gone bad.  Chris Mason said that he'd
like to collaborate on having a common getfsmap ioctl between btrfs and
XFS since they have a backref index that could be hooked up to it for them.

Obviously the app still has to coordinate stopping file IO and calling
GETFSMAP since the fs won't do that on its own.  There's also the question
of how to handle LBA translation if there's other stuff like dm in the way.
I don't think device-mapper or md do reverse mapping, so things get murky
from here.

Guess I should get on pushing out a getfsmap patch for review. :)

--D

(/me doesn't have answers to any of your other questions.)

> > - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
> > fiemap)
> >     * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
> > this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
> > entire sector
> 
> Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
> rewrite it?
> 
> > - Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
> > mmap+stores)
> >     * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
> > reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will be
> > done through the driver and will clear errors
> 
> There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
> copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
> automatically repair it? And then there's the implicit assumption
> that it will unlink and free the entire file before writing a new
> copy, and that then assumes the the filesystem will zero blocks if
> they get reused to clear errors on that LBA sector mapping before
> they are accessible again to userspace..
> 
> It seems to me that there are a number of assumptions being made
> across multiple layers here. Maybe I've missed something - can you
> point me to the design/architecture description so I can see how
> "app does data recovery itself" dance is supposed to work?
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Dave.
> -- 
> Dave Chinner
> [e-mail]
> 
> _______________________________________________
> xfs mailing list
> [e-mail]
> http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dan Williams April 25, 2016, 11:43 p.m. UTC | #25

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 05:14:36PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
>> On Mon, 2016-04-25 at 01:31 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
>> > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
>> > >
>> > > direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM
>> > > due
>> > > to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the
>> > > original
>> > > -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the
>> > > information
>> > > that the bad block is actually causing the error.
>> > EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
>> > because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
>> > need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
>> > alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
>> >
>> > I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
>> > don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
>> > fallback.
>> >
>> Agreed that DAX I/O can happen with any size/alignment, but how else do
>> we send an IO through the driver without alignment restrictions? Also,
>> the granularity at which we store badblocks is 512B sectors, so it
>> seems natural that to clear such a sector, you'd expect to send a write
>> to the whole sector.
>>
>> The expected usage flow is:
>>
>> - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
>>
>> - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
>
> Lots of hand-waving here. How does the application map a bad
> "sector" to a file without scanning the entire filesystem to find
> the owner of the bad sector?
>
>> - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
>> fiemap)
>>     * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
>> this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
>> entire sector
>
> Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
> rewrite it?
>
>> - Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
>> mmap+stores)
>>     * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
>> reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will be
>> done through the driver and will clear errors
>
> There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
> copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
> automatically repair it? And then there's the implicit assumption
> that it will unlink and free the entire file before writing a new
> copy, and that then assumes the the filesystem will zero blocks if
> they get reused to clear errors on that LBA sector mapping before
> they are accessible again to userspace..
>
> It seems to me that there are a number of assumptions being made
> across multiple layers here. Maybe I've missed something - can you
> point me to the design/architecture description so I can see how
> "app does data recovery itself" dance is supposed to work?
>

Maybe I missed something, but all these assumptions are already
present for typical block devices, i.e. sectors may go bad and a write
may make the sector usable again.  This patch series is extending that
out to the DAX-mmap case, but it's the same principle of "write to
clear error" that we live with in the block-I/O path.  What
clarification are you looking for beyond that point?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Verma, Vishal L April 25, 2016, 11:53 p.m. UTC | #26
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--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner April 26, 2016, 12:11 a.m. UTC | #27

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 04:43:14PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 05:14:36PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> >> On Mon, 2016-04-25 at 01:31 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
> >> > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 06:08:37PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > > direct_IO might fail with -EINVAL due to misalignment, or -ENOMEM
> >> > > due
> >> > > to some allocation failing, and I thought we should return the
> >> > > original
> >> > > -EIO in such cases so that the application doesn't lose the
> >> > > information
> >> > > that the bad block is actually causing the error.
> >> > EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
> >> > because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
> >> > need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
> >> > alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
> >> >
> >> > I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
> >> > don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
> >> > fallback.
> >> >
> >> Agreed that DAX I/O can happen with any size/alignment, but how else do
> >> we send an IO through the driver without alignment restrictions? Also,
> >> the granularity at which we store badblocks is 512B sectors, so it
> >> seems natural that to clear such a sector, you'd expect to send a write
> >> to the whole sector.
> >>
> >> The expected usage flow is:
> >>
> >> - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
> >>
> >> - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
> >
> > Lots of hand-waving here. How does the application map a bad
> > "sector" to a file without scanning the entire filesystem to find
> > the owner of the bad sector?
> >
> >> - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
> >> fiemap)
> >>     * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
> >> this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
> >> entire sector
> >
> > Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
> > rewrite it?
> >
> >> - Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
> >> mmap+stores)
> >>     * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
> >> reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will be
> >> done through the driver and will clear errors
> >
> > There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
> > copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
> > automatically repair it? And then there's the implicit assumption
> > that it will unlink and free the entire file before writing a new
> > copy, and that then assumes the the filesystem will zero blocks if
> > they get reused to clear errors on that LBA sector mapping before
> > they are accessible again to userspace..
> >
> > It seems to me that there are a number of assumptions being made
> > across multiple layers here. Maybe I've missed something - can you
> > point me to the design/architecture description so I can see how
> > "app does data recovery itself" dance is supposed to work?
> >
> 
> Maybe I missed something, but all these assumptions are already
> present for typical block devices, i.e. sectors may go bad and a write
> may make the sector usable again.

The assumption we make about sectors going bad on SSDs or SRDs is
that the device is about to die and needs replacing ASAP. Then
RAID takes care of the rebuild completely transparently. i.e.
handling and correcting bad sectors is typically done completely
transparently /below/ the filesytem like so:

Application
Filesystem
block
[LBA mapping/redundancy/correction driver e.g. md/dm]
driver
hardware
[LBA redundancy/correction e.g h/w RAID]

In the case of filesystems with their own RAID/redundancy code (e.g.
btrfs), then it looks like this:

Application
Filesystem
mapping/redundancy/correction driver
block
driver
hardware
[LBA redundancy/correction e.g h/w RAID]

> This patch series is extending that
> out to the DAX-mmap case, but it's the same principle of "write to
> clear error" that we live with in the block-I/O path.  What
> clarification are you looking for beyond that point?

I'm asking for an actual design document that explains how moving
all the redundancy and bad sector correction stuff from the LBA
layer up into application space is supposed to work when
applications have no clue about LBA mappings, nor tend to keep
redundant data around. i.e. you're proposing this:

Application
Application data redundancy/correction
Filesystem
Block
[LBA mapping/redundancy/correction driver e.g. md/dm]
driver
hardware

And somehow all the error information from the hardware layer needs
to be propagated up to the application layer, along with all the
mapping information from the filesystem and block layers for the
application to make sense of the hardware reported errors.

I see assumptions this this "just works" but we don't have any of
the relevant APIs or infrastructure to enable the application to do
the hardware error->file+offset namespace mapping (i.e. filesystem
reverse mapping for for file offsets and directory paths, and
reverse mapping for the the block layer remapping drivers).

I haven't seen any design/documentation for infrastructure at the
application layer to handle redundant data and correctly
transparently so I don't have any idea what the technical
requirements this different IO stack places on filesystems may be.
Hence I'm asking for some kind of architecture/design documentation
that I can read to understand exactly what is being proposed here...

Cheers,

Dave.

Dave Chinner April 26, 2016, 12:41 a.m. UTC | #28

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:53:13PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 09:25 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> > 
> <>
> 
> > > 
> > > - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
> > Lots of hand-waving here. How does the application map a bad
> > "sector" to a file without scanning the entire filesystem to find
> > the owner of the bad sector?
> 
> Yes this was hand-wavey, but we talked about this a bit at LSF..
> The idea is that a per-block-device badblocks list is available at
> /sys/block/<pmemX>/badblocks. The application (or a suitable yet-to-be-
> written library function) does a fiemap to figure out the sectors its
> files are using, and correlates the two lists.
> We can also look into providing an easier-to-use interface from the
> kernel, in the form of an fiemap flag to report only the bad sectors, or
> a SEEK_BAD flag..
> The application doesn't have to scan the entire filesystem, but
> presumably it knows what files it 'owns', and does a fiemap for those.

You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's
files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem
re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files and
they may throw errors. What then?

> > > - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets
> > > using
> > > fiemap)
> > >     * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is
> > > doing
> > > this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write
> > > the
> > > entire sector
> > Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
> > rewrite it?
> 
> The data that was lost is gone -- this assumes the application has some
> ability to recover using a journal/log or other redundancy - yes, at the
> application layer. If it doesn't have this sort of capability, the only
> option is to restore files from a backup/mirror.

So the architecture has a built in assumption that only userspace
can handle data loss?

What about filesytsems like NOVA, that use log structured design to
provide DAX w/ update atomicity and can potentially also provide
redundancy/repair through the same mechanisms? Won't pmem native
filesystems with built in data protection features like this remove
the need for adding all this to userspace applications?

If so, shouldn't that be the focus of development rahter than
placing the burden on userspace apps to handle storage repair
situations?

> > > - Or it replaces the entire file from backup also using write() (not
> > > mmap+stores)
> > >     * This just frees the fs block, and the next time the block is
> > > reallocated by the fs, it will likely be zeroed first, and that will
> > > be
> > > done through the driver and will clear errors
> > There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
> > copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
> > automatically repair it? And then there's the implicit assumption
> > that it will unlink and free the entire file before writing a new
> > copy, and that then assumes the the filesystem will zero blocks if
> > they get reused to clear errors on that LBA sector mapping before
> > they are accessible again to userspace..
> > 
> > It seems to me that there are a number of assumptions being made
> > across multiple layers here. Maybe I've missed something - can you
> > point me to the design/architecture description so I can see how
> > "app does data recovery itself" dance is supposed to work?
> 
> There isn't a document other than the flow in my head :) - but maybe I
> could write one up..
> I wasn't thinking the application itself maintains and restores from
> backup copy of the file.. The application hits either a SIGBUS or EIO
> depending on how it accesses the data, and crashes or raises some alarm.
> The recovery is then done out-of-band, by a sysadmin or such (i.e.
> delete the file, replace with a known good copy, restart application).
> 
> To summarize, the two cases we want to handle are:
> 1. Application has inbuilt recovery:
>   - hits badblock
>   - figures out it is able to recover the data
>   - handles SIGBUS or EIO
>   - does a (sector aligned) write() to restore the data

The "figures out" step here is where >95% of the work we'd have to
do is. And that's in filesystem and block layer code, not
userspace, and userspace can't do that work in a signal handler.
And it  can still fall down to the second case when the application
doesn't have another copy of the data somewhere.

FWIW, we don't have a DAX enabled filesystem that can do
reverse block mapping, so we're a year or two away from this being a
workable production solution from the filesystem perspective. And
AFAICT, it's not even on the roadmap for dm/md layers.

> 2. Application doesn't have any inbuilt recovery mechanism
>   - hits badblock
>   - gets SIGBUS (or EIO) and crashes
>   - Sysadmin restores file from backup

Which is no different to an existing non-DAX application getting an
EIO/sigbus from current storage technologies.

Except: in the existing storage stack, redundancy and correction has
already had to have failed for the application to see such an error.
Hence this is normally considered a DR case as there's had to be
cascading failures (e.g.  multiple disk failures in a RAID) to get
to this stage, not a single error in a single sector in
non-redundant storage.

We need some form of redundancy and correction in the PMEM stack to
prevent single sector errors from taking down services until an
administrator can correct the problem. I'm trying to understand
where this is supposed to fit into the picture - at this point I
really don't think userspace applications are going to be able to do
this reliably....

Cheers,

Dave.

Dan Williams April 26, 2016, 1:45 a.m. UTC | #29

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 5:11 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 04:43:14PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
[..]
>> Maybe I missed something, but all these assumptions are already
>> present for typical block devices, i.e. sectors may go bad and a write
>> may make the sector usable again.
>
> The assumption we make about sectors going bad on SSDs or SRDs is
> that the device is about to die and needs replacing ASAP.

Similar assumptions here.  Storage media is experiencing errors and
past a certain threshold it may be time to decommission the device.

You can see definitions for SMART / media health commands from various
vendors at these links, and yes, hopefully these are standardized /
unified at some point down the road:

http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface_Example.pdf
https://github.com/HewlettPackard/hpe-nvm/blob/master/Documentation/NFIT_DSM_DDR4_NVDIMM-N_v84s.pdf
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/mt604717(v=vs.85).aspx


> Then
> RAID takes care of the rebuild completely transparently. i.e.
> handling and correcting bad sectors is typically done completely
> transparently /below/ the filesytem like so:

Again, same for an NVDIMM.  Use the pmem block-device as a RAID-member device.

>> This patch series is extending that
>> out to the DAX-mmap case, but it's the same principle of "write to
>> clear error" that we live with in the block-I/O path.  What
>> clarification are you looking for beyond that point?
>
> I'm asking for an actual design document that explains how moving
> all the redundancy and bad sector correction stuff from the LBA
> layer up into application space is supposed to work when
> applications have no clue about LBA mappings, nor tend to keep
> redundant data around. i.e. you're proposing this:

These patches are not proposing *new* / general infrastructure for
moving redundancy and bad sector correction handling to userspace.  If
an existing app is somehow dealing with raw (without RAID) device
errors on disk storage media today it should not need to change to
handle errors on an NVDIMM.  My expectation is that very few if any
applications handle this today and just fail in the presence of media
errors.

> Application
> Application data redundancy/correction
> Filesystem
> Block
> [LBA mapping/redundancy/correction driver e.g. md/dm]
> driver
> hardware
>
> And somehow all the error information from the hardware layer needs
> to be propagated up to the application layer, along with all the
> mapping information from the filesystem and block layers for the
> application to make sense of the hardware reported errors.
>
> I see assumptions this this "just works" but we don't have any of
> the relevant APIs or infrastructure to enable the application to do
> the hardware error->file+offset namespace mapping (i.e. filesystem
> reverse mapping for for file offsets and directory paths, and
> reverse mapping for the the block layer remapping drivers).

If an application expects errors to be handled beneath the filesystem
then it should forgo DAX and arrange for the NVDIMM devices to be
RAIDed.  Otherwise, if an application wants to use DAX then it might
need to be prepared to handle media errors itself same as the
un-RAIDed disk case.  Yes, at an administrative level without
reverse-mapping support from a filesystem there's presently no way to
ask "which files on this fs are impacted by media errors", and we're
aware that reverse-mapping capabilities are nascent for current
DAX-aware filesystems.  The forward lookup path, as impractical as it
is for large numbers of files, is available if an application wanted
to know if a specific file was impacted.  We've discussed possibly
extending fiemap() to return bad blocks in a file rather than
consulting sysfs, or extending lseek() with something like SEEK_ERROR
to return offsets of bad areas in a file.

> I haven't seen any design/documentation for infrastructure at the
> application layer to handle redundant data and correctly
> transparently so I don't have any idea what the technical
> requirements this different IO stack places on filesystems may be.
> Hence I'm asking for some kind of architecture/design documentation
> that I can read to understand exactly what is being proposed here...

I think this is a discussion for a solution that would build on top of
this basic "here are the errors, re-write them with good data if you
can; otherwise, best of luck" foundation.  Something like a DAX-aware
device mapper layer that duplicates data tagged with REQ_META so at
least we have a recovery path when a sector error lands in critical
filesystem-metadata.  However, anything we come up with to make NVDIMM
errors more survivable should be directly applicable to traditional
disk storage as well.  Along these lines we had a BoF session at Vault
where drive vendors we're wondering if the sysfs bad sectors list
could help software recover from the loss of a disk-head, or other
errors that only take down part of the drive.  An I/O hint that flags
data that should be stored redundantly might be useful there as well.

By the way, your presence was sorely missed at LSF/MM!
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner April 26, 2016, 2:56 a.m. UTC | #30

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 06:45:08PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 5:11 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 04:43:14PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> [..]
> >> Maybe I missed something, but all these assumptions are already
> >> present for typical block devices, i.e. sectors may go bad and a write
> >> may make the sector usable again.
> >
> > The assumption we make about sectors going bad on SSDs or SRDs is
> > that the device is about to die and needs replacing ASAP.
> 
> Similar assumptions here.  Storage media is experiencing errors and
> past a certain threshold it may be time to decommission the device.
> 
> You can see definitions for SMART / media health commands from various
> vendors at these links, and yes, hopefully these are standardized /
> unified at some point down the road:
> 
> http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface_Example.pdf
> https://github.com/HewlettPackard/hpe-nvm/blob/master/Documentation/NFIT_DSM_DDR4_NVDIMM-N_v84s.pdf
> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/mt604717(v=vs.85).aspx
> 
> 
> > Then
> > RAID takes care of the rebuild completely transparently. i.e.
> > handling and correcting bad sectors is typically done completely
> > transparently /below/ the filesytem like so:
> 
> Again, same for an NVDIMM.  Use the pmem block-device as a RAID-member device.

Which means we're not using DAX and so the existing storage model
applies. I understand how this works.

What I'm asking about the redundancy/error correction model /when
using DAX/ and a userspace DAX load/store throws the MCE.

> > And somehow all the error information from the hardware layer needs
> > to be propagated up to the application layer, along with all the
> > mapping information from the filesystem and block layers for the
> > application to make sense of the hardware reported errors.
> >
> > I see assumptions this this "just works" but we don't have any of
> > the relevant APIs or infrastructure to enable the application to do
> > the hardware error->file+offset namespace mapping (i.e. filesystem
> > reverse mapping for for file offsets and directory paths, and
> > reverse mapping for the the block layer remapping drivers).
> 
> If an application expects errors to be handled beneath the filesystem
> then it should forgo DAX and arrange for the NVDIMM devices to be
> RAIDed.

See above: I'm asking about the DAX-enabled error handling model,
not the traditional error handling model.

> Otherwise, if an application wants to use DAX then it might
> need to be prepared to handle media errors itself same as the
> un-RAIDed disk case.  Yes, at an administrative level without
> reverse-mapping support from a filesystem there's presently no way to
> ask "which files on this fs are impacted by media errors", and we're
> aware that reverse-mapping capabilities are nascent for current
> DAX-aware filesystems.

Precisely my point - suggestions are being proposed which assume
use of infrastructure that *does not exist yet* and has not been
discussed or documented. If we're expecting such infrastructure to
be implemented in the filesystems and block device drivers, then we
need to determine that the error model actually works first...

> The forward lookup path, as impractical as it
> is for large numbers of files, is available if an application wanted
> to know if a specific file was impacted.  We've discussed possibly
> extending fiemap() to return bad blocks in a file rather than
> consulting sysfs, or extending lseek() with something like SEEK_ERROR
> to return offsets of bad areas in a file.

Via what infrastructure will the filesystem use for finding out
whether a file has bad blocks in it? And if the file does have bad
blocks, what are you expecting the filesystem to do with that
information?

> > I haven't seen any design/documentation for infrastructure at the
> > application layer to handle redundant data and correctly
> > transparently so I don't have any idea what the technical
> > requirements this different IO stack places on filesystems may be.
> > Hence I'm asking for some kind of architecture/design documentation
> > that I can read to understand exactly what is being proposed here...
> 
> I think this is a discussion for a solution that would build on top of
> this basic "here are the errors, re-write them with good data if you
> can; otherwise, best of luck" foundation.  Something like a DAX-aware
> device mapper layer that duplicates data tagged with REQ_META so at
> least we have a recovery path when a sector error lands in critical
> filesystem-metadata. 

Filesytsem metadata is not the topic of discussion here - it's
user data that throws an error on a DAX load/store that is the
issue.

> However, anything we come up with to make NVDIMM
> errors more survivable should be directly applicable to traditional
> disk storage as well.

I'm not sure it does. DAX implies that traditional block layer RAID
infrastructure is not possible, nor are data CRCs, nor are any other
sort of data transformations that are needed for redundancy at the
device layers. Anything that relies on copying/modifying/stable data to
provide redundancies needs to do such work at a place where it can
stall userspace page faults.

This is where pmem native filesystem designs like NOVA take over
from traditional block based filesystems - they are designed around
the ability to do atomic page-based operations for data protection
and recovery operations. It is this mechanism that allows stable
pages to be committed to permanent storage and as such, allow
redundancy operations such as mirroring to be performed before
operations are marked as "stable".

I'm missing the bigger picture that is being aimed at here - what's the
point of DAX if we have to turn it off if we want any sort of
failure protection? What's the big plan for fully enabling DAX with
robust error correction? Where is this all supposed to be leading
to?

> Along these lines we had a BoF session at Vault
> where drive vendors we're wondering if the sysfs bad sectors list
> could help software recover from the loss of a disk-head, or other
> errors that only take down part of the drive.

Right, but as I've said elsewhere, loss of a disk head implies
terabyte scale data loss. That is not something we can automatically
recovery from at the filesystem level. Low level raid recovery could
handle that sort of loss, but at the higher layers it's a disaster
similar to multiple disk RAID failure.  It's a completely different
scale to a single sector/page loss we are talking about here, and so
I don't see there as being much (if any) overlap here.

> An I/O hint that flags
> data that should be stored redundantly might be useful there as well.

DAX doesn't have an IO path to hint with... :/

Cheers,

Dave.

Dan Williams April 26, 2016, 4:18 a.m. UTC | #31

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 7:56 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 06:45:08PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
[..]
>> Otherwise, if an application wants to use DAX then it might
>> need to be prepared to handle media errors itself same as the
>> un-RAIDed disk case.  Yes, at an administrative level without
>> reverse-mapping support from a filesystem there's presently no way to
>> ask "which files on this fs are impacted by media errors", and we're
>> aware that reverse-mapping capabilities are nascent for current
>> DAX-aware filesystems.
>
> Precisely my point - suggestions are being proposed which assume
> use of infrastructure that *does not exist yet* and has not been
> discussed or documented. If we're expecting such infrastructure to
> be implemented in the filesystems and block device drivers, then we
> need to determine that the error model actually works first...

These patches only assume the clear-error-on write-model, and that
*maybe* the sysfs bad blocks list is useful if the filesystem has a
reverse-map, or if the application can compare the list against the
results of fiemap().  Beyond that, this is the same perennial "we
should really have better error coordination between block device and
filesystems" discussions that we have at LSF.

>
>> The forward lookup path, as impractical as it
>> is for large numbers of files, is available if an application wanted
>> to know if a specific file was impacted.  We've discussed possibly
>> extending fiemap() to return bad blocks in a file rather than
>> consulting sysfs, or extending lseek() with something like SEEK_ERROR
>> to return offsets of bad areas in a file.
>
> Via what infrastructure will the filesystem use for finding out
> whether a file has bad blocks in it? And if the file does have bad
> blocks, what are you expecting the filesystem to do with that
> information?

We currently have no expectation that the filesystem does anything
with the bad blocks list.  However, if a filesystem had btrfs-like
capabilities to recover data from a redundant location we'd be looking
to plug into that infrastructure.

>> > I haven't seen any design/documentation for infrastructure at the
>> > application layer to handle redundant data and correctly
>> > transparently so I don't have any idea what the technical
>> > requirements this different IO stack places on filesystems may be.
>> > Hence I'm asking for some kind of architecture/design documentation
>> > that I can read to understand exactly what is being proposed here...
>>
>> I think this is a discussion for a solution that would build on top of
>> this basic "here are the errors, re-write them with good data if you
>> can; otherwise, best of luck" foundation.  Something like a DAX-aware
>> device mapper layer that duplicates data tagged with REQ_META so at
>> least we have a recovery path when a sector error lands in critical
>> filesystem-metadata.
>
> Filesytsem metadata is not the topic of discussion here - it's
> user data that throws an error on a DAX load/store that is the
> issue.

Which is not a new problem since volatile DRAM in the non-DAX case can
throw the exact same error.  The current recovery model there is crash
the kernel (without MCE recovery), or crash the application and hope
the kernel maps out the page or the application knows how to restart
after SIGBUS.  Memory mirroring is meant to make this a bit less
harsh, but there's no mechanism to make this available outside the
kernel.

>> However, anything we come up with to make NVDIMM
>> errors more survivable should be directly applicable to traditional
>> disk storage as well.
>
> I'm not sure it does. DAX implies that traditional block layer RAID
> infrastructure is not possible, nor are data CRCs, nor are any other
> sort of data transformations that are needed for redundancy at the
> device layers. Anything that relies on copying/modifying/stable data to
> provide redundancies needs to do such work at a place where it can
> stall userspace page faults.
>
> This is where pmem native filesystem designs like NOVA take over
> from traditional block based filesystems - they are designed around
> the ability to do atomic page-based operations for data protection
> and recovery operations. It is this mechanism that allows stable
> pages to be committed to permanent storage and as such, allow
> redundancy operations such as mirroring to be performed before
> operations are marked as "stable".
>
> I'm missing the bigger picture that is being aimed at here - what's the
> point of DAX if we have to turn it off if we want any sort of
> failure protection? What's the big plan for fully enabling DAX with
> robust error correction? Where is this all supposed to be leading
> to?
>

NOVA and other solutions are free and encouraged to do a coherent
bottoms-up rethink of error handling on top of persistent memory
devices, in the meantime applications can only expect the legacy
SIGBUS and -EIO mechanisms are available.  So I'm still trying to
connect how the "What would NOVA do?" discussion is anything but
orthogonal to hooking up SIGBUS and -EIO for traditional-filesystem
DAX.  It's the only error model an application can expect because it's
the only one that currently exists.

>> Along these lines we had a BoF session at Vault
>> where drive vendors we're wondering if the sysfs bad sectors list
>> could help software recover from the loss of a disk-head, or other
>> errors that only take down part of the drive.
>
> Right, but as I've said elsewhere, loss of a disk head implies
> terabyte scale data loss. That is not something we can automatically
> recovery from at the filesystem level. Low level raid recovery could
> handle that sort of loss, but at the higher layers it's a disaster
> similar to multiple disk RAID failure.  It's a completely different
> scale to a single sector/page loss we are talking about here, and so
> I don't see there as being much (if any) overlap here.
>
>> An I/O hint that flags
>> data that should be stored redundantly might be useful there as well.
>
> DAX doesn't have an IO path to hint with... :/

...I was thinking traditional filesystem metadata operations through
the block layer.  NOVA could of course do something better since it
always indirects userspace access through a filesystem managed page.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner April 26, 2016, 8:27 a.m. UTC | #32

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 09:18:42PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 7:56 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 06:45:08PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >> > I haven't seen any design/documentation for infrastructure at the
> >> > application layer to handle redundant data and correctly
> >> > transparently so I don't have any idea what the technical
> >> > requirements this different IO stack places on filesystems may be.
> >> > Hence I'm asking for some kind of architecture/design documentation
> >> > that I can read to understand exactly what is being proposed here...
> >>
> >> I think this is a discussion for a solution that would build on top of
> >> this basic "here are the errors, re-write them with good data if you
> >> can; otherwise, best of luck" foundation.  Something like a DAX-aware
> >> device mapper layer that duplicates data tagged with REQ_META so at
> >> least we have a recovery path when a sector error lands in critical
> >> filesystem-metadata.
> >
> > Filesytsem metadata is not the topic of discussion here - it's
> > user data that throws an error on a DAX load/store that is the
> > issue.
> 
> Which is not a new problem since volatile DRAM in the non-DAX case can
> throw the exact same error.

They are not the same class of error, not by a long shot.

The "bad page in page cache" error on traditional storage means data
is not lost - the original copy still in whatever storage medium
that the cached page was filled from. i.e. Re-read the file and the
data is still there, which is no different to crashing and
restarting that machine and losing whatever writes had not been
committed to stable storage..

In the pmem case, a "bad page" is a permanent loss of data - it's
unrecoverable without some form data recovery operation being
performed on the storage.

> The current recovery model there is crash
> the kernel (without MCE recovery),

Ouch. Permanent data loss and a system wide DoS.

> or crash the application and hope
> the kernel maps out the page or the application knows how to restart
> after SIGBUS. 

Not much better - neither provide a mechanism for recovery.

> Memory mirroring is meant to make this a bit less
> harsh, but there's no mechanism to make this available outside the
> kernel.

Which implies that we need a DM module that interfaces with the
hardware memory mirroring to perform recovery and remapping
operations. i.e. in the traditional storage stack location.

> >> However, anything we come up with to make NVDIMM
> >> errors more survivable should be directly applicable to traditional
> >> disk storage as well.
> >
> > I'm not sure it does. DAX implies that traditional block layer RAID
> > infrastructure is not possible, nor are data CRCs, nor are any other
> > sort of data transformations that are needed for redundancy at the
> > device layers. Anything that relies on copying/modifying/stable data to
> > provide redundancies needs to do such work at a place where it can
> > stall userspace page faults.
> >
> > This is where pmem native filesystem designs like NOVA take over
> > from traditional block based filesystems - they are designed around
> > the ability to do atomic page-based operations for data protection
> > and recovery operations. It is this mechanism that allows stable
> > pages to be committed to permanent storage and as such, allow
> > redundancy operations such as mirroring to be performed before
> > operations are marked as "stable".
> >
> > I'm missing the bigger picture that is being aimed at here - what's the
> > point of DAX if we have to turn it off if we want any sort of
> > failure protection? What's the big plan for fully enabling DAX with
> > robust error correction? Where is this all supposed to be leading
> > to?
> >
> 
> NOVA and other solutions are free and encouraged to do a coherent
> bottoms-up rethink of error handling on top of persistent memory
> devices, in the meantime applications can only expect the legacy
> SIGBUS and -EIO mechanisms are available.  So I'm still trying to
> connect how the "What would NOVA do?" discussion is anything but
> orthogonal to hooking up SIGBUS and -EIO for traditional-filesystem
> DAX.  It's the only error model an application can expect because it's
> the only one that currently exists.

<sigh>

Yes, I get that. I'm not interested in the resultant fatal error
delivery - I'm asking about what happens between the memory error
and the delivery of the fatal "we've lost your data forever" error
that gets delivered to userspace. i.e. I'm after  a description of
how error correction/recovery is supposed to be applied to DAX
*before we report SIGBUS or EIO* to the application.

What is the plan/model/vision for intercepting MCEs and recovering
from them? e.g. how do we going to pull the good copy from
hardware/software memory mirrors? What layer is supposed to be
responsible for that? Is it different for hardware mirroring
compared to a more traditional software dm-RAID1 solution? What
requirements does software recovery imply - do we need stable page
state for DAX (i.e. to prevent userspace modification while we
make copies)? Do we need to remap LBAs in the storage stack iduring
recovery when bad blocks are reported? If so, where does it get
done? What atomicity and resiliency requirements are there for
recovery? e.g. bad block is reported, system crashes - what needs to
happen on reboot to have recovery work correctly? 

There's heaps of stuff that is completely undefined here - error
handling is fucking hard at the best of times, but I'm struggling to
understand even the basics of what is being proposed here apart from
"pmem error == crash the application, maybe even the system".

Future filesystems are only part of the solution here -
infrastructure like access to hardware mirrored copies for recovery
purposes will impact greatly on the design of upper layers and their
performance (e.g. no need for RAID1 in a software layer), so we
really need the model/architecture to be pretty clearly defined at
the outset before people waste too much time going down paths that
simply won't work on the hardware/infrastructure that is being
provided....

> >> An I/O hint that flags
> >> data that should be stored redundantly might be useful there as well.
> >
> > DAX doesn't have an IO path to hint with... :/
> 
> ...I was thinking traditional filesystem metadata operations through
> the block layer.  NOVA could of course do something better since it
> always indirects userspace access through a filesystem managed page.

It seems to me you are focussing on code/technologies that exist
today instead of trying to define an architecture that is more
optimal for pmem storage systems. Yes, working code is great, but if
you can't tell people how things like robust error handling and
redundancy are going to work in future then it's going to take
forever for everyone else to handle such errors robustly through the
storage stack...

Cheers,

Dave.

Christoph Hellwig April 26, 2016, 8:32 a.m. UTC | #33

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:32:08AM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
> > EINVAL is a concern here.  Not due to the right error reported, but
> > because it means your current scheme is fundamentally broken - we
> > need to support I/O at any alignment for DAX I/O, and not fail due to
> > alignbment concernes for a highly specific degraded case.
> >
> > I think this whole series need to go back to the drawing board as I
> > don't think it can actually rely on using direct I/O as the EIO
> > fallback.
> 
> The only callers of dax_do_io are direct_IO methods.

They are because the DAX I/O pass is a mess, but that doesn't mean
the user specific O_DIRECT on the open nessecarily.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Christoph Hellwig April 26, 2016, 8:33 a.m. UTC | #34

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 05:14:36PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
> 
> - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
> 
> - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets using
> fiemap)
> ?? ?? * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is doing
> this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write the
> entire sector

This sounds like a mess.

> I think if we want to keep allowing arbitrary alignments for the
> dax_do_io path, we'd need:
> 1. To represent badblocks at a finer granularity (likely cache lines)
> 2. To allow the driver to do IO to a *block device* at sub-sector
> granularity

It's not a block device if it supports DAX.  It's byte addressable
memory masquerading as a block device.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Vishal Verma April 26, 2016, 2:58 p.m. UTC | #35

On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 10:41 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> <>

> > The application doesn't have to scan the entire filesystem, but
> > presumably it knows what files it 'owns', and does a fiemap for
> > those.
> You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's
> files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem
> re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files and
> they may throw errors. What then?

In this scenario, backup applications etc that try to read that data
before it has been replaced will just hit the errors and fail..

> 

<>

> > The data that was lost is gone -- this assumes the application has
> > some
> > ability to recover using a journal/log or other redundancy - yes,
> > at the
> > application layer. If it doesn't have this sort of capability, the
> > only
> > option is to restore files from a backup/mirror.
> So the architecture has a built in assumption that only userspace
> can handle data loss?
> 
> What about filesytsems like NOVA, that use log structured design to
> provide DAX w/ update atomicity and can potentially also provide
> redundancy/repair through the same mechanisms? Won't pmem native
> filesystems with built in data protection features like this remove
> the need for adding all this to userspace applications?
> 
> If so, shouldn't that be the focus of development rahter than
> placing the burden on userspace apps to handle storage repair
> situations?

Agreed that file systems like NOVA can be designed to handle this
better, but haven't you said in the past that it may take years for a
new file system to become production ready, and that DAX is the until-
then solution that gets us most of the way there.. I think we just want
to ensure that current-DAX has some way to deal with errors, and these
patches provide an admin-intervention recovery path and possibly
another if the app wants to try something fancy for recovery.

<>
> 
> > 
> > To summarize, the two cases we want to handle are:
> > 1. Application has inbuilt recovery:
> >   - hits badblock
> >   - figures out it is able to recover the data
> >   - handles SIGBUS or EIO
> >   - does a (sector aligned) write() to restore the data
> The "figures out" step here is where >95% of the work we'd have to
> do is. And that's in filesystem and block layer code, not
> userspace, and userspace can't do that work in a signal handler.
> And it  can still fall down to the second case when the application
> doesn't have another copy of the data somewhere.

Ah when I said "figures out" I was only thinking if the application has
some redundancy/jouranlling, and if it can recover using that -- not
additional recovery mechanisms at the block/fs layer.

> 
> FWIW, we don't have a DAX enabled filesystem that can do
> reverse block mapping, so we're a year or two away from this being a
> workable production solution from the filesystem perspective. And
> AFAICT, it's not even on the roadmap for dm/md layers.
> 
> > 
> > 2. Application doesn't have any inbuilt recovery mechanism
> >   - hits badblock
> >   - gets SIGBUS (or EIO) and crashes
> >   - Sysadmin restores file from backup
> Which is no different to an existing non-DAX application getting an
> EIO/sigbus from current storage technologies.
> 
> Except: in the existing storage stack, redundancy and correction has
> already had to have failed for the application to see such an error.
> Hence this is normally considered a DR case as there's had to be
> cascading failures (e.g.  multiple disk failures in a RAID) to get
> to this stage, not a single error in a single sector in
> non-redundant storage.
> 
> We need some form of redundancy and correction in the PMEM stack to
> prevent single sector errors from taking down services until an
> administrator can correct the problem. I'm trying to understand
> where this is supposed to fit into the picture - at this point I
> really don't think userspace applications are going to be able to do
> this reliably....

Agreed that the pmem stack could use more redundancy and error
correction, perhaps enabling md-raid to raid pmem devices and then
enable DAX on top of that and we'll have a better chance to handle
errors, but that level of recovery isn't what these patches are aiming
for -- that is obviously a longer term effort. These simply aim to
provide that disaster recovery path when a single sector failure does
take down the service.

Today, on a dax enabled filesystem, if/when the app hits an error and
crashes, dax is simply disabled till the errors are gone. This is
obviously less than ideal. (This was done because there is currently no
way for a DAX file system to send any IO - mmap or otherwise - through
the driver, including zeroing of new fs blocks). These patches enable
the DR path by allowing some non-mmap IO (most importantly zeroing) to
go through the driver which can tell the device to do some remapping
etc.

So, yes, this is very much a DR case in our current pmem+dax
architecture, and we should probably design more robust handling at the
block/md/fs layer, but with these, you at least get to crash the app,
delete its files and restore them from out-of-band backups and continue
with DAX.

> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Dave.

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dan Williams April 26, 2016, 2:59 p.m. UTC | #36

On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 1:27 AM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 09:18:42PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
[..]
> It seems to me you are focussing on code/technologies that exist
> today instead of trying to define an architecture that is more
> optimal for pmem storage systems. Yes, working code is great, but if
> you can't tell people how things like robust error handling and
> redundancy are going to work in future then it's going to take
> forever for everyone else to handle such errors robustly through the
> storage stack...

Precisely because higher order redundancy is built on top this baseline.

MD-RAID can't do it's error recovery if we don't have -EIO and
clear-error-on-write.  On the other hand, you're absolutely right that
we have a gaping hole on top of the SIGBUS recovery model, and don't
have a kernel layer we can interpose on top of DAX to provide some
semblance of redundancy.

In the meantime, a handful of applications with a team of full-time
site-reliability-engineers may be able to plug in external redundancy
infrastructure on top of what is defined in these patches.  For
everyone else, the hard problem, we need to do a lot more thinking
about a trap and recover solution.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Vishal Verma April 26, 2016, 3:01 p.m. UTC | #37

On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 01:33 -0700, [e-mail] wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 05:14:36PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> > 
> > - Application hits EIO doing dax_IO or load/store io
> > 
> > - It checks badblocks and discovers it's files have lost data
> > 
> > - It write()s those sectors (possibly converted to file offsets
> > using
> > fiemap)
> > ?? ?? * This triggers the fallback path, but if the application is
> > doing
> > this level of recovery, it will know the sector is bad, and write
> > the
> > entire sector
> This sounds like a mess.
> 
> > 
> > I think if we want to keep allowing arbitrary alignments for the
> > dax_do_io path, we'd need:
> > 1. To represent badblocks at a finer granularity (likely cache
> > lines)
> > 2. To allow the driver to do IO to a *block device* at sub-sector
> > granularity
> It's not a block device if it supports DAX.  It's byte addressable
> memory masquerading as a block device.

Yes but we made that decision a while back with pmem :)
Are you saying it should stop being a block device anymore?

> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-
> block" in
> the body of a message to [e-mail]
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jan Kara April 26, 2016, 3:31 p.m. UTC | #38

On Tue 26-04-16 07:59:10, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 1:27 AM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 09:18:42PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> [..]
> > It seems to me you are focussing on code/technologies that exist
> > today instead of trying to define an architecture that is more
> > optimal for pmem storage systems. Yes, working code is great, but if
> > you can't tell people how things like robust error handling and
> > redundancy are going to work in future then it's going to take
> > forever for everyone else to handle such errors robustly through the
> > storage stack...
> 
> Precisely because higher order redundancy is built on top this baseline.
> 
> MD-RAID can't do it's error recovery if we don't have -EIO and
> clear-error-on-write.  On the other hand, you're absolutely right that
> we have a gaping hole on top of the SIGBUS recovery model, and don't
> have a kernel layer we can interpose on top of DAX to provide some
> semblance of redundancy.
> 
> In the meantime, a handful of applications with a team of full-time
> site-reliability-engineers may be able to plug in external redundancy
> infrastructure on top of what is defined in these patches.  For
> everyone else, the hard problem, we need to do a lot more thinking
> about a trap and recover solution.

So we could actually implement some kind of redundancy with DAX with
reasonable effort. We already do track dirty storage PFNs in the radix
tree. After DAX locking patches get merged we also have a reliable way to
write-protect them when we decide to do 'writeback' (translates to flushing
CPU caches) for them. When we do that, we have all the infrastructure in
place to provide 'stable pages' while some mirroring or other redundancy
mechanism in kernel works with the data.

But as Dave said, we should do some writeup of how this is all supposed to
work and e.g. which layer is going to be responsible for the redundancy. Do
we want to have that in DAX code? Or just provide stable page guarantees
from DAX and do the redundancy from device mapper? This needs more
thought...

								Honza

Dan Williams April 26, 2016, 5:16 p.m. UTC | #39

On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Jan Kara <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Tue 26-04-16 07:59:10, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 1:27 AM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 09:18:42PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> [..]
>> > It seems to me you are focussing on code/technologies that exist
>> > today instead of trying to define an architecture that is more
>> > optimal for pmem storage systems. Yes, working code is great, but if
>> > you can't tell people how things like robust error handling and
>> > redundancy are going to work in future then it's going to take
>> > forever for everyone else to handle such errors robustly through the
>> > storage stack...
>>
>> Precisely because higher order redundancy is built on top this baseline.
>>
>> MD-RAID can't do it's error recovery if we don't have -EIO and
>> clear-error-on-write.  On the other hand, you're absolutely right that
>> we have a gaping hole on top of the SIGBUS recovery model, and don't
>> have a kernel layer we can interpose on top of DAX to provide some
>> semblance of redundancy.
>>
>> In the meantime, a handful of applications with a team of full-time
>> site-reliability-engineers may be able to plug in external redundancy
>> infrastructure on top of what is defined in these patches.  For
>> everyone else, the hard problem, we need to do a lot more thinking
>> about a trap and recover solution.
>
> So we could actually implement some kind of redundancy with DAX with
> reasonable effort. We already do track dirty storage PFNs in the radix
> tree. After DAX locking patches get merged we also have a reliable way to
> write-protect them when we decide to do 'writeback' (translates to flushing
> CPU caches) for them. When we do that, we have all the infrastructure in
> place to provide 'stable pages' while some mirroring or other redundancy
> mechanism in kernel works with the data.
>
> But as Dave said, we should do some writeup of how this is all supposed to
> work and e.g. which layer is going to be responsible for the redundancy. Do
> we want to have that in DAX code? Or just provide stable page guarantees
> from DAX and do the redundancy from device mapper? This needs more
> thought...
>

[ adding Mike, since his ears are likely burning by this point ]

If we had the ability to specify a range or list of ranges to
blkdev_issue_flush() that would allow the driver level to implement
redundancy at sync time.  And no, before someone flies off the handle,
this isn't rehashing the same argument I lost about where to track
dirty pfns.  Rather this relies on the radix to track dirty pfns, but
asks the driver to do the flush operation.  In the nominal case this
is a clflush / clwb loop or wbinvd in the pmem driver, in the
redundancy case the pmem driver is swapped out for a driver that uses
the flush request as a trigger point to synchronize redundant data.

We want this at the driver level to take advantage of standard
asynchronous completions, and make it administratively equivalent to
the dm/md layering people are used to using.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Jeff Moyer May 2, 2016, 3:18 p.m. UTC | #40

Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:

> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:53:13PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
>> On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 09:25 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's
> files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem
> re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files and
> they may throw errors. What then?

I'm not sure how this is any different from regular storage.  If an
application gets EIO, it's up to the app to decide what to do with that.

>> > Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
>> > rewrite it?
>> 
>> The data that was lost is gone -- this assumes the application has some
>> ability to recover using a journal/log or other redundancy - yes, at the
>> application layer. If it doesn't have this sort of capability, the only
>> option is to restore files from a backup/mirror.
>
> So the architecture has a built in assumption that only userspace
> can handle data loss?

Remember that the proposed programming model completely bypasses the
kernel, so yes, it is expected that user-space will have to deal with
the problem.

> What about filesytsems like NOVA, that use log structured design to
> provide DAX w/ update atomicity and can potentially also provide
> redundancy/repair through the same mechanisms? Won't pmem native
> filesystems with built in data protection features like this remove
> the need for adding all this to userspace applications?

I don't think we'll /only/ support NOVA for pmem.  So we'll have to deal
with this for existing file systems, right?

> If so, shouldn't that be the focus of development rahter than
> placing the burden on userspace apps to handle storage repair
> situations?

It really depends on the programming model.  In the model Vishal is
talking about, either the applications themselves or the libraries they
link to are expected to implement the redundancies where necessary.

>> > There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
>> > copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
>> > automatically repair it?

That's one way to do things.  It really depends on the application what
it will do for recovery.

>> > And then there's the implicit assumption that it will unlink and
>> > free the entire file before writing a new copy

I think Vishal was referring to restoring from backup.  cp itself will
truncate the file before overwriting, iirc.

>> To summarize, the two cases we want to handle are:
>> 1. Application has inbuilt recovery:
>>   - hits badblock
>>   - figures out it is able to recover the data
>>   - handles SIGBUS or EIO
>>   - does a (sector aligned) write() to restore the data
>
> The "figures out" step here is where >95% of the work we'd have to
> do is. And that's in filesystem and block layer code, not
> userspace, and userspace can't do that work in a signal handler.
> And it  can still fall down to the second case when the application
> doesn't have another copy of the data somewhere.

I read that "figures out" step as the application determining whether or
not it had a redundant copy.

> FWIW, we don't have a DAX enabled filesystem that can do
> reverse block mapping, so we're a year or two away from this being a
> workable production solution from the filesystem perspective. And
> AFAICT, it's not even on the roadmap for dm/md layers.

Do we even need that?  What if we added an FIEMAP flag for determining
bad blocks.  The file system could simply walk the list of extents for
the file and check the corresponding disk blocks.  No reverse mapping
required.  Also note that DM/MD don't support direct_access(), either,
so I don't think they're relevant for this discussion.

>> 2. Application doesn't have any inbuilt recovery mechanism
>>   - hits badblock
>>   - gets SIGBUS (or EIO) and crashes
>>   - Sysadmin restores file from backup
>
> Which is no different to an existing non-DAX application getting an
> EIO/sigbus from current storage technologies.
>
> Except: in the existing storage stack, redundancy and correction has
> already had to have failed for the application to see such an error.
> Hence this is normally considered a DR case as there's had to be
> cascading failures (e.g.  multiple disk failures in a RAID) to get
> to this stage, not a single error in a single sector in
> non-redundant storage.
>
> We need some form of redundancy and correction in the PMEM stack to
> prevent single sector errors from taking down services until an
> administrator can correct the problem. I'm trying to understand
> where this is supposed to fit into the picture - at this point I
> really don't think userspace applications are going to be able to do
> this reliably....

Not all storage is configured into a RAID volume, and in some instances,
the application is better positioned to recover the data (gluster/ceph,
for example).  It really comes down to whether applications or libraries
will want to implement redundancy themselves in order to get a bump in
performance by not going through the kernel.  And I think I know what
your opinion is on that front.  :-)

Speaking of which, did you see the numbers Dan shared at LSF on how much
overhead there is in calling into the kernel for syncing?  Dan, can/did
you publish that spreadsheet somewhere?

Cheers,
Jeff
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dan Williams May 2, 2016, 5:53 p.m. UTC | #41

On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:18 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
> Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:
[..]
>> We need some form of redundancy and correction in the PMEM stack to
>> prevent single sector errors from taking down services until an
>> administrator can correct the problem. I'm trying to understand
>> where this is supposed to fit into the picture - at this point I
>> really don't think userspace applications are going to be able to do
>> this reliably....
>
> Not all storage is configured into a RAID volume, and in some instances,
> the application is better positioned to recover the data (gluster/ceph,
> for example).  It really comes down to whether applications or libraries
> will want to implement redundancy themselves in order to get a bump in
> performance by not going through the kernel.  And I think I know what
> your opinion is on that front.  :-)
>
> Speaking of which, did you see the numbers Dan shared at LSF on how much
> overhead there is in calling into the kernel for syncing?  Dan, can/did
> you publish that spreadsheet somewhere?

Here it is:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1pwr9psy6vtB9DOsc2bUdXevJRz5Guf6laZ4DaZlkhoo/edit?usp=sharing

On the "Filtered" tab I have some of the comparisons where:

noop => don't call msync and don't flush caches in userspace

persist => cache flushing only in userspace and only on individual cache lines

persist_4k => cache flushing only in userspace, but flushing is
performed in 4K aligned units

msync => same granularity flushing as the 'persist' case, but the
kernel internally promotes this to a 4K sized / aligned flush

msync_0 => synthetic case where msync() returns immediately and does
no other work

The takeaway is that msync() is 9-10x slower than userspace cache management.

Let me know if there are any questions and I can add an NVML developer
to this thread...
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner May 2, 2016, 11:04 p.m. UTC | #42

On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 11:18:36AM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
> Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:
> 
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:53:13PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> >> On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 09:25 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> > You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's
> > files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem
> > re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files and
> > they may throw errors. What then?
> 
> I'm not sure how this is any different from regular storage.  If an
> application gets EIO, it's up to the app to decide what to do with that.

Sure - they'll fail. But the question I'm asking is that if the
application that owns the data is supposed to do error recovery,
what happens when a 3rd party application hits an error? If that
consumes the error, the the app that owns the data won't ever get a
chance to correct the error.

This is a minefield - a 3rd party app that swallows and clears DAX
based IO errors is a data corruption vector. can yo imagine if
*grep* did this? The model that is being promoted here effectively
allows this sort of behaviour - I don't really think we
should be architecting an error recovery strategy that has the
capability to go this wrong....

> >> > Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
> >> > rewrite it?
> >> 
> >> The data that was lost is gone -- this assumes the application has some
> >> ability to recover using a journal/log or other redundancy - yes, at the
> >> application layer. If it doesn't have this sort of capability, the only
> >> option is to restore files from a backup/mirror.
> >
> > So the architecture has a built in assumption that only userspace
> > can handle data loss?
> 
> Remember that the proposed programming model completely bypasses the
> kernel, so yes, it is expected that user-space will have to deal with
> the problem.

No, it doesn't completely bypass the kernel - the kernel is the
infrastructure that catches the errors in the first place, and it
owns and controls all the metadata that corresponds to the physical
location of that error. The only thing the kernel doesn't own is the
*contents* of that location.

> > What about filesytsems like NOVA, that use log structured design to
> > provide DAX w/ update atomicity and can potentially also provide
> > redundancy/repair through the same mechanisms? Won't pmem native
> > filesystems with built in data protection features like this remove
> > the need for adding all this to userspace applications?
> 
> I don't think we'll /only/ support NOVA for pmem.  So we'll have to deal
> with this for existing file systems, right?

Yes, but that misses my point that it seems that the design is only
focussed on userspace and existing filesystems and there is no
consideration of kernel side functionality that could do transparent
recovery....

> > If so, shouldn't that be the focus of development rahter than
> > placing the burden on userspace apps to handle storage repair
> > situations?
> 
> It really depends on the programming model.  In the model Vishal is
> talking about, either the applications themselves or the libraries they
> link to are expected to implement the redundancies where necessary.

IOWs, filesystems no longer have any control over data integrity.
Yet it's the filesystem developers who will still be responsible for
data integrity and when the filesystem has a data coruption event
we'll get blamed and the filesystem gets a bad name, even though
it's entirely the applications fault. We've seen this time and time
again - application developers cannot be trusted to guarantee data
integrity. yes, some apps will be fine, but do you really expect
application devs that refuse to use fsync because it's too slow are
going to have a different approach to integrity when it comes to
DAX?

> >> > There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
> >> > copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
> >> > automatically repair it?
> 
> That's one way to do things.  It really depends on the application what
> it will do for recovery.
> 
> >> > And then there's the implicit assumption that it will unlink and
> >> > free the entire file before writing a new copy
> 
> I think Vishal was referring to restoring from backup.  cp itself will
> truncate the file before overwriting, iirc.

Which version of cp? what happens if they use --sparse and the error
is in a zeroed region? There's so many assumptions about undefined userspace
environment, application and user behaviour being made here, and
it's all being handwaved away.

I'm asking for this to be defined, demonstrated and documented as a
working model that cannot be abused and doesn't have holes the size
of trucks in it, not handwaving...

> >> To summarize, the two cases we want to handle are:
> >> 1. Application has inbuilt recovery:
> >>   - hits badblock
> >>   - figures out it is able to recover the data
> >>   - handles SIGBUS or EIO
> >>   - does a (sector aligned) write() to restore the data
> >
> > The "figures out" step here is where >95% of the work we'd have to
> > do is. And that's in filesystem and block layer code, not
> > userspace, and userspace can't do that work in a signal handler.
> > And it  can still fall down to the second case when the application
> > doesn't have another copy of the data somewhere.
> 
> I read that "figures out" step as the application determining whether or
> not it had a redundant copy.

Another undocumented assumption, that doesn't simplify what needs to
be done. Indeed, userspace can't do that until it is in SIGBUS
context, which tends to imply applications need to do a major amount
of work from within the signal handler....

> > FWIW, we don't have a DAX enabled filesystem that can do
> > reverse block mapping, so we're a year or two away from this being a
> > workable production solution from the filesystem perspective. And
> > AFAICT, it's not even on the roadmap for dm/md layers.
> 
> Do we even need that?  What if we added an FIEMAP flag for determining
> bad blocks.

So you're assuming that the filesystem has been informed of the bad
blocks and has already marked the bad regions of the file in it's
extent list?

How does that happen? What mechanism is used for the underlying
block device to inform the filesytem that theirs a bad LBA, and how
does the filesytem the map that to a path/file/offset with reverse
mapping? Or is there some other magic that hasn't been explained
happening here?

> The file system could simply walk the list of extents for
> the file and check the corresponding disk blocks.  No reverse mapping
> required.

You're expecting the filesystem to poll the block device to find bad
sectors? Ignoring the fact this is the sort of brute force scan we
need reverse mapping to avoid, how does the filesystem know what
file/extent list it should be searching when the block device
informs it there is a bad sector somewhere? i.e. what information
does the MCE convey to the block device, and what does the block
device pass to the filesytem so the filesystem can do one of these
scans? If the block device is only passing LBAs or a generic "new
bad block has been found" message, the filesystem still has to do an
full scan of it's metadata to find the owner of the LBA(s) that have
gone bad....

Nobody is explaining these important little details - there seems to
be an assumption that everyone "knows" how this is all going to work
and that we have infrastructure that can make it work.

Just because we might be able to present bad block information to
userspace via FIEMAP doesn't mean that it's trivial to implement.
THE FIEMAP flag is trivial - connecting the dots is the hard part
and nobody is explaining to me how that is all supposed to be done.

> Also note that DM/MD don't support direct_access(), either,
> so I don't think they're relevant for this discussion.

But they could for linear concatenation, which would be extremely
useful. e.g. stitching per-node non-linear pmem into a single linear
LBA range....


> >> 2. Application doesn't have any inbuilt recovery mechanism
> >>   - hits badblock
> >>   - gets SIGBUS (or EIO) and crashes
> >>   - Sysadmin restores file from backup
> >
> > Which is no different to an existing non-DAX application getting an
> > EIO/sigbus from current storage technologies.
> >
> > Except: in the existing storage stack, redundancy and correction has
> > already had to have failed for the application to see such an error.
> > Hence this is normally considered a DR case as there's had to be
> > cascading failures (e.g.  multiple disk failures in a RAID) to get
> > to this stage, not a single error in a single sector in
> > non-redundant storage.
> >
> > We need some form of redundancy and correction in the PMEM stack to
> > prevent single sector errors from taking down services until an
> > administrator can correct the problem. I'm trying to understand
> > where this is supposed to fit into the picture - at this point I
> > really don't think userspace applications are going to be able to do
> > this reliably....
> 
> Not all storage is configured into a RAID volume, and in some instances,
> the application is better positioned to recover the data (gluster/ceph,
> for example).

Right, but they still rely on the filesystem to provide data
integrity guarantees to work correctly. While they have "node level"
redundancy, operations within the node still need to work correctly
and so they'd still need all the kernel/fs side functionality to
provide them with error information (like fiemap bad blocks) on top
of all the new error detectiona nd correction code they'd need to
support this...

FWIW, the whole point of DAX on existing filesystems was to not need
major changes to existing filesystems to support fast pmem
operations.  i.e. to get something working quickly while pmem native
filesytems are developed to support pmem and all it's quirks in a
clean and efficient manner.

Instead, what I'm seeing now is a trend towards forcing existing
filesystems to support the requirements and quirks of DAX and pmem,
without any focus on pmem native solutions. i.e. I'm hearing "we
need major surgery to existing filesystems and block devices to make
DAX work" rather than "how do we make this efficient for a pmem
native solution rather than being bound to block device semantics"?

Cheers,

Dave.

Verma, Vishal L May 2, 2016, 11:17 p.m. UTC | #43

On Tue, 2016-05-03 at 09:04 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 11:18:36AM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:

> > 

> > Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:

> > 

> > > 

> > > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:53:13PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:

> > > > 

> > > > On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 09:25 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:

> > > You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's

> > > files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem

> > > re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files

> > > and

> > > they may throw errors. What then?

> > I'm not sure how this is any different from regular storage.  If an

> > application gets EIO, it's up to the app to decide what to do with

> > that.

> Sure - they'll fail. But the question I'm asking is that if the

> application that owns the data is supposed to do error recovery,

> what happens when a 3rd party application hits an error? If that

> consumes the error, the the app that owns the data won't ever get a

> chance to correct the error.

> 

> This is a minefield - a 3rd party app that swallows and clears DAX

> based IO errors is a data corruption vector. can yo imagine if

> *grep* did this? The model that is being promoted here effectively

> allows this sort of behaviour - I don't really think we

> should be architecting an error recovery strategy that has the

> capability to go this wrong....

> 


Just to address this bit - No. Any number of backup/3rd party
application can hit the error and _fail_ but surely they won't try to
_write_ the bad location? Only a write to the bad sector will clear it
in this model - and until such time, all reads will just keep erroring
out. This works for DAX/mmap based reads/writes too - mmap-stores
won't/can't clear errors - you have to go through the block path, and in
the altest version of my patch set, that has to be explicitly through
O_DIRECT.

Dan Williams May 2, 2016, 11:25 p.m. UTC | #44

On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 11:18:36AM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
>> Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:
>>
>> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:53:13PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
>> >> On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 09:25 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
>> > You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's
>> > files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem
>> > re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files and
>> > they may throw errors. What then?
>>
>> I'm not sure how this is any different from regular storage.  If an
>> application gets EIO, it's up to the app to decide what to do with that.
>
> Sure - they'll fail. But the question I'm asking is that if the
> application that owns the data is supposed to do error recovery,
> what happens when a 3rd party application hits an error? If that
> consumes the error, the the app that owns the data won't ever get a
> chance to correct the error.
>
> This is a minefield - a 3rd party app that swallows and clears DAX
> based IO errors is a data corruption vector. can yo imagine if
> *grep* did this? The model that is being promoted here effectively
> allows this sort of behaviour - I don't really think we
> should be architecting an error recovery strategy that has the
> capability to go this wrong....

Since when does grep write to a file on error?

>
>> >> > Where does the application find the data that was lost to be able to
>> >> > rewrite it?
>> >>
>> >> The data that was lost is gone -- this assumes the application has some
>> >> ability to recover using a journal/log or other redundancy - yes, at the
>> >> application layer. If it doesn't have this sort of capability, the only
>> >> option is to restore files from a backup/mirror.
>> >
>> > So the architecture has a built in assumption that only userspace
>> > can handle data loss?
>>
>> Remember that the proposed programming model completely bypasses the
>> kernel, so yes, it is expected that user-space will have to deal with
>> the problem.
>
> No, it doesn't completely bypass the kernel - the kernel is the
> infrastructure that catches the errors in the first place, and it
> owns and controls all the metadata that corresponds to the physical
> location of that error. The only thing the kernel doesn't own is the
> *contents* of that location.
>
>> > What about filesytsems like NOVA, that use log structured design to
>> > provide DAX w/ update atomicity and can potentially also provide
>> > redundancy/repair through the same mechanisms? Won't pmem native
>> > filesystems with built in data protection features like this remove
>> > the need for adding all this to userspace applications?
>>
>> I don't think we'll /only/ support NOVA for pmem.  So we'll have to deal
>> with this for existing file systems, right?
>
> Yes, but that misses my point that it seems that the design is only
> focussed on userspace and existing filesystems and there is no
> consideration of kernel side functionality that could do transparent
> recovery....
>
>> > If so, shouldn't that be the focus of development rahter than
>> > placing the burden on userspace apps to handle storage repair
>> > situations?
>>
>> It really depends on the programming model.  In the model Vishal is
>> talking about, either the applications themselves or the libraries they
>> link to are expected to implement the redundancies where necessary.
>
> IOWs, filesystems no longer have any control over data integrity.
> Yet it's the filesystem developers who will still be responsible for
> data integrity and when the filesystem has a data coruption event
> we'll get blamed and the filesystem gets a bad name, even though
> it's entirely the applications fault. We've seen this time and time
> again - application developers cannot be trusted to guarantee data
> integrity. yes, some apps will be fine, but do you really expect
> application devs that refuse to use fsync because it's too slow are
> going to have a different approach to integrity when it comes to
> DAX?

