From patchwork Thu Sep 20 00:19:54 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 10606729 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 871CE14BD for ; Thu, 20 Sep 2018 00:20:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 761272CEF1 for ; Thu, 20 Sep 2018 00:20:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 6A5B22CEFE; Thu, 20 Sep 2018 00:20:34 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.8 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE1B82CEF1 for ; Thu, 20 Sep 2018 00:20:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1733276AbeITGA1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Sep 2018 02:00:27 -0400 Received: from sonic306-10.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com ([74.6.132.49]:43776 "EHLO sonic306-10.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1733270AbeITGA1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Sep 2018 02:00:27 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1537402800; bh=3J+qiALNxSw/NGUe+je3zM3JHobyUgbDaAYk6Vg2OGo=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From:Subject; b=TR0+9qy1hlq/5tq65vK+1jP1csZCU9cNJiwMzOq4g8qI+ODAzveda18RMEl8+pka3BO13odL4Of/5EPXbSqyoVCoxiZLEe4RP25CnjbuQj8jUic/dKsHFbzugEJDLB7JnhSivTtEaT/fJpkYngsw7thWBchtueszkOonmQVUx1dJLHDZiJZhrjY1QYX1yDp6KbhNMXOx9AN9Y8CAmymUtA3dj6qUBLUkwgnHuA+VrNCkSlVWDIKHSq03D+4b0ey4BjIpH1N1Rvia9ll8vcI/QdxEDGIaX/zo3IwbYX3wIMnElS441JTK7k1PVFtKuOHAZr3SZ3LK8EEZlbG4qBs3iA== X-YMail-OSG: uPnWRtkVM1mpTeDQueSnU7BYFzvCKJZi_k7FuoWmghS5MGHTP8otPKePicrwIuL 7ZlQoogatDE7q.DNYIm8Lj5VflgyIIvXbEdndp_4jMedVpN2GfxDtIdjOvbTZvYCjUnKP2JWLeQR Vgm9DboTdqCr2FVZlnwzOzJ1JtTxb32aKsLjNkh5qx3ex8EGkpSv.MJ4Y_Guplr8AgYJ0HmTpZCD jzC9S23Jy2E800MCMtiD4H25RRYH5SuuWEH_15tph.eknaxB2CFf_zxivo8cOH9ar3WPqcVzkxF9 Gu0WZEOXQCCvex_JIMI7xzbdeHADHV7QZd6LYHnTHyQXQ_ZYDqzxzPmGBRaTu7LMX_S_3q1orKsf dUbXRQ5P4Ac._f9VjN.GpVCSTypF1KJoivKbaUr.T8qK8GI0PJFIKe4OCY98.ime2SQf.FTx26iz gt8r0m2Qwd4lbblKoHtxtITlwHAOuP3D3rVMWArd2Kv_Zk_QdO5Y9.s.ZvVBRO1U6KlsgflHMHed bQOHDwGe0GE47L5gTw3sCE5IOhnRPITFyWs1dYkOLZxo9baiCSU9YVi8aVc_MyhqzmH8RHa3_JS7 HUxDE8HjgAVAUQjwC85HMZtAHKhkFWUhEClKFMilhTf0xdftO_J.lIMctzxH1EWh4JG9Xi9QCWb. 07RBiDSgyYUmx_kIrhMXOf5ry9s2n9T40Ld1LYasP.UvQ_1pv4IaAt5E5F7Tw1bGVyFlPlveMe_0 Y7FAptZaWn7LDLm76lwqQlb1HCmkoK2hZPKJ4.vAhuVdoWTjk8FVEOtMSIAhllHWk9kjDfWSp5kP 8gqp5fI4N8JgL3CLUQYltHDsjtj7JVZxKcwA.CKeYBIijg.ckXizeOvvVRsiFHF9A4fS2q0cS.Yl u9WMzvprrJCDoHHoMPDv._4bzqmIYZK2xk26.GGkVnrvA8ZS3P0Pfs5.jmuCKz6H7wmyL6gibECS EGNhTmR9ZErQYMt3LLbadT1MOt4Lfy6jDrfcOxehiiCPU.bvcfPLxkT09Wyo.ycWlO74p5IXzOqb wpwAUOh2kfwvkz9EOGC_5A1Lctn2Jfk8- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic306.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com with HTTP; Thu, 20 Sep 2018 00:20:00 +0000 Received: from c-67-169-65-224.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (EHLO [192.168.0.102]) ([67.169.65.224]) by smtp417.mail.bf1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID bdf8f880f25bcf7d213f06dfcd9fb6dd; Thu, 20 Sep 2018 00:19:58 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [PATCH v3 03/16] SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob To: LSM , James Morris , SE Linux , LKLM , John Johansen , Kees Cook , Tetsuo Handa , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , Alexey Dobriyan , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Salvatore Mesoraca References: <748c61cb-b6fa-c36d-a7b3-2315ff6292af@schaufler-ca.com> From: Casey Schaufler Message-ID: Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 17:19:54 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <748c61cb-b6fa-c36d-a7b3-2315ff6292af@schaufler-ca.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob Don't use the cred->security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 54 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +++ security/selinux/xfrm.c | 4 +-- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ad9a9b8e9979..9d6cdd21acb6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec = cred->security; + tsec = selinux_cred(cred); return tsec->sid; } @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, @@ -1949,7 +1949,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; @@ -1971,7 +1971,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, if (rc) return rc; - rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir, + rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2478,8 +2478,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->called_set_creds) return 0; - old_tsec = current_security(); - new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; + old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); isec = inode_security(inode); /* Default to the current task SID. */ @@ -2643,7 +2643,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; - new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; + new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; @@ -2686,7 +2686,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct itimerval itimer; u32 osid, sid; int rc, i; @@ -2989,7 +2989,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, u32 newsid; int rc; - rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), + rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); @@ -3009,14 +3009,14 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, int rc; struct task_security_struct *tsec; - rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security, + rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; - tsec = new->security; + tsec = selinux_cred(new); tsec->create_sid = newsid; return 0; } @@ -3026,7 +3026,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 newsid, clen; int rc; @@ -3036,7 +3036,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, newsid = tsec->create_sid; - rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), + rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir, qstr, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); @@ -3498,7 +3498,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return -ENOMEM; } - tsec = new_creds->security; + tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); tsec->create_sid = sid; @@ -3918,7 +3918,7 @@ static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) */ static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); /* * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or @@ -3938,7 +3938,7 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; struct task_security_struct *tsec; - old_tsec = old->security; + old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); if (!tsec) @@ -3953,8 +3953,8 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security; - struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; + const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); + struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; } @@ -3970,7 +3970,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -3995,7 +3995,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -4544,7 +4544,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; @@ -4564,7 +4564,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); @@ -5442,7 +5442,7 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 tsid; - __tsec = current_security(); + __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); tsid = __tsec->sid; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -6379,7 +6379,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, unsigned len; rcu_read_lock(); - __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security; + __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (current != p) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -6502,7 +6502,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ - tsec = new->security; + tsec = selinux_cred(new); if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { tsec->exec_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { @@ -6631,7 +6631,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, if (!ksec) return -ENOMEM; - tsec = cred->security; + tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; else diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index cc5e26b0161b..734b6833bdff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -158,4 +158,9 @@ struct bpf_security_struct { u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/ }; +static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred) +{ + return cred->security; +} + #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 91dc3783ed94..8ffe7e1053c4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, gfp_t gfp) { int rc; - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; u32 str_len; @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) */ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); if (!ctx) return 0;