From patchwork Tue Jul 17 19:09:04 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Fasheh X-Patchwork-Id: 10530365 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 725A4601D2 for ; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:09:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62E2529710 for ; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:09:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 56DE529722; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:09:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3F7D29710 for ; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:09:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729980AbeGQTn2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:43:28 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:37758 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729970AbeGQTn2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:43:28 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay1.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8DFFAF4B; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:09:25 +0000 (UTC) From: Mark Fasheh To: Al Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, "Darrick J . Wong" , Adam Borowski , David Sterba , Mark Fasheh Subject: [RESEND][PATCH v4 0/2] vfs: better dedupe permission check Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 12:09:04 -0700 Message-Id: <20180717190906.31073-1-mfasheh@suse.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.15.1 Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Hi Al, The following patches fix a couple of issues with the permission check we do in vfs_dedupe_file_range(). I sent them out for a few times now, a changelog is attached. If they look ok to you, I'd appreciate them being pushed upstream. You can get them from git if you like: git pull https://github.com/markfasheh/linux dedupe-perms I also have a set of patches against 4.17 if you prefer. The code and testing are identical: git pull https://github.com/markfasheh/linux dedupe-perms-v4.17 The first patch expands our check to allow dedupe of a file if the user owns it or otherwise would be allowed to write to it. Current behavior is that we'll allow dedupe only if: - the user is an admin (root) - the user has the file open for write This makes it impossible for a user to dedupe their own file set unless they do it as root, or ensure that all files have write permission. There's a couple of duperemove bugs open for this: https://github.com/markfasheh/duperemove/issues/129 https://github.com/markfasheh/duperemove/issues/86 The other problem we have is also related to forcing the user to open target files for write - A process trying to exec a file currently being deduped gets ETXTBUSY. The answer (as above) is to allow them to open the targets ro - root can already do this. There was a patch from Adam Borowski to fix this back in 2016: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/17/130 which I have incorporated into my changes. The 2nd patch fixes our return code for permission denied to be EPERM. For some reason we're returning EINVAL - I think that's probably my fault. At any rate, we need to be returning something descriptive of the actual problem, otherwise callers see EINVAL and can't really make a valid determination of what's gone wrong. This has also popped up in duperemove, mostly in the form of cryptic error messages. Because this is a code returned to userspace, I did check the other users of extent-same that I could find. Both 'bees' and 'rust-btrfs' do the same as duperemove and simply report the error (as they should). Please apply. Thanks, --Mark Changes from V3 to V4: - Add a patch (below) to ioctl_fideduperange.2 explaining our changes. I will send this patch once the kernel update is accepted. Thanks to Darrick Wong for this suggestion. - V3 discussion: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg79135.html Changes from V2 to V3: - Return bool from allow_file_dedupe - V2 discussion: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg78421.html Changes from V1 to V2: - Add inode_permission check as suggested by Adam Borowski - V1 discussion: https://marc.info/?l=linux-xfs&m=152606684017965&w=2 From: Mark Fasheh [PATCH] ioctl_fideduperange.2: clarify permission requirements dedupe permission checks were recently relaxed - update our man page to reflect those changes. Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh --- man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 b/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 index 84d20a276..7dea0323d 100644 --- a/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 +++ b/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 @@ -105,9 +105,11 @@ The field must be zero. During the call, .IR src_fd -must be open for reading and +must be open for reading. .IR dest_fd -must be open for writing. +can be open for writing, or reading. If +.IR dest_fd +is open for reading, the user should be have write access to the file. The combined size of the struct .IR file_dedupe_range and the struct @@ -185,8 +187,8 @@ This can appear if the filesystem does not support deduplicating either file descriptor, or if either file descriptor refers to special inodes. .TP .B EPERM +This will be returned if the user lacks permission to dedupe the file referenced by .IR dest_fd -is immutable. .TP .B ETXTBSY One of the files is a swap file.