Yes, completely agree.  The applications that will implement competent
error recovery with these mechanisms will be vanishingly small, and
there is definite room for a kernel data-redundancy solution that
builds on these patches.

>
>> >> > There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
>> >> > copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
>> >> > automatically repair it?
>>
>> That's one way to do things.  It really depends on the application what
>> it will do for recovery.
>>
>> >> > And then there's the implicit assumption that it will unlink and
>> >> > free the entire file before writing a new copy
>>
>> I think Vishal was referring to restoring from backup.  cp itself will
>> truncate the file before overwriting, iirc.
>
> Which version of cp? what happens if they use --sparse and the error
> is in a zeroed region? There's so many assumptions about undefined userspace
> environment, application and user behaviour being made here, and
> it's all being handwaved away.
>
> I'm asking for this to be defined, demonstrated and documented as a
> working model that cannot be abused and doesn't have holes the size
> of trucks in it, not handwaving...

You lost me...  how are these patches abusing the existing semantics
of -EIO and write to clear?

>> >> To summarize, the two cases we want to handle are:
>> >> 1. Application has inbuilt recovery:
>> >>   - hits badblock
>> >>   - figures out it is able to recover the data
>> >>   - handles SIGBUS or EIO
>> >>   - does a (sector aligned) write() to restore the data
>> >
>> > The "figures out" step here is where >95% of the work we'd have to
>> > do is. And that's in filesystem and block layer code, not
>> > userspace, and userspace can't do that work in a signal handler.
>> > And it  can still fall down to the second case when the application
>> > doesn't have another copy of the data somewhere.
>>
>> I read that "figures out" step as the application determining whether or
>> not it had a redundant copy.
>
> Another undocumented assumption, that doesn't simplify what needs to
> be done. Indeed, userspace can't do that until it is in SIGBUS
> context, which tends to imply applications need to do a major amount
> of work from within the signal handler....
>
>> > FWIW, we don't have a DAX enabled filesystem that can do
>> > reverse block mapping, so we're a year or two away from this being a
>> > workable production solution from the filesystem perspective. And
>> > AFAICT, it's not even on the roadmap for dm/md layers.
>>
>> Do we even need that?  What if we added an FIEMAP flag for determining
>> bad blocks.
>
> So you're assuming that the filesystem has been informed of the bad
> blocks and has already marked the bad regions of the file in it's
> extent list?
>
> How does that happen? What mechanism is used for the underlying
> block device to inform the filesytem that theirs a bad LBA, and how
> does the filesytem the map that to a path/file/offset with reverse
> mapping? Or is there some other magic that hasn't been explained
> happening here?

In 4.5 we added this:

commit 99e6608c9e7414ae4f2168df8bf8fae3eb49e41f
Author: Vishal Verma <[e-mail]>
Date:   Sat Jan 9 08:36:51 2016 -0800

    block: Add badblock management for gendisks

    NVDIMM devices, which can behave more like DRAM rather than block
    devices, may develop bad cache lines, or 'poison'. A block device
    exposed by the pmem driver can then consume poison via a read (or
    write), and cause a machine check. On platforms without machine
    check recovery features, this would mean a crash.

    The block device maintaining a runtime list of all known sectors that
    have poison can directly avoid this, and also provide a path forward
    to enable proper handling/recovery for DAX faults on such a device.

    Use the new badblock management interfaces to add a badblocks list to
    gendisks.

    Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <[e-mail]>
    Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[e-mail]>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner May 3, 2016, 12:42 a.m. UTC | #45

On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 10:53:25AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:18 AM, Jeff Moyer <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:
> [..]
> >> We need some form of redundancy and correction in the PMEM stack to
> >> prevent single sector errors from taking down services until an
> >> administrator can correct the problem. I'm trying to understand
> >> where this is supposed to fit into the picture - at this point I
> >> really don't think userspace applications are going to be able to do
> >> this reliably....
> >
> > Not all storage is configured into a RAID volume, and in some instances,
> > the application is better positioned to recover the data (gluster/ceph,
> > for example).  It really comes down to whether applications or libraries
> > will want to implement redundancy themselves in order to get a bump in
> > performance by not going through the kernel.  And I think I know what
> > your opinion is on that front.  :-)
> >
> > Speaking of which, did you see the numbers Dan shared at LSF on how much
> > overhead there is in calling into the kernel for syncing?  Dan, can/did
> > you publish that spreadsheet somewhere?
> 
> Here it is:
> 
> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1pwr9psy6vtB9DOsc2bUdXevJRz5Guf6laZ4DaZlkhoo/edit?usp=sharing
> 
> On the "Filtered" tab I have some of the comparisons where:

Those numbers are really wacky - the inconsistent decimal place
representation makes it really, really hard to read the differences
in orders of magnitude, too. Let's take the first numbers - noop, 64
byte ops are:

threads		ops/s
1		 90M
2		310M
4		 65M
8		175M
16		426M

Why aren't these linear? And if the test is not running in an
environment where these are controlled and linear, how valid are the
rest of the tests and hence the comparison.

> noop => don't call msync and don't flush caches in userspace
> 
> persist => cache flushing only in userspace and only on individual cache lines

So these look a lot more linear than the no-op behaviour, so I'll
just ignore the no-op results for now.

> persist_4k => cache flushing only in userspace, but flushing is
> performed in 4K aligned units

Urg, your "vs persist" percentages are all wrong. You can't have a
"-1000%" difference, you have "persist 4k" running at 10% of the
speed of "persist".

So, with that in mind, the "persist_4k" speed is:

		 ops/s		single thread
Size		vs "persist"	4k flush rate
  64		 10%		 834k
 128		 13%		 849k
 256		 15%		 410k(one off variation?)
 512		 20%		 860k
1024		 25%		 850k
2048		 50%		 840k
4096		none		 836k
8192		none		 410k

What we see here is that the CPU(s) can flush the 4k pages at a rate
of roughly 850,000 flushes/s, whilst the 64 byte flush rate is
around 8.8M flushes/s.  This is clearly demonstrated in the numbers
- as the dirty object size approaches the cache flush granularity,
the speed approaches single cacheline flush granularity speed.

Comparing 4k vs 64b flushes, we have 63 clean cache line flushes
taking roughly the same time as 9 dirty cache line flushes. Nice
numbers - that means a clean cache line flush has ~14% of the
overhead of dirty cache line flush. Seems rather high - it's tens of
CPU cycles to determine that the flush is a no-op for that
cacheline.

Fixing this seems like a hardware optimisation issue to me, but I
still have to question how many applications are going to have such
fine-grained random synchronous memory writes that this actually
matters in practice? If we are doing such small writes across
multiple different 4k pages, then TLB overhead for all the page
faults is going to be as much of an issue as 4k cache flushes...

> msync => same granularity flushing as the 'persist' case, but the
> kernel internally promotes this to a 4K sized / aligned flush

So you're calling msync for every modification that is made? What
application needs to do that? Anyway, page flush rates paint an
interesting picture:

	single thread		 versus
Size	4k flush rate		persist_4k
  64	 655k			 78%
 128	 655k			 81%
 256	 670k			163%  (* persist 4k number low) 
 512	 681k			 79%
1024	 666k			 78%
2048	 650k			 77%
4096	 652k			 78%
8192	 390k			 95%

msync adds relatively little overhead (~20% extra overhead) compared
to the performance loss from the 4k flush granularity change. And
given this appears to be a worst case test scenario (and I'm sure
msync could be improved), I don't think this demonstrates a problem
with using msync.

IMO, these numbers don't support the argument that the *msync
model* for data integrity for DAX is flawed, unworkable, or too
slow. What I see is a performance problem resulting from the
overhead of flushing clean cachelines.  i.e. there's data here that
supports the argument for reducing the overhead of flushing clean
cachelines in the hardware and/or better tracking of dirty
cachelines within the kernel, but not data that says the msync()
based data integrity model is the source of the problem.

i.e. separate the programming model from the performance issue, and
we can see that the performance problem is not caused by the
programming model - it's caused by the kernel implementation of the
model.

> The takeaway is that msync() is 9-10x slower than userspace cache management.

An alternative viewpoint: that flushing clean cachelines is
extremely expensive on Intel CPUs. ;)

i.e. Same numbers, different analysis from a different PoV, and
that gives a *completely different conclusion*.

Think about it for the moment. The hardware inefficiency being
demonstrated could be fixed/optimised in the next hardware product
cycle(s) and so will eventually go away. OTOH, we'll be stuck with
whatever programming model we come up with for the next 30-40 years,
and we'll never be able to fix flaws in it because applications will
be depending on them. Do we really want to be stuck with a pmem
model that is designed around the flaws and deficiencies of ~1st
generation hardware?

Cheers,

Dave.

Rudoff, Andy May 3, 2016, 1:26 a.m. UTC | #46

>> The takeaway is that msync() is 9-10x slower than userspace cache management.

>

>An alternative viewpoint: that flushing clean cachelines is

>extremely expensive on Intel CPUs. ;)

>

>i.e. Same numbers, different analysis from a different PoV, and

>that gives a *completely different conclusion*.

>

>Think about it for the moment. The hardware inefficiency being

>demonstrated could be fixed/optimised in the next hardware product

>cycle(s) and so will eventually go away. OTOH, we'll be stuck with

>whatever programming model we come up with for the next 30-40 years,

>and we'll never be able to fix flaws in it because applications will

>be depending on them. Do we really want to be stuck with a pmem

>model that is designed around the flaws and deficiencies of ~1st

>generation hardware?


Hi Dave,

Not sure I agree with your completely different conclusion.  (Not sure
I completely disagree either, but please let me raise some practical
points.)

First of all, let's say you're completely right and flushing clean
cache lines is extremely expensive.  So your solution is to wait for
the chip to be fixed?  Remember the model we're putting forward (which
we're working on documenting, because I fully agree with the lack of
documentation point you keep raising) requires the application to ASK
for the file system's permission before assuming flushing from user space
to persistence is allowed.  So that doesn't stick us with 30-40 years of
a flawed model.  I don't think the model is wrong, having spent lots of
research time on it, but if I'm full of crap, all we have to do is stop
telling the app that flushing from user space is allowed and it must go
back to using msync().  This is my understanding of what Dan suggested
at LSF and this is what I'm currently writing up.  By the way, the NVM
Libraries already contain the logic to ask if flushing from user space
is allowed, falling back to msync() if not.  Currently those libraries
check for DAX mappings.  But the points you raised about metadata changes
happening during page faults made us realize we have to ask the file
system to opt-in to allowing user space flushing, so that's what we're
changing the library to do.  See, we are listening :-)

Anyway, I doubt that flushing a clean cache line is extremely expensive.
Remember the code is building transactions to maintain a consistent
in-memory data structure in the face of sudden failure like powerloss.
So it is using the flushes to create store barriers, but not the block-
based store barriers we're used to in the storage world, but cache-line-
sized store barriers (usually multiples of cache lines, but most commonly
smaller than 4k of them).  So I think when you turn a cache line flush
into an msync(), you're seeing some dirty stuff get flushed before it
is time to flush it.  I'm not sure though, but certainly we could spend
more time testing & measuring.

More importantly, I think it is interesting to decide what we want the
pmem programming model to be long-term.  I think we want applications to
just map pmem, do normal stores to it, and assume they are persistent.
This is quite different from the 30-year-old POSIX Model where msync()
is required.  But I think it is cleaner, easier to understand, and less
error-prone.  So why doesn't it work that way right now?  Because we're
finding it impractical.  Using write-through caching for pmem simply
doesn't perform well, and depending on the platform to flush the CPU
caches on shutdown/powerfail is not practical yet.  But I think the day
will come when it is practical.

So given that long-term target, the idea is for an application to ask if
the msync() calls are required, or if just flushing the CPU caches is
sufficient for persistence.  Then, we're also adding an ACPI property
that allows SW to discover if the caches are flushed automatically
on shutdown/powerloss.  Initially that will only be true for custom
platforms, but hopefully it can be available more broadly in the future.
The result will be that the programming model gets simpler as more and
more hardware requires less explicit flushing.

Now I'll go back to writing up the big picture for this programming
model so I can ask you for comments on that as well...


-andy

Dave Chinner May 3, 2016, 1:51 a.m. UTC | #47

On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 04:25:51PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 11:18:36AM -0400, Jeff Moyer wrote:
> >> Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> writes:
> >>
> >> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:53:13PM +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> >> >> On Tue, 2016-04-26 at 09:25 +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
> >> > You're assuming that only the DAX aware application accesses it's
> >> > files.  users, backup programs, data replicators, fileystem
> >> > re-organisers (e.g.  defragmenters) etc all may access the files and
> >> > they may throw errors. What then?
> >>
> >> I'm not sure how this is any different from regular storage.  If an
> >> application gets EIO, it's up to the app to decide what to do with that.
> >
> > Sure - they'll fail. But the question I'm asking is that if the
> > application that owns the data is supposed to do error recovery,
> > what happens when a 3rd party application hits an error? If that
> > consumes the error, the the app that owns the data won't ever get a
> > chance to correct the error.
> >
> > This is a minefield - a 3rd party app that swallows and clears DAX
> > based IO errors is a data corruption vector. can yo imagine if
> > *grep* did this? The model that is being promoted here effectively
> > allows this sort of behaviour - I don't really think we
> > should be architecting an error recovery strategy that has the
> > capability to go this wrong....
> 
> Since when does grep write to a file on error?

That's precisely my point - it doesn't right now because there is no
onus on userspace applications to correct data errors when they are
found.

However, if the accepted model becomes "userspace needs to try to correct
errors in data automatically", the above scenario is a distinct
possiblity. I'm not saying grep will do this - I'm taking
the logical argument being presented to the extreme - but I'm sure
that there will be developers that have enough knowledge to know
they are supposed to do something with errors on pmem devices, but
not have enough knowledge to know the correct things to do.

And then the app mishandles a EINVAL error (or something like that)
and so we end up with buggy userspace apps trying to correct
errors in good data and causing data loss that way.

Do we really want to introduce a data integrity and error recovery
model where this sort of "bug" is a distinct possibly?

> >> >> > There's an implicit assumption that applications will keep redundant
> >> >> > copies of their data at the /application layer/ and be able to
> >> >> > automatically repair it?
> >>
> >> That's one way to do things.  It really depends on the application what
> >> it will do for recovery.
> >>
> >> >> > And then there's the implicit assumption that it will unlink and
> >> >> > free the entire file before writing a new copy
> >>
> >> I think Vishal was referring to restoring from backup.  cp itself will
> >> truncate the file before overwriting, iirc.
> >
> > Which version of cp? what happens if they use --sparse and the error
> > is in a zeroed region? There's so many assumptions about undefined userspace
> > environment, application and user behaviour being made here, and
> > it's all being handwaved away.
> >
> > I'm asking for this to be defined, demonstrated and documented as a
> > working model that cannot be abused and doesn't have holes the size
> > of trucks in it, not handwaving...
> 
> You lost me...  how are these patches abusing the existing semantics
> of -EIO and write to clear?

I haven't said that. I said there are assumptions about how
userspace will handle the error, but they aren't documented
anywhere. "copy a file using cp" is not a robust recovery solution -
it provides no guarantees about how the bad file and regions will be
recycled and the errors cleared. This effectively of puts it all on
the filesystems to deal with, even though you're trying to design an
error handling model that bypasses the filesystems and goes straight
to userspace.

