From patchwork Tue Apr 5 07:20:18 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 12801366 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 789D0C433F5 for ; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:53:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239257AbiDEJxN (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 05:53:13 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41748 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S244165AbiDEJlJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Apr 2022 05:41:09 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 850F2BABB2; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 02:25:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22EE96164E; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:25:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0CD8CC385A0; Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:25:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1649150722; bh=qf4ZwozjSQoZIc83YqsJxUrUHToM2owTQGjbfuCX/KU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=EmoXBARIZ7xj0IZzawdm+k2cqzZUTo02txyP3HbmeUr0tnpVHvpOv8iyaRHSDqDIT oxshoyUled4saJ8wtvS23eix+wsNAIxnVZxyKgzK9okkofqFaP8z7epYM2E2CTdvri Z9+o4OYgR8+NsWhxpi8Zk8dOR+SNyRLqEDP82Dfo= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Ariadne Conill , Michael Kerrisk , Matthew Wilcox , Christian Brauner , Rich Felker , Eric Biederman , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Andy Lutomirski Subject: [PATCH 5.15 156/913] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:20:18 +0200 Message-Id: <20220405070344.514801608@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220405070339.801210740@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220405070339.801210740@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org From: Kees Cook commit dcd46d897adb70d63e025f175a00a89797d31a43 upstream. Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill: "In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[2]: The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider. This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]." While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] existing userspace programs. The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv. Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so userspace has some notice about the change: process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org/ [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0 [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C%5Cs*NULL&literal=0 [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Reported-by: Ariadne Conill Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Rich Felker Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: Ariadne Conill Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/exec.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -494,8 +494,14 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linu * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. + * + * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a + * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused + * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking + * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. + * See do_execveat_common(). */ - ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); + ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (limit <= ptr_size) return -E2BIG; limit -= ptr_size; @@ -1895,6 +1901,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, st } retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); + if (retval == 0) + pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", + current->comm, bprm->filename); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; @@ -1921,6 +1930,19 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, st if (retval < 0) goto out_free; + /* + * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to + * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing + * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also + * bprm_stack_limits(). + */ + if (bprm->argc == 0) { + retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out_free; + bprm->argc = 1; + } + retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1949,6 +1971,8 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_fil } retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) + retval = -EINVAL; if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval;