diff mbox

[RFC,4/8] evm: Turn evm_update_evmxattr into void function

Message ID 1462229118-13123-5-git-send-email-agruenba@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Andreas Gruenbacher May 2, 2016, 10:45 p.m. UTC 
The return value of evm_update_evmxattr is never used.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        |  7 +++----
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 14 ++++++--------
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

Comments

James Morris May 4, 2016, 7:23 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Tue, 3 May 2016, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:

> The return value of evm_update_evmxattr is never used.

Perhaps it should be used, otherwise there are potential silent failure 
paths in the EVM code.
Andreas Gruenbacher May 4, 2016, 11:20 a.m. UTC | #2 
On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 9:23 AM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 3 May 2016, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
>
>> The return value of evm_update_evmxattr is never used.
>
> Perhaps it should be used, otherwise there are potential silent failure
> paths in the EVM code.

Yes, perhaps. That's not the only place in EVM / IMA where such
failures are silently
ignored though; the code seems to need some work.

Thanks,
Andreas
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diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index f5f1272..8b1cef07 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -39,10 +39,9 @@  extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
 
 int evm_init_key(void);
-int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			const char *req_xattr_name,
-			const char *req_xattr_value,
-			size_t req_xattr_value_len);
+void evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+			 const char *req_xattr_value,
+			 size_t req_xattr_value_len);
 int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 		  const char *req_xattr_value,
 		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 30b6b7d0..3ac6407 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -239,24 +239,22 @@  int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
  *
  * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
  */
-int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+void evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
-	int rc = 0;
+	int rc;
 
 	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 			   xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
-					   &xattr_data,
-					   sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
+		__vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &xattr_data,
+				      sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
 	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && inode->i_op->removexattr) {
-		rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
+		inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
 	}
-	return rc;
 }
 
 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,