If I can't understand how this is all supposed to work
because none of it is documented, then we have no chance that the
average admin is going to be able to understand it.

> 
> >> >> To summarize, the two cases we want to handle are:
> >> >> 1. Application has inbuilt recovery:
> >> >>   - hits badblock
> >> >>   - figures out it is able to recover the data
> >> >>   - handles SIGBUS or EIO
> >> >>   - does a (sector aligned) write() to restore the data
> >> >
> >> > The "figures out" step here is where >95% of the work we'd have to
> >> > do is. And that's in filesystem and block layer code, not
> >> > userspace, and userspace can't do that work in a signal handler.
> >> > And it  can still fall down to the second case when the application
> >> > doesn't have another copy of the data somewhere.
> >>
> >> I read that "figures out" step as the application determining whether or
> >> not it had a redundant copy.
> >
> > Another undocumented assumption, that doesn't simplify what needs to
> > be done. Indeed, userspace can't do that until it is in SIGBUS
> > context, which tends to imply applications need to do a major amount
> > of work from within the signal handler....
> >
> >> > FWIW, we don't have a DAX enabled filesystem that can do
> >> > reverse block mapping, so we're a year or two away from this being a
> >> > workable production solution from the filesystem perspective. And
> >> > AFAICT, it's not even on the roadmap for dm/md layers.
> >>
> >> Do we even need that?  What if we added an FIEMAP flag for determining
> >> bad blocks.
> >
> > So you're assuming that the filesystem has been informed of the bad
> > blocks and has already marked the bad regions of the file in it's
> > extent list?
> >
> > How does that happen? What mechanism is used for the underlying
> > block device to inform the filesytem that theirs a bad LBA, and how
> > does the filesytem the map that to a path/file/offset with reverse
> > mapping? Or is there some other magic that hasn't been explained
> > happening here?
> 
> In 4.5 we added this:
> 
> commit 99e6608c9e7414ae4f2168df8bf8fae3eb49e41f
> Author: Vishal Verma <[e-mail]>
> Date:   Sat Jan 9 08:36:51 2016 -0800
> 
>     block: Add badblock management for gendisks

Yes, I know, and it doesn't answer any of the questions I just
asked. What you just told me is that there is something that is kept
three levels of abstraction away from a filesystem. So:

	- What mechanism is to be used for the underlying block
	  device to inform the filesytem that a new bad block was
	  added to this list? What context comes along with that
	  notification?
	- how does the filesystem query the bad block list without
	  adding layering violations?
	- when does the filesystem need to query the bad block list?
	- how will the bad block list propagate through DM/MD
	  layers?
	- how does the filesytem the map the bad block to a
	  path/file/offset without reverse mapping - does this error
	  handling interface really imply the filesystem needs to
	  implement brute force scans at notification time?
	- Is the filesystem expectd to find the active application or
	  address_space access that triggered the bad block
	  notification to handle them correctly? (e.g. prevent a
	  page fault from failing because we can recover from the
	  error immediately)
	- what exactly is the filesystem supposed to do with the bad
	  block? e.g:
		- is the block persistently bad until the filesystem
		  rewrites it? Over power cycles? Will we get
		  multiple notifications (e.g. once per boot)?
		- Is the filesystem supposed to intercept
		  reads/writes to bad blocks once it knows about
		  them?
		- how is the filesystem supposed to communicate that
		  there is a bad block in a file back to userspace?
		  Or is userspace supposed to infer that there's a
		  bad block from EIO and so has to run FIEMAP to
		  determine if the error really was due to a bad
		  block?
		- what happens if there is no running application
		  that we can report the error to or will handle the
		  error (e.g. found error by a media scrub or during
		  boot)?
	- if the bad block is in filesystem free space, what should
	  the filesystem do with it?

What I'm failing to communicate is that having and maintaining
things like bad block lists in a block device is the easy part of
the problem.

Similarly reporting a bad block flag in FIEMAP is only a few
lines of code to implement, but that assumes the filesystem has
already propagated the bad block information into it's internal
extents lists.

That's the hard part of all this: connecting the two pieces together
in a sane, reliable, consistent and useful manner. This will form
the user API, so we need to sort it out before applications start to
use it. However, if I'm struggling to understand how I'm supposed to
connecct up the parts inside a filesytem, then expecting application
developers to be able to connect the dots in a sane manner is
bordering on fantasy....

Cheers,

Dave.

Dave Chinner May 3, 2016, 2:49 a.m. UTC | #48

On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 01:26:46AM +0000, Rudoff, Andy wrote:
> 
> >> The takeaway is that msync() is 9-10x slower than userspace cache management.
> >
> >An alternative viewpoint: that flushing clean cachelines is
> >extremely expensive on Intel CPUs. ;)
> >
> >i.e. Same numbers, different analysis from a different PoV, and
> >that gives a *completely different conclusion*.
> >
> >Think about it for the moment. The hardware inefficiency being
> >demonstrated could be fixed/optimised in the next hardware product
> >cycle(s) and so will eventually go away. OTOH, we'll be stuck with
> >whatever programming model we come up with for the next 30-40 years,
> >and we'll never be able to fix flaws in it because applications will
> >be depending on them. Do we really want to be stuck with a pmem
> >model that is designed around the flaws and deficiencies of ~1st
> >generation hardware?
> 
> Hi Dave,
> 
> Not sure I agree with your completely different conclusion.  (Not sure
> I completely disagree either, but please let me raise some practical
> points.)
> 
> First of all, let's say you're completely right and flushing clean
> cache lines is extremely expensive.  So your solution is to wait for
> the chip to be fixed? 

No, I'm not saying that's the solution - I'm pointing out that if
clean cache line flushing overhead is less of a problem in future,
the optimisations made now will not be necessary. However, we'll be
still stuck with the API/model that has encoded those optimisations
as a necessary thing for applications to know about and do the
correct thing with. I.e. we end up with a library of applications
that are optimised for a problem that no longer exists...

> Remember the model we're putting forward (which
> we're working on documenting, because I fully agree with the lack of
> documentation point you keep raising) requires the application to ASK
> for the file system's permission before assuming flushing from user space
> to persistence is allowed.

And when the filesystem says no because the fs devs don't want to
have to deal with broken apps because app devs learn that "this is a
go fast knob" and data integrity be damned? It's "fsync is slow so I
won't use it" all over again...

> Anyway, I doubt that flushing a clean cache line is extremely expensive.
> Remember the code is building transactions to maintain a consistent
> in-memory data structure in the face of sudden failure like powerloss.
> So it is using the flushes to create store barriers, but not the block-
> based store barriers we're used to in the storage world, but cache-line-
> sized store barriers (usually multiples of cache lines, but most commonly
> smaller than 4k of them).  So I think when you turn a cache line flush
> into an msync(), you're seeing some dirty stuff get flushed before it
> is time to flush it.  I'm not sure though, but certainly we could spend
> more time testing & measuring.

Sure, but is that what Dan was testing? I don't know - he just
presented a bunch of numbers without a description of the workload,
posting the benchmark code, etc. hence I can only *make assumptions*
about what the numbers mean.

I'm somewhat tired of having to make assumptions because nobody is
describing what they are doing sufficiently and then getting called
out for it, or having to ask lots of questions because other people
have made assumptions about how they think something is going to
work without explaining how the dots connect together. It's a waste
of everyone's time to be playing this ass-u-me game...

The fact that nobody has been able to explain the how the overall
model is supposed to work from physical error all the way out to
userspace makes me think that this is all being made up on the spot.
There are big pieces of the picture missing, and nobody seems to be
able to communicate a clear vision of the architecture we are
supposed to be discussing, let alone implementing...

> More importantly, I think it is interesting to decide what we want the
> pmem programming model to be long-term.  I think we want applications to
> just map pmem, do normal stores to it, and assume they are persistent.
> This is quite different from the 30-year-old POSIX Model where msync()
> is required.

Yes, it's different, but we still have to co-ordinate multiple
layers of persistence (i.e. metadata that references the data).

> But I think it is cleaner, easier to understand, and less
> error-prone.  So why doesn't it work that way right now?  Because we're
> finding it impractical.  Using write-through caching for pmem simply
> doesn't perform well, and depending on the platform to flush the CPU
> caches on shutdown/powerfail is not practical yet.  But I think the day
> will come when it is practical.

Right - it's also simply not practical to intercept every userspace
store to ensure the referencing metadata is also persistent, so we
still need synchronisation mechanisms to ensure that such state is
acheived.  Either that, or the entire dynamic filesystem state needs
to be stored in write-through persistent memory as well. We're a
long, long way from that.

And, please keep in mind: many application developers will not
design for pmem because they also have to support traditional
storage backed by page cache. If they use msync(), the app will work
on any storage stack, but just be much, much faster on pmem+DAX. So,
really, we have to make the msync()-only model work efficiently, so
we may as well design for that in the first place....

> So given that long-term target, the idea is for an application to ask if
> the msync() calls are required, or if just flushing the CPU caches is
> sufficient for persistence.  Then, we're also adding an ACPI property
> that allows SW to discover if the caches are flushed automatically
> on shutdown/powerloss.  Initially that will only be true for custom
> platforms, but hopefully it can be available more broadly in the future.
> The result will be that the programming model gets simpler as more and
> more hardware requires less explicit flushing.

That's a different problem, and one that requires a filesystem to
also store all it's dynamic information in pmem. i.e. there's not
point flushing pmem caches if the powerloss loses dirty metadata
that is held in system RAM. We really need completely new
pmem-native filesystems to make this work - it's a completely
separate problem to whether msync() should be the API that provided
fundamental data integrity guarantees or not.

Which brings up another point: advanced new functionality
is going to require native pmem filesystems. These are unlikely to
be block device based, and instead will directly interface with the
low level CPU and pmem APIs. I don't expect these to use the DAX
infrastructure, either, because that assumes block device based
operations. The will, however, still have to have POSIX compatible
behaviour, and so we go full circle in expecting that an app
written for mmap+DAX on an existing block based filesystem will work
identically on funky new byte-addressable native pmem filesytems.

Encoding cache flushing for data integrity into the userspace
applications assumes that such future pmem-based storage will have
identical persistence requirements to the existing hardware. This,
to me, seems very unlikely to be the case (especially when
considering different platforms (e.g. power, ARM)) and so, again,
application developers are likely to have to fall back to using a
kernel provided data integrity primitive they know they can rely on
(i.e. msync()).....

Cheers,

Dave.

Dan Williams May 3, 2016, 5:28 p.m. UTC | #49

On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 6:51 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 04:25:51PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
[..]
> Yes, I know, and it doesn't answer any of the questions I just
> asked. What you just told me is that there is something that is kept
> three levels of abstraction away from a filesystem. So:

Ok, let's answer them.

A lot of your questions seem to assume the filesystem has a leading
role to play with error recovery, that isn't the case with traditional
disk errors and we're not looking to change that situation.  The
filesystem can help with forensics after an error escapes the kernel
and is communicated to userspace, but the ability to reverse map a
sector to a file is just a convenience to identify potential data
loss.

For redundancy in the DAX case I can envision DAX-aware RAID that
makes the potential exposure to bad blocks smaller, but it will always
be the case that the array can be out-of-sync / degraded and has no
choice but to communicate the error to userspace.  So, the answers
below address what we do when we are in that state, and include some
thoughts about follow-on enabling we can do at the DM/MD layer.

>         - What mechanism is to be used for the underlying block
>           device to inform the filesytem that a new bad block was
>           added to this list?

The filesystem doesn't need this notification and doesn't get it today
from RAID.  It's handy for the bad block list to be available to
fs/dax.c and the block layer, but I don't see ext4/xfs having a role
to play with the list and certainly not care about "new error detected
events".  For a DM/MD driver it also does not need to know about new
errors because it will follow the traditional disk model where errors
are handled on access, or discovered and scrubbed during a periodic
array scan.

That said, new errors may get added to the list by having the pmem
driver trigger a rescan of the device whenever a latent error is
discovered (i.e. memcpy_from_pmem() returns -EIO).  The update of the
bad block list is asynchronous.  We also have a task on the todo list
to allow the pmem rescan action to be triggered via sysfs.

>           What context comes along with that
>           notification?

The only notification the file system gets is -EIO on access.
However, assuming we had a DAX-aware RAID driver what infrastructure
would we need to prevent SIGBUS from reaching the application if we
happened to have a redundant copy of the data?

One feature we've talked about for years at LSF/MM but never made any
progress on is a way for a file system to discover and query if the
storage layer can reconstruct data from redundant information.
Assuming we had such an interface there's still the matter of plumbing
a machine check fault through a physical-address-to-sector conversion
and request the block device driver to attempt to provide a redundant
copy.

The in-kernel recovery path, assuming RAID is present, needs more
thought especially considering the limited NMI context of a machine
check notification and the need to trap back into driver code.  I see
the code in fs/dax.c getting involved to translate a
process-physical-address back to a sector, but otherwise the rest of
the filesystem need not be involved.

>         - how does the filesystem query the bad block list without
>           adding layering violations?

Why does the file system need to read the list?

Apologies for answering this question with a question, but these
patches don't assume the filesystem will do anything with a bad block
list.

>         - when does the filesystem need to query the bad block list?
>         - how will the bad block list propagate through DM/MD
>           layers?
>         - how does the filesytem the map the bad block to a
>           path/file/offset without reverse mapping - does this error
>           handling interface really imply the filesystem needs to
>           implement brute force scans at notification time?

No, there is no implication that reverse mapping is a requirement.

>         - Is the filesystem expectd to find the active application or
>           address_space access that triggered the bad block
>           notification to handle them correctly? (e.g. prevent a
>           page fault from failing because we can recover from the
>           error immediately)

With these patches no, but it would be nice to incrementally add that
ability.  I.e. trap machine check faults on non-anonymous memory and
send a request down the stack to recover the sector if the storage
layer has a redundant copy.  Again, fs/dax.c would need extensions to
do this coordination, but I don't foresee the filesystem getting
involved beyond that point.

>         - what exactly is the filesystem supposed to do with the bad
>           block? e.g:
>                 - is the block persistently bad until the filesystem
>                   rewrites it? Over power cycles? Will we get
>                   multiple notifications (e.g. once per boot)?

Bad blocks on persistent memory media remain bad after a reboot.  Per
the ACPI spec the DIMM device tracks the errors and reports them in
response to an "address range scrub" command.  Each boot the libnvdimm
sub-system kicks off a scrub and populates the bad block list per pmem
namespace.  As mentioned above, we want to add the ability to
re-trigger this scrub on-demand, in response to a memcpy_from_pmem()
discovering an error, or after a SIGBUS is communicated to userspace.

>                 - Is the filesystem supposed to intercept
>                   reads/writes to bad blocks once it knows about
>                   them?

No, the driver handles that.

>                 - how is the filesystem supposed to communicate that
>                   there is a bad block in a file back to userspace?

-EIO on access.

>                   Or is userspace supposed to infer that there's a
>                   bad block from EIO and so has to run FIEMAP to
>                   determine if the error really was due to a bad
>                   block?

The information is there to potentially do forensics on why an I/O
encountered an error, but there is no expectation that userspace
follow up on each -EIO with a FIEMAP.

>                 - what happens if there is no running application
>                   that we can report the error to or will handle the
>                   error (e.g. found error by a media scrub or during
>                   boot)?

Same as RAID today, if the array is in sync the bad block will get
re-written during the scrub hopefully in advance of when an
application might discover it.  If no RAID is present then the only
notification is an on-access error.

