From patchwork Thu Jun 18 13:48:25 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Adrian Reber X-Patchwork-Id: 11612231 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 310C3618 for ; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 13:50:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1849320656 for ; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 13:50:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="dOqScK8n" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730532AbgFRNuH (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Jun 2020 09:50:07 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.61]:29027 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730526AbgFRNuH (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Jun 2020 09:50:07 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1592488205; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=oJm9QsQNjyNKb25LuVwhqvqveb7Phcc9WaN/omydpzc=; b=dOqScK8nu3YDMdkdNgyZAfSThjNYEanbQVCemCSYXJeqIPoFi5FyODdza392E7TouJ+8sD A67KKwWqi1HqQ2bGTDROwOMI0dHKVL75Y3SW2nXGHzBpIKpm9wKf5jUxQkPAMO9WjtJrPD 67aMkq82yHu3c7ybrvIr3az//HsTMqQ= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-354-MNpJvKkvPtyHa9-pfR19tg-1; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 09:50:00 -0400 X-MC-Unique: MNpJvKkvPtyHa9-pfR19tg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7D864835B40; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 13:49:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dcbz.redhat.com (ovpn-112-197.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.112.197]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 012841E2260; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 13:49:45 +0000 (UTC) From: Adrian Reber To: Christian Brauner , Eric Biederman , Pavel Emelyanov , Oleg Nesterov , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Andrei Vagin , Nicolas Viennot , =?utf-8?b?TWljaGHFgiBDxYJh?= =?utf-8?b?cGnFhHNraQ==?= , Kamil Yurtsever , Dirk Petersen , Christine Flood , Casey Schaufler Cc: Mike Rapoport , Radostin Stoyanov , Adrian Reber , Cyrill Gorcunov , Serge Hallyn , Stephen Smalley , Sargun Dhillon , Arnd Bergmann , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris , Jann Horn , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 3/3] prctl: Allow ptrace capable processes to change exe_fd Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 15:48:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20200618134825.487467-4-areber@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20200618134825.487467-1-areber@redhat.com> References: <20200618134825.487467-1-areber@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org From: Nicolas Viennot The current process is authorized to change its /proc/self/exe link via two policies: 1) The current user can do checkpoint/restore In other words is CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable. 2) The current user can use ptrace. With access to ptrace facilities, a process can do the following: fork a child, execve() the target executable, and have the child use ptrace() to replace the memory content of the current process. This technique makes it possible to masquerade an arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones. This commit also changes the permission error code from -EINVAL to -EPERM for consistency with the rest of the prctl() syscall when checking capabilities. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber --- kernel/sys.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 00a96746e28a..ce77012a42d7 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -2007,12 +2007,23 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { /* - * Make sure the caller has the rights to - * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should - * be allowed to. + * The current process is authorized to change its + * /proc/self/exe link via two policies: + * 1) The current user can do checkpoint/restore + * In other words is CAP_SYS_ADMIN or + * CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable. + * 2) The current user can use ptrace. + * + * With access to ptrace facilities, a process can do the + * following: fork a child, execve() the target executable, + * and have the child use ptrace() to replace the memory + * content of the current process. This technique makes it + * possible to masquerade an arbitrary program as the target + * executable, even if it is setuid. */ - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EINVAL; + if (!(checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns()) || + security_ptrace_access_check(current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS))) + return -EPERM; error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); if (error)