>         - if the bad block is in filesystem free space, what should
>           the filesystem do with it?

Nothing.  When the free space becomes allocated we rely on the fact
that the filesystem will first zero the blocks.  That zeroing process
will clear the media error.

Now, in rare cases clearing the error might itself fail, but in that
case we just degenerate to the latent error discovery case.

> What I'm failing to communicate is that having and maintaining
> things like bad block lists in a block device is the easy part of
> the problem.
>
> Similarly reporting a bad block flag in FIEMAP is only a few
> lines of code to implement, but that assumes the filesystem has
> already propagated the bad block information into it's internal
> extents lists.
>
> That's the hard part of all this: connecting the two pieces together
> in a sane, reliable, consistent and useful manner. This will form
> the user API, so we need to sort it out before applications start to
> use it.

Applications are already using most of this model today.  The new
enabling we should consider is a way to take advantage of redundancy
at the storage driver layer to prevent errors from being reported to
userspace when redundant data is available.  Preventing
machine-check-SIGBUS signals from reaching applications is a new
general purpose error handling mechanism that might also be useful for
DRAM errors outside of pmem+DAX.

> However, if I'm struggling to understand how I'm supposed to
> connecct up the parts inside a filesytem, then expecting application
> developers to be able to connect the dots in a sane manner is
> bordering on fantasy....

Hopefully it is becoming clearer that we are not proposing anything
radically different than what is present for error recovery today
modulo thinking about the mechanisms to trap and recover a DAX read of
a bad media area via a DM/MD implementation.  DAX writes on the other
hand are more challenging in that we'd likely want to stage them and
wait to commit them until an explicit sync point.  However, this is
still consistent with the DAX programming model.  An application is
free to trade off raw access to the media for higher-order filesystem
and storage layer features provided by the kernel.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Rudoff, Andy May 3, 2016, 6:30 p.m. UTC | #50
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--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Dave Chinner May 4, 2016, 1:36 a.m. UTC | #51

On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 06:30:04PM +0000, Rudoff, Andy wrote:
> >
> >And when the filesystem says no because the fs devs don't want to
> >have to deal with broken apps because app devs learn that "this is a
> >go fast knob" and data integrity be damned? It's "fsync is slow so I
> >won't use it" all over again...
> ...
> >
> >And, please keep in mind: many application developers will not
> >design for pmem because they also have to support traditional
> >storage backed by page cache. If they use msync(), the app will work
> >on any storage stack, but just be much, much faster on pmem+DAX. So,
> >really, we have to make the msync()-only model work efficiently, so
> >we may as well design for that in the first place....
> 
> Both of these snippets seem to be arguing that we should make msync/fsync
> more efficient.  But I don't think anyone is arguing the opposite.  Is
> someone saying we shouldn't make the msync()-only model work efficiently?

Not directly. The argument presented is "we need a flag to avoid
msync, because msync is inefficient", which is followed by "look,
here's numbers that show msync() being slow, so just give us the
flag already". Experience tells me that the moment a workaround is
in place, nobody will go back and try to fix the problem that the
workaround is mitigating.

Now we know that it's the page granularity cache flushing overhead
that causes the performance differential rather than it being caused
by using msync(), we should be looking at ways to reduce the cache
flushing overhead, not completely bypassing it.

> Said another way: the common case for DAX will be applications simply
> following the POSIX model.  open, mmap, msync...  That will work fine
> and of course we should optimize that path as much as possible.  Less
> common are latency-sensitive applications built to leverage to byte-
> addressable nature of pmem.  File systems supporting this model will
> indicate it using a new ioctl that says doing CPU cache flushes is
> sufficient to flush stores to persistence.

You keep saying this whilst ignoring the repeated comments about how
this can not be guaranteed by all filesystems, and hence apps will
not be able to depend on having such behaviour present. The only
guarantee for persistence that an app will be able to rely on is
msync().

> But I don't see how that
> direction is getting turned into an argument against msync() efficiency.

Promoting a model that works around inefficiency rather than solving
it is no different to saying you don't care about fixing the
inefficiency....

I've said my piece, I'm not going to waste any more time going
around this circle again.

Cheers,

Dave.

Dave Chinner May 4, 2016, 3:18 a.m. UTC | #52

On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 10:28:15AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 6:51 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 04:25:51PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> [..]
> > Yes, I know, and it doesn't answer any of the questions I just
> > asked. What you just told me is that there is something that is kept
> > three levels of abstraction away from a filesystem. So:
> 
> Ok, let's answer them.
> 
> A lot of your questions seem to assume the filesystem has a leading
> role to play with error recovery, that isn't the case with traditional
> disk errors and we're not looking to change that situation. 

*cough* BTRFS

New filesystems are mostly being designed with redundancy and
recovery mechanisms built into them. Hence the high level
/assumption/ that filesystems aren't going to play a significant
role in error recovery for pmem storage is, well, somewhat
disturbing....

> The
> filesystem can help with forensics after an error escapes the kernel
> and is communicated to userspace, but the ability to reverse map a
> sector to a file is just a convenience to identify potential data
> loss.

So working out what file got corrupted in your terabytes of pmem
storage is "just a convenience"? I suspect that a rather large
percentage of admins will disagree with you on this.

> For redundancy in the DAX case I can envision DAX-aware RAID that
> makes the potential exposure to bad blocks smaller, but it will always
> be the case that the array can be out-of-sync / degraded and has no
> choice but to communicate the error to userspace.  So, the answers
> below address what we do when we are in that state, and include some
> thoughts about follow-on enabling we can do at the DM/MD layer.
> 
> >         - What mechanism is to be used for the underlying block
> >           device to inform the filesytem that a new bad block was
> >           added to this list?
> 
> The filesystem doesn't need this notification and doesn't get it today
> from RAID.

Why doesn't the filesystem need this notification? Just because we
don't get it today from a RAID device does not mean we can't use it.

Indeed, think about the btrfs scrub operation - it validates
everything on it's individual block devices, and when it finds a
problem (e.g. a data CRC error) it notifies a different layer in the
btrfs code that goes and works out if it can repair the problem from
redundant copies/parity/mirrors/etc.

> It's handy for the bad block list to be available to
> fs/dax.c and the block layer, but I don't see ext4/xfs having a role
> to play with the list and certainly not care about "new error detected
> events". 

That's very short-sighted. Just because ext4/xfs don't *currently*
do this, it doesn't mean other filesystems (existing or new) can't
make use of notifications, nor that ext4/XFS can't ever make use of
it, either.

> For a DM/MD driver it also does not need to know about new
> errors because it will follow the traditional disk model where errors
> are handled on access, or discovered and scrubbed during a periodic
> array scan.
>
> That said, new errors may get added to the list by having the pmem
> driver trigger a rescan of the device whenever a latent error is
> discovered (i.e. memcpy_from_pmem() returns -EIO).  The update of the
> bad block list is asynchronous.  We also have a task on the todo list
> to allow the pmem rescan action to be triggered via sysfs.

IOWs, the pmem driver won't report errors to anyone who can correct
them until an access to that bad block is made? Even if it means the
error might go unreported and hence uncorrected for weeks or months
because no access is made to that bad data?

> >           What context comes along with that
> >           notification?
> 
> The only notification the file system gets is -EIO on access.
> However, assuming we had a DAX-aware RAID driver what infrastructure
> would we need to prevent SIGBUS from reaching the application if we
> happened to have a redundant copy of the data?

We'd need the same infrastructure at the filesystem layer would
require if it has a redundant copy of the data. I don't know what
that is, however, because I know very little about about MCEs and
signal delivery (which is why I asked this question).

[....]

> The in-kernel recovery path, assuming RAID is present, needs more
> thought especially considering the limited NMI context of a machine
> check notification and the need to trap back into driver code.

This is precisely the problem I am asking about - I know there is a
limited context, but how exactly is it limited and what can we
actually do from this context? e.g. Can we schedule recovery work on
other CPU cores and wait for it to complete in a MCE notification
handler?

> I see
> the code in fs/dax.c getting involved to translate a
> process-physical-address back to a sector, but otherwise the rest of
> the filesystem need not be involved.

More /assumptions/ about filesystems not containing or being able to
recover from redudant copies of data.

> 
> >         - how does the filesystem query the bad block list without
> >           adding layering violations?
> 
> Why does the file system need to read the list?
> Apologies for answering this question with a question, but these
> patches don't assume the filesystem will do anything with a bad block
> list.

People keep talking about FIEMAP reporting bad blocks in files! How
the fuck are we supposed to report bad blocks in a file via FIEMAP
if the filesystem can't access the bad block list?

> >         - Is the filesystem expectd to find the active application or
> >           address_space access that triggered the bad block
> >           notification to handle them correctly? (e.g. prevent a
> >           page fault from failing because we can recover from the
> >           error immediately)
> 
> With these patches no, but it would be nice to incrementally add that
> ability.  I.e. trap machine check faults on non-anonymous memory and
> send a request down the stack to recover the sector if the storage
> layer has a redundant copy.  Again, fs/dax.c would need extensions to
> do this coordination, but I don't foresee the filesystem getting
> involved beyond that point.

Again, the /assumption/ here is that only the block layer has the
ability to recover, and only sector mapping is required from the fs.

> >         - what exactly is the filesystem supposed to do with the bad
> >           block? e.g:
> >                 - is the block persistently bad until the filesystem
> >                   rewrites it? Over power cycles? Will we get
> >                   multiple notifications (e.g. once per boot)?
> 
> Bad blocks on persistent memory media remain bad after a reboot.  Per
> the ACPI spec the DIMM device tracks the errors and reports them in
> response to an "address range scrub" command.  Each boot the libnvdimm
> sub-system kicks off a scrub and populates the bad block list per pmem
> namespace.  As mentioned above, we want to add the ability to
> re-trigger this scrub on-demand, in response to a memcpy_from_pmem()
> discovering an error, or after a SIGBUS is communicated to userspace.
> 
> >                 - Is the filesystem supposed to intercept
> >                   reads/writes to bad blocks once it knows about
> >                   them?
> 
> No, the driver handles that.

So, -EIO will be returned to the filesystem on access? If -EIO, then
we'll have to check over the bad block list to determine if data
recovery operations are required, right? Perhaps we need a different
error here to tell the higher layers it's a specific type of error
(e.g. -EBADBLOCK)?

> >                 - how is the filesystem supposed to communicate that
> >                   there is a bad block in a file back to userspace?
> 
> -EIO on access.

So no consideration for proactive "data loss has occurred at offset X
in file /mnt/path/to/file, attempting recovery" messages when the
error is first detected by the lowest layers?

> >                   Or is userspace supposed to infer that there's a
> >                   bad block from EIO and so has to run FIEMAP to
> >                   determine if the error really was due to a bad
> >                   block?
> 
> The information is there to potentially do forensics on why an I/O
> encountered an error, but there is no expectation that userspace
> follow up on each -EIO with a FIEMAP.

Ok, so how is userspace driven error recovery supposed to work if it
can't differentiate the cause of an EIO error? If there's no
requirement for FIEMAP to report the bad blocks in a file that needs
recovery, then what is the app supposed to do with the EIO? Indeed,
what consideration has been given to ensuring the app knows aheadi
of time that the filesystem FIEMAP implementation will report bad
blocks if they exist?

Of course, the filesystem has to know about the bad blocks to be
able to do any of this with FIEMAP....

> >                 - what happens if there is no running application
> >                   that we can report the error to or will handle the
> >                   error (e.g. found error by a media scrub or during
> >                   boot)?
> 
> Same as RAID today, if the array is in sync the bad block will get
> re-written during the scrub hopefully in advance of when an
> application might discover it.  If no RAID is present then the only
> notification is an on-access error.

More /assumptions/ that only device level RAID will be able to
recover....

> >         - if the bad block is in filesystem free space, what should
> >           the filesystem do with it?
> 
> Nothing.  When the free space becomes allocated we rely on the fact
> that the filesystem will first zero the blocks.  That zeroing process
> will clear the media error.

The incorrect /assumption/ here is that all allocations will do
block zeroing first. That's simply wrong. We do that for *user data*
in XFS and ext4, but we do not do it for metadata as they are not
accessed by DAX and, being transactionally protected, don't need
zeroing to prevent stale data exposure.

Hence we have a problem here - the first write to such blocks may
be metadata writeback of some type and so the filesystem will see
EIO errors in metadata writes and they'll freak out. What
now - does this really mean that we'll have to add special IO
falback code for all internal IO paths to be able to clear pmem bad
block errors?

Oh, and just a thought: lots of people are pushing for selectable
FALLOC_FL_NO_HIDE_STALE behaviour which will skip zeroing
of data blocks on allocation. If this happens, it we also skip
the zeroing on allocation, so again there is no mechanism to clear
bad block status in this case.....

[...]

> > However, if I'm struggling to understand how I'm supposed to
> > connecct up the parts inside a filesytem, then expecting application
> > developers to be able to connect the dots in a sane manner is
> > bordering on fantasy....
> 
> Hopefully it is becoming clearer that we are not proposing anything
> radically different than what is present for error recovery today
> modulo thinking about the mechanisms to trap and recover a DAX read of
> a bad media area via a DM/MD implementation.

There is a radical difference - there is a pervasive /assumption/ in
what is being proposed that filesystems are incapable of storing
redundant information that can be used for error recovery. The
current IO stack makes no such assumptions, even if it doesn't
provide any infrastructure for such functionality.

Cheers,

Dave.

Dan Williams May 4, 2016, 5:05 a.m. UTC | #53

On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 8:18 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 10:28:15AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 6:51 PM, Dave Chinner <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> > On Mon, May 02, 2016 at 04:25:51PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> [..]
>> > Yes, I know, and it doesn't answer any of the questions I just
>> > asked. What you just told me is that there is something that is kept
>> > three levels of abstraction away from a filesystem. So:
>>
>> Ok, let's answer them.
>>
>> A lot of your questions seem to assume the filesystem has a leading
>> role to play with error recovery, that isn't the case with traditional
>> disk errors and we're not looking to change that situation.
>
> *cough* BTRFS
>
> New filesystems are mostly being designed with redundancy and
> recovery mechanisms built into them. Hence the high level
> /assumption/ that filesystems aren't going to play a significant
> role in error recovery for pmem storage is, well, somewhat
> disturbing....

It is unfortunate is that you cite the lack of pmem enabling in btrfs
as a reason to block patches that hookup the kernel's existing error
mechanisms for the DAX case.  I expect btrfs multi-device
redundancy-management for pmem to be a more a coherent solution than
what we can achieve with single-device-filesystems + RAID.  I'm trying
not to boil the ocean in this discussion, but Iet's go ahead and rope
in btrfs-devel into this thread so we can make progress on hooking up
SIGBUS notifications for DAX errors and bypassing dax_do_io() to clear
errors.

>> The
>> filesystem can help with forensics after an error escapes the kernel
>> and is communicated to userspace, but the ability to reverse map a
>> sector to a file is just a convenience to identify potential data
>> loss.
>
> So working out what file got corrupted in your terabytes of pmem
> storage is "just a convenience"? I suspect that a rather large
> percentage of admins will disagree with you on this.

Yes, I will point them to their file system maintainer to ask about
reverse mapping support.

>> For redundancy in the DAX case I can envision DAX-aware RAID that
>> makes the potential exposure to bad blocks smaller, but it will always
>> be the case that the array can be out-of-sync / degraded and has no
>> choice but to communicate the error to userspace.  So, the answers
>> below address what we do when we are in that state, and include some
>> thoughts about follow-on enabling we can do at the DM/MD layer.
>>
>> >         - What mechanism is to be used for the underlying block
>> >           device to inform the filesytem that a new bad block was
>> >           added to this list?
>>
>> The filesystem doesn't need this notification and doesn't get it today
>> from RAID.
>
> Why doesn't the filesystem need this notification? Just because we
> don't get it today from a RAID device does not mean we can't use it.

If xfs and ext4 had a use for error notification today we would hook into it.

> Indeed, think about the btrfs scrub operation - it validates
> everything on it's individual block devices, and when it finds a
> problem (e.g. a data CRC error) it notifies a different layer in the
> btrfs code that goes and works out if it can repair the problem from
> redundant copies/parity/mirrors/etc.

Yes, just like RAID, sounds like we should definitely keep that in
mind for the patch set that adds pmem support to btrfs, this isn't
that patch set.

>> It's handy for the bad block list to be available to
>> fs/dax.c and the block layer, but I don't see ext4/xfs having a role
>> to play with the list and certainly not care about "new error detected
>> events".
>
> That's very short-sighted. Just because ext4/xfs don't *currently*
> do this, it doesn't mean other filesystems (existing or new) can't
> make use of notifications, nor that ext4/XFS can't ever make use of
> it, either.

Did I say "can't ever make use of it", no, if you have a need for a
notification for xfs let's work on a notification mechanism.

>
>> For a DM/MD driver it also does not need to know about new
>> errors because it will follow the traditional disk model where errors
>> are handled on access, or discovered and scrubbed during a periodic
>> array scan.
>>
>> That said, new errors may get added to the list by having the pmem
>> driver trigger a rescan of the device whenever a latent error is
>> discovered (i.e. memcpy_from_pmem() returns -EIO).  The update of the
>> bad block list is asynchronous.  We also have a task on the todo list
>> to allow the pmem rescan action to be triggered via sysfs.
>
> IOWs, the pmem driver won't report errors to anyone who can correct
> them until an access to that bad block is made? Even if it means the
> error might go unreported and hence uncorrected for weeks or months
> because no access is made to that bad data?

RAID periodically polls for and fixes bad blocks.  The currently
implementation only polls for errors at driver load.  When we
implement userspace triggered bad blocks scans we could also have a
cron job to periodically kick off a scan, which follows the status quo
for RAID error scanning.

>
>> >           What context comes along with that
>> >           notification?
>>
>> The only notification the file system gets is -EIO on access.
>> However, assuming we had a DAX-aware RAID driver what infrastructure
>> would we need to prevent SIGBUS from reaching the application if we
>> happened to have a redundant copy of the data?
>
> We'd need the same infrastructure at the filesystem layer would
> require if it has a redundant copy of the data. I don't know what
> that is, however, because I know very little about about MCEs and
> signal delivery (which is why I asked this question).

Fair enough.

> [....]
>
>> The in-kernel recovery path, assuming RAID is present, needs more
>> thought especially considering the limited NMI context of a machine
>> check notification and the need to trap back into driver code.
>
> This is precisely the problem I am asking about - I know there is a
> limited context, but how exactly is it limited and what can we
> actually do from this context? e.g. Can we schedule recovery work on
> other CPU cores and wait for it to complete in a MCE notification
> handler?
>
>> I see
>> the code in fs/dax.c getting involved to translate a
>> process-physical-address back to a sector, but otherwise the rest of
>> the filesystem need not be involved.
>
> More /assumptions/ about filesystems not containing or being able to
> recover from redudant copies of data.
>
>>
>> >         - how does the filesystem query the bad block list without
>> >           adding layering violations?
>>
>> Why does the file system need to read the list?
>> Apologies for answering this question with a question, but these
>> patches don't assume the filesystem will do anything with a bad block
>> list.
>
> People keep talking about FIEMAP reporting bad blocks in files! How
> the fuck are we supposed to report bad blocks in a file via FIEMAP
> if the filesystem can't access the bad block list?

Compare FIEMAP results against the badblocks list, or arrange for
FIEMAP to return the errors in file list by parsing the list against
the badblocks list available in the gendisk.  Shall I send a patch?
It does assume we can do a inode to bdev lookup.

>> >         - Is the filesystem expectd to find the active application or
>> >           address_space access that triggered the bad block
>> >           notification to handle them correctly? (e.g. prevent a
>> >           page fault from failing because we can recover from the
>> >           error immediately)
>>
>> With these patches no, but it would be nice to incrementally add that
>> ability.  I.e. trap machine check faults on non-anonymous memory and
>> send a request down the stack to recover the sector if the storage
>> layer has a redundant copy.  Again, fs/dax.c would need extensions to
>> do this coordination, but I don't foresee the filesystem getting
>> involved beyond that point.
>
> Again, the /assumption/ here is that only the block layer has the
> ability to recover, and only sector mapping is required from the fs.

Presently yes, in the future, no.

>
>> >         - what exactly is the filesystem supposed to do with the bad
>> >           block? e.g:
>> >                 - is the block persistently bad until the filesystem
>> >                   rewrites it? Over power cycles? Will we get
>> >                   multiple notifications (e.g. once per boot)?
>>
>> Bad blocks on persistent memory media remain bad after a reboot.  Per
>> the ACPI spec the DIMM device tracks the errors and reports them in
>> response to an "address range scrub" command.  Each boot the libnvdimm
>> sub-system kicks off a scrub and populates the bad block list per pmem
>> namespace.  As mentioned above, we want to add the ability to
>> re-trigger this scrub on-demand, in response to a memcpy_from_pmem()
>> discovering an error, or after a SIGBUS is communicated to userspace.
>>
>> >                 - Is the filesystem supposed to intercept
>> >                   reads/writes to bad blocks once it knows about
>> >                   them?
>>
>> No, the driver handles that.
>
> So, -EIO will be returned to the filesystem on access? If -EIO, then
> we'll have to check over the bad block list to determine if data
> recovery operations are required, right? Perhaps we need a different
> error here to tell the higher layers it's a specific type of error
> (e.g. -EBADBLOCK)?

That sounds reasonable.

>> >                 - how is the filesystem supposed to communicate that
>> >                   there is a bad block in a file back to userspace?
>>
>> -EIO on access.
>
> So no consideration for proactive "data loss has occurred at offset X
> in file /mnt/path/to/file, attempting recovery" messages when the
> error is first detected by the lowest layers?

That sounds reasonable too, what does xfs report today for disk errors?

>> >                   Or is userspace supposed to infer that there's a
>> >                   bad block from EIO and so has to run FIEMAP to
>> >                   determine if the error really was due to a bad
>> >                   block?
>>
>> The information is there to potentially do forensics on why an I/O
>> encountered an error, but there is no expectation that userspace
>> follow up on each -EIO with a FIEMAP.
>
> Ok, so how is userspace driven error recovery supposed to work if it
> can't differentiate the cause of an EIO error? If there's no
> requirement for FIEMAP to report the bad blocks in a file that needs
> recovery, then what is the app supposed to do with the EIO? Indeed,
> what consideration has been given to ensuring the app knows aheadi
> of time that the filesystem FIEMAP implementation will report bad
> blocks if they exist?

So, having a new flavor of FIEMAP that reports bad blocks in a file,
or a new SEEK_BADBLOCK flag for lseek() was proposed for situations
where an application could not simply take a list of badblocks from
sysfs and do an intersection operation with typical FIEMAP results to
see if a file was impacted.

Indeed btrfs is an example where the per-block-device list is unusable
for an application to do this FIEMAP intersection operation, but an
application on a single-device-ext4 filesystem could make use of the
list.

> Of course, the filesystem has to know about the bad blocks to be
> able to do any of this with FIEMAP....

Is there some complication about looking up the gendisk from the inode
that I'm overlooking?  Is there a different location we need to place
the error list to make it easy for the fs to consume?

>> >                 - what happens if there is no running application
>> >                   that we can report the error to or will handle the
>> >                   error (e.g. found error by a media scrub or during
>> >                   boot)?
>>
>> Same as RAID today, if the array is in sync the bad block will get
>> re-written during the scrub hopefully in advance of when an
>> application might discover it.  If no RAID is present then the only
>> notification is an on-access error.
>
> More /assumptions/ that only device level RAID will be able to
> recover....

Presently yes, in the future, no.

>
>> >         - if the bad block is in filesystem free space, what should
>> >           the filesystem do with it?
>>
>> Nothing.  When the free space becomes allocated we rely on the fact
>> that the filesystem will first zero the blocks.  That zeroing process
>> will clear the media error.
>
> The incorrect /assumption/ here is that all allocations will do
> block zeroing first. That's simply wrong. We do that for *user data*
> in XFS and ext4, but we do not do it for metadata as they are not
> accessed by DAX and, being transactionally protected, don't need
> zeroing to prevent stale data exposure.

Ah, great point.  See, I knew if we kept talking, something productive
would come out of this discussion, but I think we're still ok, see
below.

> Hence we have a problem here - the first write to such blocks may
> be metadata writeback of some type and so the filesystem will see
> EIO errors in metadata writes and they'll freak out.

As long as the filesystem writes before it reads metadata we're mostly
ok, because a block error is cleared on write, we don't return -EIO
for them, however...

> What
> now - does this really mean that we'll have to add special IO
> falback code for all internal IO paths to be able to clear pmem bad
> block errors?

...we still have the case where a badblock can develop in metadata
after writing it, we can't do anything about it unless some layer
somewhere implements redundancy.

> Oh, and just a thought: lots of people are pushing for selectable
> FALLOC_FL_NO_HIDE_STALE behaviour which will skip zeroing
> of data blocks on allocation. If this happens, it we also skip
> the zeroing on allocation, so again there is no mechanism to clear
> bad block status in this case.....

Outside of rewriting the file, yes I was aware of this and it breaks
the "delete to clear media errors" recovery model.  My only answer
right now is that we would need to document FALLOC_FL_NO_HIDE_STALE
with notifications about the fact that we lose the side-effect of
clearing latent media errors when block zeroing / trimming on
reallocation is disabled.

> [...]
>
>> > However, if I'm struggling to understand how I'm supposed to
>> > connecct up the parts inside a filesytem, then expecting application
>> > developers to be able to connect the dots in a sane manner is
>> > bordering on fantasy....
>>
>> Hopefully it is becoming clearer that we are not proposing anything
>> radically different than what is present for error recovery today
>> modulo thinking about the mechanisms to trap and recover a DAX read of
>> a bad media area via a DM/MD implementation.
>
> There is a radical difference - there is a pervasive /assumption/ in
> what is being proposed that filesystems are incapable of storing
> redundant information that can be used for error recovery.

That's not an assumption, it is a fact that DAX enabled filesystems
don't account for data redundancy today outside of "let the storage
layer do it".  I'm all for making this situation better than it is.

> The
> current IO stack makes no such assumptions, even if it doesn't
> provide any infrastructure for such functionality.

Great, lets start to fill in that hole with some patches to return
SIGBUS on a DAX fault hitting a bad block, and bypassing dax_do_io()
for O_DIRECT writes so userspace I/O can clear errors instead of
receiving -EIO for a write.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to [e-mail]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Patch

diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c
index c5837fa..d6113b9 100644
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -166,13 +166,24 @@  blkdev_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, loff_t offset)
 {
 	struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
 	struct inode *inode = bdev_file_inode(file);
+	ssize_t ret, ret_saved = 0;
 
-	if (IS_DAX(inode))
-		return dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, blkdev_get_block,
+	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
+		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, blkdev_get_block,
 				NULL, DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
-	return __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter, offset,
+		if (ret == -EIO && (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE))
+			ret_saved = ret;
+		else
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, I_BDEV(inode), iter, offset,
 				    blkdev_get_block, NULL, NULL,
 				    DIO_SKIP_DIO_COUNT);
+	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
+		return ret_saved;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int __sync_blockdev(struct block_device *bdev, int wait)
diff --git a/fs/ext2/inode.c b/fs/ext2/inode.c
index 824f249..64792c6 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/inode.c
@@ -859,14 +859,22 @@  ext2_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, loff_t offset)
 	struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
 	struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
 	size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
-	ssize_t ret;
+	ssize_t ret, ret_saved = 0;
 
-	if (IS_DAX(inode))
-		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, ext2_get_block, NULL,
-				DIO_LOCKING);
-	else
-		ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
-					 ext2_get_block);
+	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
+		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, ext2_get_block,
+				NULL, DIO_LOCKING | DIO_SKIP_HOLES);
+		if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
+			ret_saved = ret;
+		else
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset, ext2_get_block);
+	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
+		ret = ret_saved;
+
+ out:
 	if (ret < 0 && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
 		ext2_write_failed(mapping, offset + count);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/indirect.c b/fs/ext4/indirect.c
index 3027fa6..798f341 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/indirect.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/indirect.c
@@ -716,14 +716,22 @@  retry:
 						   NULL, NULL, 0);
 		inode_dio_end(inode);
 	} else {
+		ssize_t ret_saved = 0;
+
 locked:
-		if (IS_DAX(inode))
+		if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
 			ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
 					ext4_dio_get_block, NULL, DIO_LOCKING);
-		else
-			ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
-						 ext4_dio_get_block);
-
+			if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
+				ret_saved = ret;
+			else
+				goto skip_dio;
+		}
+		ret = blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
+					 ext4_get_block);
+		if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
+			ret = ret_saved;
+skip_dio:
 		if (unlikely(iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE && ret < 0)) {
 			loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode);
 			loff_t end = offset + count;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index dab84a2..27f07c2 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -3341,7 +3341,7 @@  static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
 {
 	struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
-	ssize_t ret;
+	ssize_t ret, ret_saved = 0;
 	size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
 	int overwrite = 0;
 	get_block_t *get_block_func = NULL;
@@ -3401,15 +3401,22 @@  static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
 	BUG_ON(ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode));
 #endif
-	if (IS_DAX(inode))
+	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
 		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset, get_block_func,
 				ext4_end_io_dio, dio_flags);
-	else
-		ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode,
-					   inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter, offset,
-					   get_block_func,
-					   ext4_end_io_dio, NULL, dio_flags);
+		if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
+			ret_saved = ret;
+		else
+			goto skip_dio;
+	}
 
+	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode,
+				   inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter, offset,
+				   get_block_func,
+				   ext4_end_io_dio, NULL, dio_flags);
+	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
+		ret = ret_saved;
+ skip_dio:
 	if (ret > 0 && !overwrite && ext4_test_inode_state(inode,
 						EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN)) {
 		int err;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
index d445a64..7cfcf86 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
@@ -1413,6 +1413,7 @@  xfs_vm_direct_IO(
 	dio_iodone_t		*endio = NULL;
 	int			flags = 0;
 	struct block_device	*bdev;
+	ssize_t 		ret, ret_saved = 0;
 
 	if (iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE) {
 		endio = xfs_end_io_direct_write;
@@ -1420,13 +1421,22 @@  xfs_vm_direct_IO(
 	}
 
 	if (IS_DAX(inode)) {
-		return dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
+		ret = dax_do_io(iocb, inode, iter, offset,
 				 xfs_get_blocks_direct, endio, 0);
+		if (ret == -EIO && iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE)
+			ret_saved = ret;
+		else
+			return ret;
 	}
 
 	bdev = xfs_find_bdev_for_inode(inode);
-	return  __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, bdev, iter, offset,
+	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, bdev, iter, offset,
 			xfs_get_blocks_direct, endio, NULL, flags);
+
+	if (ret < 0 && ret_saved)
+		ret = ret_saved;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*